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SOCIETE NA TIONALE INDUSTRIELLE AEROSPA TIALE V.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT: THE SUPREME
COURT UNDERMINES THE HAGUE EVIDENCE
CONVENTION AND CONFOUNDS THE
INTERNATIONAL DISCOVERY PROCESS
I.

INTRODUCTION

The American approach to gathering evidence abroad during litiga-

tion of transnational disputes in domestic courts has given rise to more
international friction than any other aspect of the American legal sys-

tem.1 The liberal pre-trial procedures used in the United States differ
materially from those in most other common-law and civil-law countries.2 The American method of "leaving no stone unturned" during pretrial discovery conflicts both philosophically and procedurally with the

legal systems of foreign nations.' For example, in civil-law countries,4
1. RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (REVISED) § 437 reporters' note 1 (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1986) [hereinafter RESrATEMENT

(REVISED)].
2. Carter, ObtainingForeign Discovery and Evidence for Use in Litigation in the United
States: Existing Rules and Procedures, 13 INT'L LAw. 5, 5 (1979).
In other common-law countries, pre-trial procedures permit little discovery of matters
that are not clearly relevant for trial. Id. at 6. Therefore, American "discovery" is often
spoken of as "the portion of pre-trial discovery not within the realm of competent, material
and admissible evidence." Id. The two spheres are considered mutually exclusive. Id. (footnote omitted).
Civil-law systems do not share the common law concept of a trial as a separate, isolated
episode of litigation. Id. "The typical civil proceeding in a civil law country is actually a series
of isolated meetings... and written communications between counsel and the judge, in which
evidence is introduced, testimony is given, procedural motions and rulings are made, and so
on." J. MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION 112 (2d ed. 1985). Matters that are ordinarily concentrated into a common-law trial are spread over numerous appearances and written
acts before the judge who is taking the evidence. Id. Each appearance is relatively brief and
involves only a small portion of the entire case, such as examining only one witness or introducing only one or two pieces of material evidence. Id. at 113. Therefore, the element of
surprise usually associated with American trial proceedings is reduced to a minimum. Id.
"Discovery is less necessary because there is little, if any, tactical or strategic advantage to be
gained from the element of surprise." Id. Pre-trial proceedings are unnecessary because there
is no trial. Id. "[I]n a sense every appearance in the first two stages of a civil law proceeding
has both trial and pre trial characteristics." Id. See infra text accompanying notes 21-52 for a
comparison of the civil-law and common-law systems.
3. D. ROSENTHAL & W. KNIGHTON, NATIONAL LAWS AND INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE: THE PROBLEM OF EXTRATERRITORIALITY 70 (1982); see infra text accompanying
notes 21-52.
4. "The civil law world includes a great number of national legal systems in Europe,
Latin America, Asia, Africa, and the Middle East." J. MERRYMAN, supra note 2, at ix-x.
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evidence gathering is regarded as a judicial function.'

Judges, not the

parties or lawyers, question witnesses and prepare a resume of the evidence during the course of the proceedings.6 In addition, foreign litigants are often prohibited by foreign penal statutes from disclosing
certain evidence, or are protected from disclosing information based on

extremely broad notions of privilege and confidentiality. 7 American atFrance, Germany, Italy, Switzerland, Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Japan are all considered
civil-law nations. Id. at 1. Nevertheless, there are differences in procedures and rules among
the legal systems of these countries. Id. France and Germany, for example, have been characterized as "atypical" and "more advanced" than other civil-law systems. Id. at ix-x. Therefore, in this Note, any comparative discussion of common-law and civil-law legal systems is
necessarily limited only to the significant, general differences between those systems. For an
excellent list of books on the civil law generally, on elements of the civil-law tradition, and on
the law of specific nations or areas, see Recommended Readings in J. MERRYMAN, supra note
2, at 161-64.
5. S. SEIDEL, EXTRATERRrrORIAL DISCOVERY IN INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION 23

(1984). In France, for example, "evidence is only submitted in written form, at least at the
beginning of a trial." Borel & Boyd, Opportunitiesfor and Obstacles to ObtainingEvidence in
Francefor Use in Litigation in the United States, 13 INTL LAw. 35, 36 (1979). Oral testimony
is not required unless the judge considers the documents submitted by the parties to be inconclusive. Id. Borel and Boyd explain further:
At this stage, control of the evidence gathering process passes from the parties
to the judge, to whom the French Code of Civil Procedure grants broad and exclusive powers. The judge alone has power to order specific types of factual investigation which he deems appropriate: for example, inspection of particular sites;
examination or testing of physical evidence; and written reports of oral testimony by
expert witnesses. Only the judge has power to appoint an expert or an investigator,
define his terms of reference, fix his compensation, and set a time limit for submission
of the investigative report.
Similarly, the judge alone has the right to summon the parties or non-party
witnesses to give oral evidence and to take official note of their testimony. Such
testimony is never transcribed verbatim; only a written summary is prepared. Each
of the parties and their counsel may request the judge to summon additional parties,
witnesses or experts, but a French judge is not bound to accede to such requests, and
there is no right of appeal from an adverse decision.
Id. at 36 (footnote omitted). For the most part, the parties and their attorneys are silent
spectators. They are permitted to speak only when the judge authorizes them to do so. Id. at
37. The French Code of Civil Procedure illustrates how limited the parties' roles are: "The
parties must not interrupt, interrogate, or seek to influence witnesses who give evidence, nor
address them directly, under penalty of being excluded from the Court." Id. at 36-37 (citing
C. PR. Civ., art. 214).
6. Borel & Boyd, supra note 5, at 36-37.
7. See Rosenthal & Yale-Loehr, Two Cheersfor the ALI Restatement's Provisions on Foreign Discovery, 16 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL.1075, 1076-78 (1984); Lowenfeld, Book Review,
16 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1205, 1209-12 (1984) (reviewing D. ROSENTHAL & W.
KNIGHTON, NATIONAL LAWS AND INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE: THE PROBLEM OF ExTRATERRITORIALITY (1982)). For example, in the Federal Republic of Germany, "the spouse

of a party may refuse to testify in any action, even if the marriage no longer exists." Shemanski, ObtainingEvidence in the FederalRepublic of Germany: The Impact of the Hague Evidence
Convdntion on German-American JudicialCooperation, 17 INT'L LAW. 465, 485 (1983) (footnote omitted). The privilege "also extends to the betrothed of a party." Id. Further,
"[p]ersons who are or were related to a party by blood or marriage in direct line, related by
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tempts to obtain evidence abroad often produce hostile opposition from
foreign governments as well. American discovery methods affect the

sovereign jurisdiction of foreign countries and are often inconsistent with
the underlying philosophies and domestic practices of those states. 9
Transnational litigation thus presents unique problems for our court

system10 as well as for multinational enterprises caught between United
States laws compelling discovery and foreign laws prohibiting it.11 Foreign and multinational enterprises that become parties to domestic litigation are often compelled to produce evidence located abroad, the
disclosure of which is contrary to the laws and public policies of the foreign state in which the enterprises are organized.12 In the United States,
litigants rely on the courts to ensure that relevant information from adversaries is produced during litigation. At the same time, our courts face
serious problems enforcing domestic discovery laws extraterritorially
against foreign parties.
The complexity of transnational discovery disputes has hampered
the development of a uniform and practical method of conducting discovery abroad. Any workable solution must reconcile issues of private
and public international law with existing state and federal rules of procedure. In 1972, the United States ratified the Hague Convention on the
Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, a multilat13
eral treaty intended to resolve the problem of securing evidence abroad.
blood up to the third degree or by marriage up to the second degree in the collateral line may
also refuse to give testimony." Id. (footnote omitted). Besides familial privileges, additional
privileges based on official or professional secrecy are also recognized. Id. Further, a witness
may refuse to testify on technical grounds. Id. at 486. Specifically, section 384 of the West
German Code of Civil Procedure (Zivil-prozessordnung) provides that a witness may refuse to
give evidence:
(1) on questions the reply to which might cause immediate financial damage to the
witness or any person with whom he has a familial relationship;
(2) on questions the reply to which might disgrace the witness or his relatives ...or
expose them to the risk of being prosecuted for an offense or breach of regulation;
and
(3) on questions to which the witness could not reply without disclosing an art or
trade secret.
Id. at 486 (footnote omitted).
8. McLean, The Hague Evidence Convention: Its Impact on American Civil Procedure, 9
Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 17 (1986).
9. von Mehren, Discovery Abroad- The Perspective of the U.S. Private Practitioner,16
N.Y.U. J.INT'L L. & POL. 985 (1984).
10. Betti, Reconciling American and Civil Law Concerns in Taking Evidence Abroad: A
Reevaluation of the Compromise from the Hague, 10 ASILS INT'L L.J. 109, 110 (1986).
11. Rosenthal & Yale-Loehr, supra note 7, at 1075.
12. Oxman, The Choice Between DirectDiscovery and Other Means of ObtainingEvidence
Abroad: The Impact ofthe HagueEvidence Convention, 37 U. MIAMI L. REV.733, 735 (1983).
13. The Hague Evidence Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Com-
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Although the Hague Evidence Convention was intended to facilitate international discovery and encourage judicial cooperation, 14 it has not
been used extensively by American litigants. I" The effectiveness of the
treaty has been undermined by judicial disagreement over whether it is
the exclusive means of obtaining evidence abroad and over how the
treaty interacts with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. State and
federal courts disagree on the impact of the Convention on the domestic
laws of the United States. 6
In Socidtj Nationale Industrielle Adrospatiale v. United States Dis-

trict Court, 7 the United States Supreme Court was presented with the
question of whether a domestic litigant should employ the procedures of
the Hague Evidence Convention or the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
when attempting to collect evidence from a foreign party litigant over
whom the court has personal jurisdiction.'" The Court held that the
Hague Evidence Convention is merely an optional supplement to the
Federal Rules, but does not preempt or supercede them.' 9 Lower courts
were instructed to assess each case individually to determine whether the
Convention should be used.
The Court's holding sidestepped significant problems associated
with transnational discovery disputes20 and created a serious setback for
litigants involved in international litigation. The Court's decision also
thwarts the effectiveness of the Hague Evidence Convention. As a result,
many complex obstacles associated with foreign evidence gathering,
which the Hague Evidence Convention was intended to alleviate, once
again will plague courts and litigants. Moreover, the Court's decision
displays a weak commitment to international judicial cooperation, and
can only foster the perception held by foreign nations that the United
States is an inflexible and uncooperative international participant.
mercial Matters, openedfor signatureMarch 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 7444, 847
U.N.T.S. 231 [hereinafter "Hague Evidence Convention" or "Convention"]. The Convention
is codified following 28 U.S.C. § 1781 (1983). Additionally, the Convention and a complete
listing of all declarations and reservations currently in force are reprinted in 8 MARTINDALEHUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY, Selected International Conventions, Part VII, 12 (1987).
A multilateral treaty is one that is negotiated by and involves more than two parties. G.
VON GLAHN, LAW AMONG NATIONS 488-89 (1986).
14. Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 13, at Preamble.
15. von Mehren, supra note 9, at 992.
16. I B. RisTAU, INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE (CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL)
§ 5:40, at 253 (1984); see infra text accompanying notes 128-74. See generally B. RISTAU,
supra, § 5:40, at 253-256.4.
17. 107 S. Ct. 2542 (1987) [hereinafter Arospatiale].
18. Id. at 2546.
19. Id. at 2553.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 21-52.
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This Note examines the ramifications of Adrospatialeon the international discovery process. As background to the discussion of Adrospatiale, this Note initially explores the problems associated with gathering
evidence abroad, which arise from conflicting substantive and procedural
national customs and from the existence of foreign legislation designed to
curb intrusive American discovery procedures. Second, this Note provides an overview of the history and relevant procedures of the Hague
Evidence Convention. Next, this Note reviews the conflicting lines of
precedents that emerged prior to Adrospatialeconcerning the application
of the Hague Evidence Convention, as well as the evolution of the
Supreme Court's current position on the Convention. The analysis of
Adrospatiale follows. Finally, since the Court failed to provide any guidance for lower courts on how to assess whether the Hague Evidence
Convention should be used, this Note proposes guidelines to assist trial
courts in that determination.

II. THE DIFFICULTIES ASSOCIATED WITH OBTAINING
EVIDENCE ABROAD

A.

Conflicting Legal Systems

Obtaining evidence abroad is required in a variety of situations.2 1
Over the past decade, the United States government's ability to gather
evidence abroad has been crucial to its efforts to enforce antitrust laws
and to investigate and prosecute securities violations.2 2 Private products
liability disputes involving foreign nationals are also increasing as global
economic interdependence intensifies.2"
Most often, evidence is needed from nonparty witnesses located
abroad.2 4 In these circumstances, domestic litigants expect to be sub21. Carter, supra note 2, at 8. Although extraterritoriality problems arise in many areas of
the law, including antitrust, securities regulation and tax, this Note focuses only on the issues
that relate to private litigation of tort, contract and commercial disputes.
22. See SEC Official Discusses InternationalLaw Enforcement, [Vol. 85-224] The SEC
Today (Wash. Serv. Bur.) at 1-2 (Nov. 20, 1985).
23. See generally Brief for the Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the United
States, Inc., Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc., and Volkswagen AG as Amici Curiae in
Support of Petitioners, Soci6t6 Nationale Industrielle A6rospatiale v. United States District
Court, 107 S. Ct. 2542 (1987) (No. 85-1695).
24. Carter, supra note 2, at 8.
If the witness is an American citizen or resident located abroad, a jurisdictional basis
for the issuance of a subpoena directing appearance in this country may be found in
28 U.S.C. § 1783. There is no reported record of the use of this power to direct an
American subpoena to a resident alien located outside the United States, however.
Id. n.6. The uniform procedures of the Hague Evidence Convention have been considered
particularly useful for obtaining evidence from non-party witnesses. See generally id. at 9-17.
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jected to the procedural and substantive constraints of a foreign jurisdiction. Frequently, however, discovery is sought from foreign litigants
over whom an American court has asserted personal jurisdiction.25 In
these instances, courts and lawyers often encounter difficulties in ob26
taining evidence in countries with markedly different legal systems.
Conflicts arise both as to the scope of evidence sought and the procedures
by which evidence is obtained.
The first source of conflict in transnational discovery disputes concerns the scope of the evidence sought by American litigators. American
discovery practices are the most extensive in the world. 27 Pre-trial discovery includes "both the process by which counsel learn about the facts
in issue and the methods by which they preserve testimony, obtain writ28
ten admissions and authenticate documents for introduction at trial.1
Ordinarily, both functions are accomplished simultaneously with pretrial investigation overlapping with the preparation of relevant evidence
in a suitable form for introduction at trial.2 9 Under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 26(b)(1), "[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the
pending action ... [as long as] the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence."3 0 This
broad scope of discovery often produces evidence that is neither material
nor relevant, and thus proves inadmissible at trial.3 "
In other common-law countries, pre-trial procedures generally only
permit discovery of matters that are relevant for trial.3 2 In England, for
example, although disclosure and production of documents are required
of all parties routinely, 3 interrogatories are only available by court order,3 4 and discovery from non-parties is generally not allowed.3 5 Depositions are rarely used and are only available when answers to
25. Id. at 8.
26. LETTER OF SUBMITTAL TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE CONVENTION ON TAKING OF EVIDENCE ABROAD IN CIVIL OR COMMERCIAL MATTERS, SEN.
ExEc. Doc. A, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., VI (1972) [hereinafter LETTER OF SUBMITTAL].

27. S. SEIDEL, supra note 5, at 21 (citing von Mehren, Discovery of Documentary and
Other Evidence in a Foreign Country, 77 AM. J. INT'L. L. 896 (1983)).
28. Carter, supra note 2, at 6.
29. Id.

30. FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b)(1).
31. Carter, supra note 2, at 6.

32. Id.
33. J. LEVINE, DISCOVERY: A COMPARISON BETWEEN ENGLISH AND AMERICAN CIVIL
DISCOVERY LAW WITH REFORM PROPOSALS 19-21, 185 (1982); see also id. 17-39.

34. Id. at 12-16, 193.
35. S. SEIDEL, supra note 5, at 24. In Collins, Opportunitiesfor andObstacles to Obtaining
Evidence in Englandfor Use in Litigation in the United States, 13 INT'L LAW. 27 (1979), the

November 1988]

HAGUE EVIDENCE CONVENTION

interrogatories are insufficient. 36 In civil-law systems, such as France
and Germany, it is the judge, during trial, who determines the type and
scope of evidence that must be produced.37 The concept of a "pre-trial
discovery phase" does not exist in the civil-law system. 38 In civil-law
litigation, "the issues are defined as the proceeding goes on."3 9 Each appearance before the judge usually consists of examining one witness or
introducing one or two pieces of relevant evidence." Therefore, discovery and pre-trial procedures are less important because there is "little, if
any, tactical or strategic advantage to be gained from the element of surprise."41 Civil-law lawyers often have difficulties determining when an

"action" has "commenced" in a common-law court.42 They understand

the term "discovery" to mean all investigation that occurs prior to the
initiation of a lawsuit.4 3 These conceptual and linguistic differences have
produced misunderstandings and intensified foreign reluctance to coop-

erate with American pre-trial discovery requests. 44
author explains the essential differences between discovery procedures in the United States and
England:
First, English pleadings, the equivalent to the complaint and answer in the United
States, have a far greater particularity than their American counterparts, the length
of which is sometimes, if not always, matched by their vagueness. Second, English
discovery is limited largely (although not necessarily exclusively) to the discovery of
documents---each party, once the pleadings are finalized, has to disclose to the other
all relevant unprivileged documents relating to the issues in its possession. If a party
makes insufficient discovery, then the other party may apply by affidavit to the court
for an order for fuller disclosure-but the discovery procedure (it must be emphasized) is not oral, and does not extend to third parties. Third, there is, except in rare
situations, such as libel cases, no jury in civil proceedings in England.
Id. at 27-28. See generally J. LEviNE, supra note 33, at 95-111.
36. J. LEVINE, supra note 33, at 8, 61-67.
37. See Borel & Boyd, supra note 5, at 36-37; Shemanski, supra note 7, at 466-67. In J.
MERRYMAN, supra note 2, the author notes that in civil-law systems other than France and
Germany, the questions put to a witness by the judge during the civil proceeding are often
based on questions submitted in writing by counsel for the parties. Id. at 114-15.
38. J. MERRYMAN, supra note 2, at 112-14; see supra note 2.
A typical civil proceeding in a civil-law jurisdiction is divided into three separate
stages. There is a brief preliminary stage, in which the pleadings are submitted and a
hearing judge (usually called the instructing judge) appointed; an evidence-taking
stage, in which the hearing judge takes the evidence and prepares a summary written
record; and a decision-making stage, in which the judges who will decide the case
consider the record transmitted to them by the hearing judge, receive counsel's briefs,
hear their arguments, and render decisions.
J. MERRYMAN, supra note 2, at 111-12. See generally id. at 111-23 for further comparison of
civil-law and common-law practices.
39. J. MERRYMAN, supra note 2, at 113.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Carter, supra note 2, at 6.
43. Id.
44. id.
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A second source of conflict arises from the procedures used to obtain evidence in different legal systems. 45 In common-law countries, including the United States, pre-trial discovery is conducted primarily by
the parties, and the role of the court is to "enforce applicable rules, re-

solve procedural disputes, and protect against potential abuse."46 In
civil-law countries, an "inquisitorial" rather than an "adversarial" system of justice exists.4 7 Judges, not the parties or the lawyers, question
witnesses and take evidence as a component of the trial itself.48 Only the
judge may compel witnesses to appear and give testimony. 49 Oral testi-

mony is never transcribed verbatim; rather, the judge dictates a summary
of the testimony to the court clerk."
Procedural differences therefore create two serious problems for the

American litigator seeking evidence abroad. First, an American lawyer
who conducts an unsupervised deposition or inspects documents abroad,
according to American custom, may violate the "judicial sovereignty" of
a foreign state by improperly performing a public judicial act.51 Second,

evidence collected abroad may be produced in a form that is inadmissible
in an American court.5 2
B. Foreign Blocking Legislation
American litigators are often confronted by a more serious obstacle
in attempting to secure information, documents and witness testimony
45. See supra notes 2, 4 & 5.
46. Borel & Boyd, supra note 5, at 35-36.
47. S.SEIDEL, supra note 5, at 23.
48. Id.; see supra notes 2, 4, 5 & 33; see also Borel & Boyd, supra note 5, at 36-37; Shemanski, supra note 7, at 466-67.
49. Borel & Boyd, supra note 5, at 36.
50. Borel & Boyd, supra note 5, at 36-37; Shemanski, supra note 7, at 466-67.
51. Carter, supra note 2, at 6-7. Under the doctrine ofjudicial sovereignty, "the courts do
not merely supervise private parties' role in the gathering of evidence but themselves take the
primary role in obtaining and presenting evidence." Id. If an American attorney improperly
performs a judicial act, this is viewed as an infringement of the foreign state's judicial sovereignty unless special authorization has been granted. Id. at 7.
52. S. SEIDEL, supra note 5, at 26-27. FED. R. Civ. P. 28(b) provides in part that:
Evidence obtained in response to a letter rogatory need not be excluded merely for
the reason that it is not a verbatim transcript or that the testimony was not taken
under oath or for any similar departure from the requirements for depositions taken
wthin the United States under these rules.
Id. Although evidence may be admissible, the "value or weight" of the evidence may be
affected:
Whether or to what degree the value or weight of the evidence may be affected by the
method of taking or recording the testimony is left for determination according to
the circumstances of the particular case ...; the testimony may indeed be so devoid
of substance or probative value as to warrant its exclusion altogether.
FED. R. Civ. P. 28 advisory committee's note (citations omitted).
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abroad: foreign nondisclosure laws. 3 Commonly known as "blocking
statutes," these laws are "designed to take advantage of the foreign government compulsion defense." 54 They prohibit the "disclosure, copying,
inspection or removal of documents located in the territory of the enact'5 5
ing state in compliance with orders of foreign authorities.
Blocking statutes cover a variety of situations. At a minimum, they
prohibit foreign nationals from disclosing information that is considered
vital to foreign sovereign interests, or information considered secret
under foreign law. 6 Violators are usually subject to criminal penalties,
including fines and imprisonment. 5 7 Foreign blocking legislation has
been enacted by many nations over the past thirty years primarily in response to the extraterritorial application of American antitrust and securities laws.5 8 Although blocking statutes were originally intended to
protect foreign commercial interests against the unilateral application of
American economic policies,59 the statutes' broad prohibitions are now
invoked in private commercial litigation to preclude disclosure of potentially harmful information to adverse parties."o
Foreign reliance on a blocking statute typically occurs in the following situation: an American litigant who has filed suit in a federal court
53. See Batista, ConfrontingForeign "Blocking" Legislation: A Guide to Securing Disclosurefrom Non-resident Partiesto American Litigation, 17 INT'L LAW. 61, 62 (1983); see infra
text accompanying notes 549-66.
54. RESTATEMENT (REvISED), supra note 1, § 437 reporters' note 4. The doctrine of foreign government compulsion consists of the notions that (1) a foreign national may not be
required to do an act in the state of which he is a national if it is prohibited by the law of that
state; and (2) a foreign naticnal may not refrain from doing an act in the state of which he is a
national if it is required by the law of that state. RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (REVISED) § 436 (Tent. Draft No. 6, Apr. 12, 1985).
55. RESTATEMENT (REVISED), supra note 1, § 437 reporters' note 4.
56. S. SEIDEL, supra note 5, at 33. Examples include information in connection with antitrust claims in which treble damages are unheard of in the foreign country or disclosure of
information in bank secrecy situations. Id. at note.
57. RESTATEMENT (REvISED), supra note 1, § 437 reporters' note 4.
58. Carter, supra note 2, at 7. Blocking legislation has also been inspired by disputes relating to admiralty, oil, uranium and aviation. S. SEIDEL, supranote 5, at 33-34. "Some 15 states
as of 1985 had adopted legislation expressly designed to counter U.S. efforts to secure production of documents situated outside the United States; other states, such as Switzerland, have
had bank and business secrecy laws in effect for longer periods and not directed specifically
against the United States." RESTATEMENT (REvISED), supra note 1, § 437 reporters' note 1.
59. Rosdeitcher, ForeignBlocking Statutesand U.S. Discovery: A Conflict of NationalPolicies, 16 N.Y.U. J. INT'L. L. & POL. 1066 (1984).
60. See Brief of Amicus Curiae the Republic of France in Support of Petitioners at 10-12,
Soci& Nationale Industrielle Arospatiale v. United States District Court, 107 S. Ct. 2542
(1987) (No. 85-1695) (France's blocking law applies to pre-trial discovery in any matter pending outside France); D. ROSENTHAL & W. KNIGHTON, supra note 3, at 75-76; Batista, supra
note 53, at 66.
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serves document requests, interrogatories or a notice of deposition pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on a foreign party over whom
the court has personal jurisdiction. The adverse party typically responds
by stating that no information can be disclosed because compliance with
the request may lead to the imposition of criminal penalties under foreign
law." The American litigant may then seek an order compelling responses, which is generally ineffective.6 2 A litigant can attempt to enforce the order against the foreign adversary by seeking a variety of
sanctions. 63 Nevertheless, American courts, when faced with the difficult,
if not insurmountable task of balancing the competing sovereign and pri61. Batista, supra note 53, at 62. In Batista, supra note 53, at 63-72, the author reviews the
most frequently invoked blocking statutes:
1. Australia, Foreign Proceedings (Prohibition of Certain Evidence) Act, 1976, Austl.
Acts No. 121 (broad prohibition of disclosures related to uranium production);
2. Canada, Uranium Information Security Regulations, Stat. 0. & R., 76-644 (P.C.
1976-2368, Sept. 21, 1976), promulgated under authority of Atomic Energy Control Act,
R.S.C. (1970) ch. A-19 (intended to completely prohibit any disclosure relating to uranium
production);
3. England, Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch. 187. "Enacted in response to
U.S. antitrust proceedings in the uranium and shipping industries, this legislation is an arsenal
of legal devices to counter extraterritorial legislation and proceedings seen to infringe on British sovereignty. On the subject of discovery, section 2 authorizes the British Secretary of State
for Trade to issue orders prohibiting, inter alia, the furnishing of commercial information or
documents by any person in the U.K. to any foreign court, tribunal or authority if the foreign
directive to provide such information or document 'infringes [on] the jurisdiction of the United
Kingdom or is otherwise prejudicial to the sovereignty of the United Kingdom.'" S. SEIDEL,
supra note 5, at 335-36 (citing British Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch. 11,
§ 2(2)(a));
4. France, Pub. Law No. 80-538, 1980 J.O. 1799, 1980 D.S.L. 285 (July 17, 1980). The
legislative history of this law clearly demonstrates that it was "designed as an effort to preclude
pre trial discovery of French nationals involved as parties in American litigation." Batista,
supra note 53, at 65; see also Toms, French Response to U.S. Antitrust Laws, 15 INT'L LAW.
585, 588-90 (1981). The law applies to "forbid most business-related communications, if
harmful to France, to foreign public authorities by persons having a presence in France, and to
prohibit the gathering in France of business-related information with a view to foreign litigation." Id. at 586;
5. South Africa, Atomic Energy Act, § 30A(l)(a), 1978 (precludes the disclosure of any
information connected to the production, exportation, refinement, possession, ownership of
source materials or derivatives thereof).
62. Batista, supra note 53, at 62-63. The requesting party is entitled to move for an order
compelling responses pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a).
63. Pursuant to FED. R. CIv. P. 37(b), possible sanctions include the entry of a default
judgment, striking pleadings or defenses, precluding the introduction of evidence, drawing adverse inferences at trial, fines, property forfeitures, impositions of fees and any other reasonable
and constitutional sanction.
Of course, a litigant may forego bringing a costly, and probably futile, motion to compel,
and alternatively attempt to obtain needed information from domestic subsidiaries which may
have access to the same information, or from other parties to the litigation who may be in a
more favorable position of producing the information. Batista, supra note 53, at 62.
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vate interests involved, rarely impose "effective sanctions to enforce orders of disclosure.""
The existence and use of foreign blocking legislation intensifies the
difficulties experienced by American litigators seeking evidence from foreign litigants. The problem also affects many foreign nationals who are
faced with a choice between refusing to comply with the requirements of
a United States court or facing criminal sanctions for violation of their
own domestic nondisclosure laws.6" By relying on the Hague Evidence
Convention to gather evidence abroad, domestic litigants often can circumvent applicable blocking statutes. The French blocking statute, in
particular, is subject to existing treaties and can not be invoked if a request is made pursuant to the Convention. 6 However, when discovery
proceeds pursuant to state or federal rules of civil procedure, the interplay between domestic and foreign laws creates complex international
dilemmas.6 7
64. Batista, supra note 53, at 63; S. SEIDEL, supra note 5, at 36. The principal case concerning the imposition of sanctions when foreign blocking legislation and domestic discovery
orders conflict is Soci6t6 Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales,
S.A. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958). See infra notes 554-57 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Rogers. The RESTATEMENT (REVISED), supra note 1, § 437 reporters' note 8
states:
Subsequent [to Rogers] U.S. cases have drawn on different aspects of the
Supreme Court's opinion. Some have focused on the requirement of good faith in
attempting to secure permission to disclose documents covered by foreign secrecy
laws,... others have focused on the Court's unwillingness to use the ultimate sanction of dismissal in instances of foreign government compulsion; still others have
applied the Court's suggestion that inferences unfavorable to the non-producing
party may be drawn even if that party is not at fault; and some have stressed the
Court's emphasis on a case-by-case approach and reliance on discretion of the district
court.
Id.
65. As one commentator has observed:
This dilemma is particularly acute for corporations that may have subsidiaries, affiliates, or licensees in a large number of countries. An attempt by one country to use
its power over a corporation or the corporation's employees and property located in
its territory to compel acts to be done in the territory of a foreign state that are illegal
under the latter's laws places the corporation or its officers or employees in a situation in which they cannot avoid committing a crime in one of the countries.
Oxman, supra note 12, at 750 n.46.
66. See infra notes 563-65 and accompanying text.
67. S.SEIDEL, supra note 5, at 37. The problem of foreign blocking legislation has generated a tremendous amount of controversy and comment. It is not the purpose of this Note to
attempt to resolve the issues raised by the application of foreign blocking legislation; however,
recognizing the problems created by nondisclosure laws is vital to understanding the complexity of transnational discovery disputes.
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III. THE HAGUE EVIDENCE CONVENTION
A.

History and Purpose of the Convention

The Hague Conference on Private International Law is an association of sovereign states which has conducted sessions periodically since
1893.68 The United States began participating as a member in 1964 pursuant to congressional authorization. 69 In 1965, the Hague Convention
on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil
or Commercial Matters (Hague Service Convention) was adopted. It
was subsequently ratified by the Senate in 1967.70 The Hague Service
Convention is currently the exclusive means by which judicial and extrajudicial documents can be served abroad. 1 "Because of widespread support attracted by the [Hague] Service Convention and the long-standing
interest of American lawyers in improving procedures for international
judicial assistance, the United States took the initiative in proposing a
complementary convention on the taking of evidence abroad."7 2
At the urging of the State Department and Department of Justice,
the Hague Conference organized a Special Commission to prepare a draft
of the Hague Evidence Convention. 73 The Advisory Committee on Private International Law formed a working group of experts to assist the
Special Commission in preparing the Convention. 7 4 The working group
consisted of practicing attorneys, professors and lawyers in the Department of Justice and the State Department. 75 The Special Commission
68. Soci6t6 Nationale Industrielle A6rospatiale v. United States District Court, 107 S.Ct.
2542, 2548 (1987).
69. Id. (citing LETTER OF SUBMITTAL TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES ON
THE CONVENTION ON TAKING OF EVIDENCE ABROAD IN CIVIL OR COMMERCIAL MATTERS,

SEN. EXEC. Doc. A, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., V (1972)).

70. 20 U.S.T. 361, T.I.A.S. No. 6638, 658 U.N.T.S. 163, done at the Hague November 15,
1965 [hereinafter "Hague Service Convention"].
71. Id. at art. 1.
72. STATEMENT OF CARL F. SALANS, Deputy Legal Adviser, Department of State, Con-

vention on Taking of Evidence Abroad, S. Exec. Rep. No. 95, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 3 (1972)
[hereinafter STATEMENT OF CARL F. SALANs].
73. Adrospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2548.

74. Report of the United States Delegation to Eleventh Session of Hague Conference on
Private InternationalLaw, 8 I.L.M. 785, 805 (1969) [hereinafter 1969 Report of the United
States Delegation].
75. Id. at 805. The expert working group was comprised of: Philip W. Amram, Chairman; Michel A. Coccia of Baker and McKenzie, Chicago; Richard D. Kearney, Department
of State; Lucien R. Le Liavre, Coudert Brothers, New York; Arthur R. Miller, Professor of
Law, Michigan Law School; Bruno A. Ristau, Civil Division, Department of Justice; Alvin J.
Rockwell, Brobeck, Phleger and Harrison, San Francisco; Rudolf B. Schlesinger, Professor of
Law, Cornell Law School; and Frederick Smith, Jr., Deputy Administrator, Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, Department of State. Id.
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produced a complete draft of the Convention, accompanied by a seventythree page explanatory report. 76 The final text of the Convention was

approved by the Hague Conference in 1968 without a dissenting vote. 7

It was signed on behalf of the United States in 1970, and ratified by a
unanimous vote of the Senate in 1972.78 Presently, eighteen governments,
including the United States, are parties to the Hague Evidence
79
Convention.
The Hague Evidence Convention was designed to "bridge [the] differences between the common-law and civil-law approaches to the taking

of evidence abroad." 80 Prior to adopting the Convention, the United
States had a liberal policy of international judicial assistance to help for-

eign parties obtain evidence in the United States for use abroad. Title 28,
United States Code sections 1781 and 1782,81 and Public Law 88-619,82
provided an open system of assistance to foreign parties without requiring reciprocity.8 3 On the other hand, since the civil-law nations viewed
evidence gathering as a judicial function, with the parties in the
subordinate position of assisting the courts,8 4 many countries insisted
that American litigants use complicated and expensive letters rogatory or
letters of request to collect evidence within their borders.8 5 Many nations simply refused to provide meaningful judicial assistance in the absence of a treaty or convention.86
76. Id.
77. Amram, supra note 73, at 104.
78. Adrospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2549 (citing 118 CONG. REc. 20623 (1972)).
79. Barbados, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, Federal Republic of
Germany, Israel, Italy, Luxemburg, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States are parties to the Convention. See 8 MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIREcTORY, Selected International Conventions, Part VII, 15
(1987).
80. LETTER OF SUBMrIrAL, supra note 26, at VI. Prior to ratification, the Department of
State expressed its support for the compromises embodied in the Convention:
The success of the Conference in working out a convention to improve procedures
for taking evidence abroad is perhaps attributable in large measure to the difficulties
experienced by courts and lawyers in obtaining evidence in countries with markedly
different legal systems. In many cases existing procedures were not only complicated
and expensive; once the evidence was obtained it was frequently in a form that was
without value in the requesting state.
STATEMENT OF CARL F. SALANS, supra note 72, at 3. See also Amram, United States Ratification of the Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad, 67 AM. J. INT'L L. 104
(1973).
81. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1781-1782 (1983).
82. 78 Stat. 995 (1964).
83. 1969 Report of the United States Delegation, supra note 74, at 808.
84. Id. at 806.
85. Amram, The ProposedConvention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad, 55 A.B.A. J.651,
651 (1969).
86. Id.
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The Convention established a system for obtaining evidence abroad
that would be "tolerable" to the state executing the request but would
produce "utilizable" evidence in the requesting state.8 7 The United
States did not expect the European countries to change their public policies and local procedures to fully conform to our domestic practices. 88
Rather, all signatories were expected to agree, in international litigation,
to follow as closely as possible the procedures of the requesting state.8 9
The Convention was intended to provide a set of minimum standards

with which all contracting states agreed to comply.9 0 Significantly, the
Convention was designed to preserve the availability of all internal do-

mestic laws of each signatory state that were more flexible than Convention procedures. 9 1 A focal point in the negotiations was the agreement
embodied in Article 27 of the Convention.9 2 If the existing domestic

laws of a responding state provided more flexible procedures than the
those domestic proceConvention to enable a litigant to collect evidence,
93
party.
requesting
a
to
available
dures remained
Prior to ratification of the Convention, the drafters emphasized that

the existing United States policy of liberal international judicial assistance would remain unaffected. 94 The drafters asserted that the Conven87. Id. (citing P. AMRAM, EXPLANATORY REPORT ON THE CONVENTION ON THE TAKREP. A, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess., 11 (1972)). The Letter of Submittal from Secretary of State William P. Rogers
to President Nixon explained that the Convention was designed to:
1. Make the employment of letters of request a principal means of obtaining
evidence abroad;
2. Improve the means of securing evidence abroad by increasing the powers of
consuls and by introducing in the civil law world, on a limited basis, the concept of
the commissioner;
3. Provide means for securing evidence in the form needed by the court where
the action is pending; and
4. Preserve all more favorable and less restrictive practices arising from internal law, internal rules of procedure and bilateral or multilateral conventions.
LETTER OF StBMriTAL, supra note 26, at VI.
88. Amram, supra note 85, at 655; see also 1969 Report of the United States Delegation,
supra note 74, at 806.
89. 1969 Report of the United States Delegation, supra note 74, at 806.
90. LETrER OF SUBMrITAL, supra note 26, at VI (emphasis added); see also Amram, supra
note 85, at 655.
91. Amram, supra note 80, at 107; Amram, supra note 85, at 655.
92. See infra notes 452-64 and accompanying text.
93. Amram, supra note 80, at 107.
94. 1969 Report of the United States Delegation,supra note 74, at 808; Amram, supra note
85, at 652. Philip Amram observed:
For instance, the liberal and open practice in the United States under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1782, Section 3.02 of the Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act and
the law in most of the fifty states will remain unchanged. Any changes in the details
of internal United States practice will be minimal, while the assistance to United
States courts and litigants in other nations will be enlarged.
ING OF EVIDENCE ABROAD IN CIVIL OR COMMERCIAL MAT=ERS, S. EXEC.
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tion "makes no major changes in United States procedure and requires
no major changes in United States legislation or rules.""5 The drafters
observed that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure had been amended to
modernize domestic practices. The Convention was expected to complement the Federal Rules and provide reliable and modem discovery procedures for use in international litigation.96 The drafters also
contemplated that the Convention might be supplemented by bilateral
side agreements and side conventions.9"
The drafting and negotiating history of the Convention reflects that

the civil-law nations agreed to radically modify their existing practices in
an effort to reach a novel solution to the international discovery problem.98 On the other hand, the United States had "everything to gain" by
ratifying the Convention9 9 and had to make very few changes in its policies in order to comply with the Convention's terms. °°
B.

Overview of Convention Procedures

1. Procedures for obtaining evidence abroad
The Hague Evidence Convention entitles a party to seek judicial
assistance in "civil or commercial matters." 10 1 Each signatory state is
required to designate a "Central Authority," which is responsible for receiving requests and transmitting them to the proper executing authority.10 2 Three different procedures are available for obtaining evidence
Id. n.8.
95. STATEMENT OF CARL F. SALANS, supra note 72, at 5.

96. Amram, supra note 80, at 105.
97. Amram, supra note 85, at 655.
98. Amram, supra note 80, at 106-07. Amram recounted that:
One of the great failures in the prior practice was the difficulty or impossibility of
securing subpoena assistance from courts abroad to require a recalcitrant witness to
appear to give his testimony in aid of a U. S. proceeding. Article 10 of the Convention provides, in mandatory terms that "appropriate" compulsion must be exercised
to compel a recalcitrant witness to respond to letters of request to the same extent
that compulsion would be provided by the requested court under the same circumstances in a domestic proceeding in its own court. This is a vast benefit, heretofore
unknown.
Id.
99. Amram, supra note 85, at 655.
100. 1969 Report of the United States Delegation,supra note 74, at 808; Amram, supra note
80, at 105.
101. Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 13, at art. 1. This Note only provides a basic
overview of the procedures contained in the Hague Evidence Convention and is not intended
as an exhaustive explanation of all of its terms and conditions. For a more comprehensive
discussion of the Convention, see generally B. RisTAu, supra note 16; Oxman, supra note 12;
McLean, supra note 8; Betti, supra note 10.
102. Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 13, at art. 2. The designated "Central Authority" for each contracting state is set forth in the declarations following the text of the
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abroad, and are set forth in Chapters I and II (Articles 1-22) of the

Convention.
First, a Letter of Request, commonly known as an international letter rogatory, may be forwarded to the Central Authority of a foreign
state for execution.10 a A Letter of Request is the method most likely to
produce evidence from a reluctant witness, since a foreign judicial au-

thority may use its power to compel a witness to respond."° Second,
diplomatic or consular officials (consuls) may obtain evidence.105 Consuls are restricted to taking evidence for use only in proceedings commenced in the courts of a State which they represent.10 6 Consuls may,
however, take evidence for other purposes from their own nationals, 10 7 or

from a national of the host state, 0 8 provided that the evidence is not
obtained under compulsion.' 0 9 Third, evidence may be obtained through

the appointment of an official commissioner." 0 To the extent permitted
by law, an American attorney can be appointed as a commissioner to

obtain evidence personally.1 ' Commissioners are permitted to take evi-

dence without compulsion from all types of witnesses, whether or not the

witness is a national of the host state, for use in "proceedings commenced
in the courts of another Contracting State.""' 2 When necessary, consuls
Convention. For example, the United States Department of Justice is the designated Central
Authority for the United States. 8 MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY, Selected International Conventions, Part VII, 21 n.4 (1987). The Department serves as a receiving authority
only. B. RISTAu, supra note 16, § 5-8, at 187. Generally, however, after a letter of request has
been executed, it may be returned directly to the issuing authority in the requesting state (i.e.,
attorney or tribunal) without directing a completed request to the Central Authority first. See
id. at 190-91.
103. Articles I through 14 of Chapter I of the Convention deal with Letters of Request and
regulate their form, content, methods of transmission, language, method and technique of execution, compulsion, privileges, grounds for refusal to execute the letter and costs. B. RISTAu,
supra note 16, § 5-3, at 179.
104. Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 13, at art. 10; see also Borel & Boyd, supra
note 5, at 38.
105. Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 13, at arts. 15 & 16.
106. Id. at art. 15.
107. Id. at art. 15. A consul is not required to seek permission from the host state to take
evidence from a national of his own state unless the host state has fied a declaration to that
effect. Id.
108. Id. at art. 16. A consul must obtain the permission of the competent authority in the
host state prior to taking evidence from a national of the host state; however, this requirement
may be waived by declaration. Id.
109. Id. at arts. 15 & 16.
110. Id. at art. 17.
111. See Borel & Boyd, supra note 5, at 42.
112. Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 13, at art. 17. A commissioner must obtain
the permission of the host state prior to taking evidence under Article 17; however, this requirement may be waived by declaration. Id.
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or commissioners can apply to the appropriate judicial authority in a
host state for assistance in obtaining the evidence by compulsion. 113 The
use of a consul or commissioner is likely to be easier and quicker than a
Letter of Request since neither requires the involvement of a foreign
court. Nevertheless, both methods are generally effective only in cases in
which a witness is willing to be deposed or produce requested
evidence. 114
2.

Article 23 and Article 27

Chapter III (Articles 23-42) contains the general clauses pertaining
to the operation of the Convention. This section covers details regarding
the Central Authority and contains provisions as to when a state may
derogate from the Convention's procedures. 15 Two general provisions,
Article 23 and Article 27, have proven to be the most controversial aspects of the Convention.' 6
Article 23 provides that "[a] Contractingstate may at the time of
signature,ratificationor accession, declare that it will not execute Letters
of Request issued for the purpose of obtainingpre-trialdiscovery of documents as known in Common Law countries."1 7 Fourteen countries have
filed declarations pursuant to Article 23,11' out of apparent distrust of
sweeping American pre-trial discovery procedures. 1 9 Many American
113. Id. at art. 18. Any compulsory measures must be "appropriate" and prescribed by the
host state by its law for use in internal proceedings. Id.
114. Borel & Boyd, supra note 5, at 38.
115. B. RISTAU, supra note 16, § 5-3, at 179.
116. See infra text accompanying notes 426-64.
117. Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 13, at art. 23 (emphasis added). The term
"Contracting state" refers to a country that is either an original party to the Convention or a
country that later acceded to the Convention and agreed to be bound by its terms. The original states that were entitled to become parties to the Convention were those states which were
represented at the Eleventh Session of the Hague Conference on Private International Law. B.
RIsTAU, supra, note 16, § 5-2, at 178. After the Convention entered into force, "any other
state may accede to the Convention if it is a member of the Hague Conference, or a member of
the United Nations or one of its specialized agencies, or if it is a party to the Statute of the
International Court of Justice. .. ." Id. Later accession is not automatic. Id. It is effective
only "between the acceeding state and those other states which affirmatively file a 'declaration'
accepting the accession. As to states which fie no such declaration, the accession will have no
effect. . . ." Id.

118. Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxemburg,
Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Sweden and the United Kingdom have
filed declarations pursuant to Article 23. Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 13.
119. Radvan, The Hague Convention on Taking Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial
Matters: Several Notes ConcerningIts Scope Methods and Compulsion, 16 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L.
& POL. 1031, 1044 (1984); see also Report of the United States Delegation to the Special Commission on the Operationof the Convention of 18 March 1970 on the Taking ofEvidence Abroad
in Civil or CommercialMatters, 17 I.L.M. 1417, 1421 (1978) [hereinafter 1978 Report of the
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courts have decided that this provision serves as an escape mechanism

for foreign litigants who are attempting to avoid disclosure of pertinent
documentary evidence. 120 Consequently, the existence of Article 23 has

fostered the belief that the Convention does not create a binding obligation to use its procedures exclusively; therefore, litigants are entitled to
rely on their country's existing domestic rules of civil procedure to obtain
evidence abroad.12
Article 27 has also precipitated conflicting interpretations of how

the Convention was intended to operate. It states:
The provisions of the present Convention shall not prevent
a Contracting State from(a) declaring that Letters of Request may be transmitted
to its judicial authorities through channels other than those
provided for in Article 2;
(b) permitting, by internal law or practice, any act provided for in this Convention to be performed upon less restric-

tive conditions;
(c) permitting, by internal law or practice, methods of
taking evidence other than those provided for in this
Convention. 122
Many American courts have based their interpretation of the Con-

vention on the existence of Article 27.123 They have reasoned that the
text of Article 27 indicates that the Convention was intended to provide
United States Delegation]; Report on the Second Meeting of the Special Commission on the
Operation of the Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial
Matters, 24 I.L.M. 1668, 1676-77 (1985) [hereinafter 1985 Report of the Special Commission].
120. See, e.g., In re Anschuetz & Co., GmbH, 754 F.2d 602, 610 n.21, 612 (5th Cir. 1985),
vacated sub nom., Anschuetz & Co., GmbH v. Mississippi River Bridge Authority, 107 S. Ct.
3223 (1987); Work v. Bier, 106 F.R.D. 45, 54-55 (D.D.C. 1985); Compagnie Francaise
D'Assurance Pour Le Commerce Exterieur v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 105 F.R.D. 16, 27 (S.D.
N.Y. 1984); Graco, Inc. v. Kremlin, Inc., 101 F.R.D. 503, 522-23 (N.D. Ill. 1984); Laker
Airways Ltd. v. Pan Am. World Airways, 103 F.R.D. 42, 48 (D.D.C. 1984); see infra text
accompanying notes 130-33; see infra text accompanying notes 426-49.
121. See, eg., In re Anschuetz, 754 F.2d at 610 n.21, 612; Work, 106 F.R.D. at 54-55;
Compagnie Francaise, 105 F.R.D. at 27; Graco, 101 F.R.D. at 522-23; Laker Airways, 103
F.R.D. at 48.
122. Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 13, at art. 27.
123. See, e.g., Graco, 101 F.R.D. at 520-21; Compagnie Francaise, 105 F.R.D. at 27-28;
Lasky v. Continental Products Corp., 569 F. Supp. 1227, 1228 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Pierburg
GmbH & Co. KG v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d 238, 244, 186 Cal. Rptr. 876, 880
(1982); Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Superior Court, 123 Cal. App. 3d 840, 859, 176
Cal. Rptr. 874, 876 (1981). But cf. In re Anschuetz, 754 F.2d at 608 n.11; Gebr. Eickhoff
Maschinenfabrik und Eisengieberei GmbH v. Starcher, 328 S.E.2d 492, 499 n.11 (W. Va.
1985); Philadelphia Gear Corp. v. American Pfauter Corp., 100 F.R.D. 58, 60 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
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supplementary procedures for American litigants and to preserve use of
alternative internal methods under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and state procedural rules.12 4 American courts, including the majority in
Aerospatiale, have reasoned that the language of Article 27 demonstrates
that the parties to the Convention intended to preserve existing internal
policies to permit both a requesting state and a state of execution to
gather evidence pursuant to more liberal internal methods.12 5 Therefore,
domestic litigants have continued to rely on the familiar procedures and
enforcement devices of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, thereby
frustrating the goals and operation of the Hague Evidence Convention.
The history of the negotiation and ratification of Article 27 shows
that the provision was directed only at states of execution to ensure that
executing states could permit evidence to be taken in accordance with
less restrictive internal procedures other than those provided for in the
Convention."2 6 This Note will analyze the conflict over Articles 23 and
27 and demonstrate that they were not designed to enable contracting
states to abrogate the Convention unilaterally, or to enable litigants to
obtain evidence abroad pursuant to domestic rules in disregard of established Convention procedures."2 7
IV.

JUDICIAL DECISIONS PRIOR TO AAROSPATIALE

Since the United States ratified the Hague Evidence Convention in
1972, the question of how the Convention interacts with existing state
and federal rules of civil procedure has remained unsettled. The state
and federal courts that have addressed the issue have disagreed on the
effect of the Convention on domestic law. In particular, the conflict over
the Convention's relationship to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure has
produced divergent opinions on the proper use of the Convention by
United States litigants."2 8 Most courts agree that the Hague Evidence
124. See Airospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2552-53 & n.24 (1987); see cases cited supra note 123.
125. Id. According to this interpretation, an American litigant would be entitled to gather
evidence abroad pursuant to the Federal Rules or analogous state rules without resorting to
the Convention at all. See jnfra text accompanying notes 452-64.
126. See generally P. AMRAM, EXPLANATORY REPORT ON THE CONVENTION ON THE
TAKING OF EVIDENcE ABROAD IN CIVIL OR COMMERICAL MATTERS, S. EXEC. REP. A, 92d

Cong., 2d Sess., 11 (1972) [hereinafter P. AMRAM, EXPLANATORY REPORT]. "[A]ny act pro-

vided for in the Convention may be performed upon less restrictive conditions... if the internal law or practice of the State of execution so permits." Id. at 39-40.
127. See infra text accompanying notes 426-64.
128. Many commentators have discussed the various judicial interpretations of the Convention that have developed since its ratification. Mr. Bruno Ristau separates the decisions into
three categories for discussion: mandatory use, optional use and first-use. See B. RiSTAU,
supra note 16, § 5-40, at 256.1. Alternatively, James S. McLean analyzes the cases in terms of
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Convention, by its terms, does not provide the exclusive means of obtaining evidence abroad.29 Disagreement has centered on whether prin-

ciples of international comity compel first resort to the Convention, or
whether a court that has personal jurisdiction over a foreign party may

ignore the Convention and rely on domestic rules of civil procedure.
A.

DiscretionaryUse of Convention Procedures

The more widely-held judicial view is that the "Hague Convention
does not supplant the application of the discovery provisions of the Fed-

eral Rules over foreign... nationals[] subject to in personamjurisdiction
in a United States Court."1 0 This conclusion is based primarily on the
concern over interference with the jurisidiction of our courts. The court
in Graco, Inc. v. Kremlin, Inc. 131 explained:
If interpreted as preempting routine interrogatories and

document requests, the Convention really would be much more
than an agreement on taking evidence abroad, which is what it
purports to be. Instead, the Convention would amount to a

major regulation of the overall conduct of litigation between
the "pre- and post-Anschuetz eras of the judicial treatment of the Hague Evidence Convention." McLean, supra note 8, at 35-41 (citing In re Anschuetz & Co., GmbH, 754 F.2d 602
(5th Cir. 1985), vacated sub nom. Anschuetz & Co., GmbH v. Mississippi River Bridge Authority, 107 S. Ct. 3223 (1987)). In Soci6t6 Nationale Industrielle A6rospatiale v. United
States District Court, 107 S. Ct. 2542 (1987), the Supreme Court recognized four possible
interpretations of the Convention. Id. at 2550. See infra note 214. This Note is not intended
to provide an exhaustive study of prior case law, but rather focuses on the basic approaches
courts have developed regarding the Convention. Therefore, the cases are divided into two
broad categories to facilitate discussion.
129. See, eg., In re Anschuetz & Co., GmbH, 754 F.2d 602, 606 n.7 (5th Cir. 1985), vacated sub nor. Anschuetz & Co., GmbH v. Mississippi River Bridge Authority, 107 S.Ct.
3223 (1987); In re Messerschmitt Bolkow Blohm GmbH, 757 F.2d 729, 731 (5th Cir. 1985),
vacated sub nom. Messerschmitt Bolkow Blohm GmbH v. Walker, 107 S.Ct. 3223 (1987);
Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Pan Am. World Airways, 103 F.R.D. 42, 48-51 (D.D.C. 1984); McLaughlin v. Fellows Gear Shaper Co., 102 F.R.D. 956, 958-59 (E.D. Pa. 1984); Cooper Industries, Inc. v. British Aerospace, Inc., 102 F.R.D. 918, 919-20 (S.D. N.Y. 1984); Graco, Inc. v.
Kremlin, Inc., 101 F.R.D. 503, 519-24 (N.D. Ill.
1984); Murphy v. Reifenhauser KG Maschinenfabrik, 101 F.R.D. 360, 361-63 (D. Vt. 1984); Schroeder v. Lufthansa German Airlines,
18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,222, 17,223-24 (N.D. Ill.
1983); Lasky v. Continental Products Corp.,
569 F. Supp. 1227, 1228 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Pierburg GmbH & Co. KG v. Superior Court, 137
Cal. App. 3d 238, 244, 186 Cal. Rptr. 876, 880 (1982); Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v.
Superior Court, 123 Cal. App. 3d 840, 859, 176 Cal. Rptr. 874, 885-86 (1981); Vincent v.
Ateliers de la Motobecane, S.A., 193 N.J. Super. 716, 723, 475 A.2d 686, 690 (1984); Th.
Goldschmidt A.G. v. Smith, 676 S.W.2d 443, 445 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984); Gebr. Eickhoff Maschinenfabrik Und Eisengieberei GmbH v. Starcher, 328 S.E.2d 492, 497-501 (W. Va. 1985).
130. In re Anschuetz & Co., GmbH, 754 F.2d 602, 604 (5th Cir. 1985), vacated sub nom.
Anschuetz & Co., GmbH v. Mississippi River Bridge Authority, 107 S.Ct. 3223 (1987).
131. 101 F.R.D. 503 (N.D. II. 1984).
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nationals of different signatory states, raising a significant possibility of very serious interference with the jurisdiction of the
court in which the litigation is begun.... Treating the Convention procedures as exclusive would make foreign authorities the
final arbiters of what evidence may be taken from their nationals, even when those nationals are parties properly within the
jurisdiction of an American court.13 2
The Graco court reasoned that the existence of an Article 23 declaration
by a foreign sovereign gives that foreign authority the "significant prerogative of determining how much discovery may be taken from their
nationals who are litigants before American courts," thereby diminishing
the power of an American court to ensure that discovery requests are
133
complied with.
Other courts have reasoned that discovery of documents that are
located in the territory of a foreign nation does not, in itself, constitute
the taking of evidence abroad, since the documents ultimately must be
physically produced in the United States. 13 4 Therefore, discovery is considered to be taking place in the United States and, consequently, is not
135
governed by the Hague Evidence Convention.
Some courts have concluded that requiring American litigants to
use the Hague Evidence Convention may encourage foreign parties to
conceal information, and confer an unfair evidentiary advantage over
their American opponents. In this situation:
[t]he foreign party would have full discovery of his opponent
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, while the American litigant would be forced to rely upon Hague Convention
procedures. Should the foreign government prove unwilling to
132. Id. at 521-22.
133. Id. at 522.
134. In reAnschuetz, 754 F.2d at 611; In re Messerschmitt Bolkow Blohm GmbH, 757 F.2d
729, 731 (5th Cir. 1985), vacated sub non. Messerschmitt Bolkow Blohm, GmbH v. Walker,
107 S. Ct. 3223 (1987); Soci~t6 Nationale Industrielle A6rospatiale v. United States District
Court, 788 F.2d 1408, 1411 (9th Cir. 1986); In re Socih Nationale Industrielle Arospatiale,
782 F.2d 120 (8th Cir. 1986); Graco, 101 F.R.D. at 513, 521; Work v. Bier, 106 F.R.D. 45, 51
(D.D.C. 1985); Lowrance v. Weinig, 107 F.R.D. 386, 387-89 (W.D. Tenn. 1985); Wilson v.
Lufthansa German Airlines, 108 A.D.2d 393, 395, 489 N.Y.S.2d 575, 577 (1985).
135. In re Messerschmitt, 757 F.2d at 731. The courts contend that what is required of
foreign litigants consists merely of acts preparatory to the giving of evidence. The only act
performed by the foreign litigant abroad is the selection of the relevant documents to be produced. The actual production of documents or other evidence takes place in the United States.
Therefore, it is argued that such actions cannot possibly intrude on the judicial sovereignty of a
foreign tribunal since no involvement by the foreign tribunal is required. See supra note 134.
In Adrospatiale, 107 S. Ct. 2542 (1987), the Court rejected this interpretation of the Convention. See infra note 533.
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carry out discovery requests under the Convention, the American litigant would be unable to prepare its case against the
fully-prepared foreign party.13 6
This line of reasoning has led some courts to conclude that the Convention simply does not apply when the court has personal jurisdiction over
the foreign party. 3 7 Other courts have decided that use of the Convention is discretionary, and a decision to require its use must be based on a
case-by-case comity analysis to be performed by the trial court. 138

B.

First-Use of Convention Procedures

A substantial but less influential group of courts have held that
although the Hague Evidence Convention is not the exclusive means of
obtaining evidence abroad, considerations of international comity require
that its procedures be used in the first instance.1 39 In Volkswagerwerk
Aktiengesellschaft v. Superior Court," the California Court of Appeal
recognized a distinction between the court's power over the parties based
on personal jurisdiction and the power to compel discovery abroad in
contravention to agreed upon international procedures:
[I]n cases such as this American courts traditionally and propetly recognize the countervailing force of international comity:

[t]he concept that the courts of one sovereign state should not,
as a matter of sound international relations, require acts or
forebearances within the territory, and inconsistent with the in-

ternal laws, of another sovereign state unless a careful weighing
of competing interests and alternative means makes clear that
136. In re Messerschmitt, 757 F.2d at 731; see also Sociitd Nationale IndustrielleAdrospatiale, 788 F.2d at 1411.
137. See, e.g., Socidt6Nationale IndustrielleAdrospatiale, 782 F.2d at 120; In re Anschuetz,
754 F.2d at 611; In re Messerschmitt, 757 F.2d at 731; Work, 106 F.R.D. at 50-51; Lowrance,
107 F.R.D. at 387-89; Wilson, 108 A.D.2d at 395, 489 N.Y.S.2d at 575.
138. See, eg., Socidtd Nationale Industrielle Adrospatiale, 788 F.2d at 1411; Compagnie
Francaise D'Assurance Pour Le Commerce Exterieur v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 105 F.R.D.
16, 27-28 (S.D. N.Y. 1984); Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Superior Court, 123 Cal.
App. 3d 840, 857-59, 176 Cal. Rptr. 874, 884-85 (1981).
139. See, e.g., Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Pan Am. World Airways, 103 F.R.D. 42, 51 (D.D.C.
1984); Philadelphia Gear Corp. v. American Pfauter Corp., 100 F.R.D. 58, 60- 61 (E.D. Pa.
1983); Schroeder v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,222, 17,223-24 (N.D.
Ill. 1983); Pierburg GmbH & Co. KG v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d 238, 242-45, 186
Cal. Rptr. 876, 879-81 (1982); Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Superior Court, 123 Cal.
App. 3d 840, 857-59, 176 Cal. Rptr. 874, 884-85 (1981); Vincent v. Ateliers de ]a Motobecane,
S.A., 193 N.J. Super. 716, 721-24, 475 A.2d 686, 689-91 (1984); Th. Goldschmidt A.G. v.
Smith, 676 S.W.2d 443, 445 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984); Gebr. Eickhoff Maschinenfabrik Und
Eisengieberei GmbH v. Starcher, 328 S.E.2d 492, 505-06 (W. Va. 1985).
140. 123 Cal. App. 3d 840, 176 Cal. Rptr. 874 (1981).
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the order is justified. Rulings based in this concept of interna-

tional comity are dictated not by technical principles of jurisdiction of the parties to... particular lawsuits, but rather by
exercise ofjudicial self-restraint in furtherance of policy consid-

erations which transcend individual lawsuits. 141

Volkswagenwerk thus emphasized that acquiring personal jurisdiction

over a foreign party does not empower a court to interfere with the judicial administration and public policy of a foreign state.
Courts have noted that first resort to the Convention does not sub-

ject a plaintiff to the "vagaries of a foreign government's whims."142
Since the terms of the Convention require "cooperative and expeditious

responses," domestic courts can expect that foreign tribunals will do all
within their power to secure compliance by their nationals.1 43 Moreover,

if initial attempts at discovery under the Convention prove fruitless, it is
argued that domestic courts retain their powers to impose sanctions for

noncompliance, or order alternative discovery pursuant to domestic rules
of civil procedure. 1"
Finally, a trial court's ability to perform a neutral and balanced

comity analysis, which devotes adequate consideration to foreign interests, has been questioned:
Lacking definite standards, a trial court is often swayed by the
immediacy of the discovery demands made by the litigant
standing before it, and there is a tendency to dismiss counter-

vailing considerations as merely abstract or hypothetical questions of judicial sovereignty. . . . [B]ecause the question of
whether to require adherence with the Convention's procedures
generally arises in discovery, courts are often called upon to

balance comity considerations on the basis of a scanty factual
record. As a result, their findings are often conclusory and re45
sult-oriented.1
141. 123 Cal. App. 3d at 857, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 884.
142. Starcher, 328 S.E.2d at 503 (citing Schroeder v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 18 Av.
Cas. (CCH) at 17,224 (N.D. Ill.
1983)).
143. Id.
144. Starcher, 328 S.E.2d at 506.
145. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 17, Socit6 Nationale Industrielle A6rospatiale v.
United States District Court, 107 S. Ct. 2542 (1987) (No. 85-1695) (citation omitted).
For example, several courts have reached the conclusion that requiring a litigant to
employ the Convention's procedures would be "futile" on the basis of little or nothing more than a declaration under article 23, which states that a Party may reserve
the right not to execute letters of request "issued for the purpose of obtaining pretrial discovery of documents as known in Common Law countries." This provision,
however, was not intended to preclude U.S. litigants from obtaining necessary evidence from abroad, but rather to prevent discovery of a "fishing expedition" nature.
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The inconsistencies that may result from flexible case-by-case comity determinations in lower courts, coupled with concerns over uniformity and
international cooperation, have persuaded many courts that the Convention should always be used first to gather evidence abroad.
C. The Supreme Court'sposition prior to A6rospatiale
Although Adrospatiale is the first case that the Supreme Court has
reviewed on the merits concerning the operation of the Hague Evidence
Convention, it was not the first case presented to the Court concerning
the issue. A number of similar cases have reached the Supreme Court,
and a brief synopsis of their history provides useful insight into the
Court's recent resolution of this conflict.
Between 1983 and 1986, the Court invited the United States Solicitor General to express the views of the United States on three petitions
involving similar issues to Aerospatiale. The first case, Volkswagenwerk
Aktiengesellschaft v. Falzon,146 involved a products liability suit against
Volkswagen and its American subsidiary in a Michigan state court.1 47
Falzon noticed the depositions of twelve German Volkswagen employees
pursuant to the Michigan state rules of civil procedure. 148 The Michigan
trial court ordered Volkswagen to make its employees available for depositions before United States consular officials in Germany. 14 9 Volkswagen asserted that the depositions could only proceed if conducted
pursuant to the Hague Evidence Convention.1 50 The trial court order
was certified for interlocutory appeal. 51 The Michigan Court of Appeals, and subsequently the Michigan Supreme Court, were unwilling to
decide the question presented and denied the application for leave to appeal.152 Volkswagen sought review by the United States Supreme Court
by asserting that the Michigan trial court order was invalid on federal
153
grounds.
In early 1984, the Solicitor General filed the government's amicus
Id. n.36 (citations omitted).
146. 464 U.S. 811 (1983), appeal dismissed, 465 U.S. 1014 (1984).
147. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 2-3, Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Falzon, 464 U.S. 811 (1983), appeal dismissed, 465 U.S. 1014 (1984) (No. 82-1888).
148. Id.
149. B. RISTAU, supra note 16, § 5-40, at 256.1; Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae at 2, Volkswagenwerk v. Falzon (No. 82-1888).
150. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 2-3, Volkswagenwerk v. Falzon (No.
82-1888).
151. Id. at 3.
152. Id.
153. Id.
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brief, which set forth the United States position on the application of the
Convention:
[Tihe Evidence Convention deals comprehensively with the
methods available to United States courts and litigants to obtain proceedings abroad for taking evidence.... The parties to
the Convention contemplated that proceedings not authorized
by the Convention would not be permitted. The Convention
accordingly must be interpreted to preclude an evidence taking
proceeding in the territory of a foreign state party if the Convention does not authorize it and the host country does not
otherwise permit it."5 4
The Solicitor General therefore advised the Court that the depositions
were barred by the Convention. 55 The State Department ordered its
consular officials not to proceed, thereby making execution of the Michigan trial court's order impossible. The Supreme Court then dismissed
the appeal on the recommendation of the Solicitor General."5 6
In September 1984, the Solicitor General submitted an amicus brief
in Club Mediterrande,S.A. v. Dorin,5 7 an action arising from personal
injuries sustained by Marjorie Dorin while vacationing at Club Med's
resort in Haiti.15 1 In this case, counsel for Dorin served interrogatories
on Club Med pursuant to New York state law.' 5 9 Club Med invoked the
French blocking statute"6 and refused to respond on the ground that the
Hague Evidence Convention provided the exclusive method for obtaining
the information.' 6 ' The New York Supreme Court ordered Club Med to
answer the interrogatories. 62 Club Med appealed, but the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court affrmed and denied leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals.' 6 3 Club Med then petitioned for
154. Id. at 5-6.
155. Id. at 2-3.
156. Id. It has been argued that the orders in Falzon were rendered by a state court, and
that the Solicitor General relied on the supremacy clause of the Constitution (art. VI, cl. 2) in
deciding that the Hague Evidence Convention superceded state rules of civil procedure. Laker
Airways, Ltd. v. Pan Am. World Airways, 103 F.R.D. 42, 50 (D.D.C. 1984). However, in
view of the revised position of the Solicitor General in Club M&iiterran6e, S.A. v. Dorin, 465
U.S. 1019, appealdismissed and cert. denied, 469 U.S. 913 (1984), which also involved a state
court discovery order, this position appears untenable. See infra notes 386-425 and accompanying text.
157. 465 U.S. 1019, appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 469 U.S. 913 (1984).
158. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 2, Club Miditerrande (No. 83-461).
159. Id.
160. See infra note 189.
161. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 2, Club Mdditerrande(No. 83-461).
162. Id. at 2-3.
163. Id. at 3.
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review in the United States Supreme Court, asserting that the order was

invalid on federal grounds.'"
In its amicus brief, the Solicitor General revised the earlier position
of the United States and stated that the Hague Evidence Convention "is
not exclusive" and "cannot be construed as absolutely restricting the authority of United States courts to employ traditional discovery devices
specified in federal and state rules."' 65 The government's brief further
urged that American courts should retain the power to demand production of evidence from foreign nationals, but use of such power must be
tempered by principles of international comity.' 66 Since the trial court
had not engaged in a proper comity analysis, the Supreme Court once
again followed the suggestion of the Solicitor General and dismissed the
appeal and denied certiorari. 6 7
Most recently, the Solicitor General filed an amicus brief concerning
two additional petitions, Anschuetz & Co., GmbH v. Mississippi River
Bridge Authority and Messerschmitt Bolkow Blohm, GmbH v. Walker.16
Anschuetz and Messerschmitt have been regarded as two of the most well-

reasoned opinions on the use of the Hague Evidence Convention.169 The
164. Id. at 4-5.
165. Id. at 3, 8-9.
166. Id. at 3.
167. B. RisTAU, supranote 16, § 5-40, at 256.4 (citing Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae at 15, Club M~literrane, S.A. v. Dorin, 465 U.S. 1019, appeal dismissed and cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 913 (1984) (No. 83-461)).
168. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, In re Anschuetz & Co., GmbH, 754 F.2d
602 (5th Cir. 1985), vacated sub nom. Anschuetz & Co., GmbH v. Mississippi River Bridge
Authority, 107 S. Ct. 3223 (1987) (No. 85-98) and In re Messerschmitt Bolkow Blohm,
GmbH, 757 F.2d 729 (5th Cir. 1985), vacated sub nom. Messerschmitt Bolkow Blohm, GmbH
v. Walker, 107 S.Ct. 3223 (1987) (No. 85-99), reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 803 (1986) [hereinafter
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Anschuetz and Messerschmitt].
169. In re Anschuetz & Co., GmbH concerned an accident in which the vessel M/V POLA
DE LENA collided with the Gretna Ferry Landing and two ferry boats owned by the Mississippi River Bridge Authority. 754 F.2d at 604. Mississippi River Bridge Authority filed suit
against the M/V POLA DE LENA and against Compania Gijonesa de Navegacion, S.A.,
which had chartered and operated the vessel at the time the accident occurred. Id. Gijonesa
filed a third party complaint against Anschuetz, a German corporation, "alleging the failure of
a steering device designed by Anschuetz as a contributing cause of the accident." Id. Gijonesa
conducted a round of discovery by way of interrogatories, requests for production and notices
of deposition. Id. at 605. Anschuetz moved for a protective order claiming that the scope of
the requests was overly broad and should be limited. Id. Anschuetz argued that Gijonesa had
already been given one opportunity to examine its personnel at the 1981 depositions in Spain,
and therefore was not entitled to "another bite at the apple." Id. Anschuetz did not rely on
the terms of the Hague Evidence Convention in its motion. Id.
In February 1984, the United States Magistrate ordered Anschuetz to comply with most
of the discovery demands. Id. Depositions went forward in April 1984 in Germany. On April
18, 1984, Anschuetz moved for a protective order based on the Hague Evidence Convention to
stop the depositions scheduled for May 2, 1984. The motion was denied. The Court of Ap-
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government's brief indicated that its position had not changed since Club
Mdditerrande v. Dorin."7 Neither Anschuetz nor Messerschmitt were
heard on the merits by the Court. When the Court granted review in
Airospatiale, it vacated certiorari in Messerschmitt. 7 After the Court
decided Airospatiale, it then granted certiorari in Anschuetz and Mespeals for the Fifth Circuit denied a writ of mandamus and held that the Hague Evidence
Convention "has no application at all to the production of evidence in this country by a party
subject to the jurisdiction of a district court pursuant to the Federal Rules." Id. at 615. The
court held that the Convention must be used to obtain evidence from foreign parties who are
not subject to the jurisdiction of the court. Id. However, the court noted that in some circumstances, a district court may find it prudent to order that discovery should be conducted pursuant to the Convention if the discovery may be "particularly intrusive." Id. The court of
appeals relied on the reasoning of the court in Graco, Inc. v. Kremlin, Inc., 101 F.R.D. 503
(N.D. Ill.
1984). In re Anscheutz, 754 F.2d at 610-11; see supra text accompanying notes 13133. The court of appeals also adopted the distinction between "matters prepatory to compliance with discovery orders" and discovery that actually takes place abroad. In re Anscheutz,
754 F.2d at 611-12. In its view, the former does not constitute discovery in a foreign nation
and does not fall within the purview of the Convention. Id.; see supra text accompanying notes
134-35.
The Fifth Circuit addressed these issues again in In re Messerschmitt Bolkow Blohm,
GmbH, 757 F.2d 729 (5th Cir. 1985), vacated sub nom. Messerschmitt Bolkow Blohm GmbH
v. Walker, 107 S. Ct. 3223 (1987). InMesserschmitt,three occupants of a helicopter died when
it crashed near McKinney, Texas. Id. at 730. Suits for wrongful death were brought in federal
district court in Texas against the German corporation Messerschmitt, which had manufactured the helicopter. Id. Personal jurisdiction over Messerschmitt was conceded. Id. The
district court ordered Messerschmitt to respond to requests for production of documents, and
to produce for deposition in advance of trial, persons it expected to call as expert witnesses. Id.
Messerschmitt sought mandamus requiring the discovery to be conducted pursuant to the
Hague Evidence Convention. Id. The Fifth Circuit denied mandamus and reaffirmed its holdig in Anschuetz: "[W]e hold that the Convention does not apply to the discovery sought here
because the proceedings are in a United States court, involve only parties subject to that
court's jurisdiction, and ultimately concern only matters that are to occur in the court's jurisdiction, not abroad." Id. at 731.
The court of appeals assessed whether the Convention should be used in the interest of
international comity. Id. at 732. In the court's opinion, the anticipated discovery of documents "need not directly involve German judicial officers." Id. The court, however, acknowledged that Germany might view the discovery as an infringement on its "judicial sovereignty."
Id. n.12. Nonetheless, the court concluded that:
The American litigants' interest in promptly obtaining the documents and deposition testimony necessary to prepare for complex litigation in an American court
must also be considered. The district court's order does not require any governmental action in Germany, any appearance in Germany of foreign attorneys, or any proceedings in Germany. It requires only that a party admittedly subject to the personal
jurisdiction of a United States court produce documents in the United States. The
order for production of documents, therefore, appears to balance appropriately the
considerations involved.
Id. at 732. The court further held that since the noticed depositions were to take place in the
United States, they were not governed by the Hague Evidence Convention. Id.
170. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 8,Anschuetz and Messerschmitt,supra
note 168.
171. 106 S.Ct. 2887 (1986).

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22:217

serschmitt, vacated each judgment, and remanded both cases for further
172
proceedings.
In each of the foregoing cases, the Supreme Court dispositions have
conformed to the' Solicitor General's fluctuating interpretation of the
Hague Evidence Convention. Similarly, in Adrospatiale, the Solicitor
General's position was given great weight in the Court's analysis. 173 The
following discussion of Adrospatiale will explore the underlying policies
that may have influenced the government to change its interpretation of
the Hague Evidence Convention.17 4
IV.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Soci6t6 Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale and Societ6 de Construction d'Avions de Tourism (collectively "Arospatiale") are corporations
owned by the Republic of France which engage in the business of designing, manufacturing and marketing aircraft. 17' Although they design and
manufacture their aircraft in France, they advertise and sell them in the
United States. 176 The companies allegedly advertised their "Rallye" type
aircraft in American aviation publications as "the World's safest and
most economical STOL plane." 177 On August 19, 1980, a "Rallye" aircraft crashed in New Virginia, Iowa, injuring its pilot, Dennis Jones and
a passenger, John George.1 78 Jones, George and George's wife brought
separate suits in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa, alleging that both corporations had manufactured and sold
a defective plane, and were guilty of negligence and breach of warranty.1 79 Both companies answered the complaints without objecting to
the jurisdiction of the district court.1 80 The parties subsequently consented to consolidate the cases and refer them to a magistrate.18 1
172. 107 S. Ct. 3223 (1987).
173. 107 S. Ct. at 2551 n.19. See infra notes 386-89 and accompanying text.

174. See infra notes 386-425 and accompanying text.
175. Soci6t6 Nationale Industrielle A6rospatiale v. United States District Court, 107 S.Ct.
2542, 2546 (1987). Soci6t6 De Construction d'Avions de Tourism is a wholly-owned subsidi-

ary of Soci~t6 Nationale Industrielle Arospatiale. Id. n.2.
176. Brief for Respondent and Real Parties In Interest at 1-2, Socit6 Nationale Industrielle
A6rospatiale v. United States District Court, 107 S. Ct. at 2542 (1987) (No. 85-1695) [hereinafter Brief for Respondent].
177. Arospatiale, 107 S.Ct. at 2546. "The term 'STOL' [is] an acronym for 'short takeoff
and landing' [and] refers to a fixed-wing aircraft that either takes off or lands with only a short

horizontal run of the aircraft." Id. n.3.
178. Brief for Respondent at 2, supra note 176.
179. Adrospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2546.
180. Id.

181. Id. This action was taken pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) (1987).
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All of the parties conducted their initial discovery pursuant to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure without objection.1 82 Afterwards,
plaintiffs served a second request for production of documents pursuant
to Rule 34,183 a set of interrogatories pursuant to Rule 33184 and requests
for admission pursuant to Rule 36.185 The defendants refused to comply

with the requests, and filed a motion for a protective order.186 The motion alleged that since both defendants were "French corporations, and

the discovery sought [could] only be found in a foreign state, namely
France," the Hague Convention"' was the exclusive method for conIn addition, the motion asserted that unducting pre-trial discovery.'

less evidence was produced in accordance with the procedures of the
Hague Evidence Convention, defendants would be subject to criminal
penalties for violating a French "blocking statute."1 9 The magistrate

denied defendants' motion. 190
182. Adrospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2546. Plaintiffs served an initial request for production of
documents pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34(b) seeking the flight manual, pilot's
handbook, performance data and testing records of the aircraft involved in the crash. Plaintiffs
also served an initial set of request for admissions pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
36. Defendants responded to these requests without objection, insofar as they called for material or information that was located in the United States. Id. n.4; Brief for Respondent at 2,
supra note 176. In turn, defendants availed themselves of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
to depose witnesses and parties pursuant to Rule 26, to serve interrogatories pursuant to Rule
33 and to serve a request for production of documents pursuant to Rule 34. Brief for Respondent at 5, supra note 176. The plaintiffs complied fully with those requests. Adrospatiale, 107
S. Ct. at 2546 n.4; Brief for Respondent at 5, supra note 176.

183.
184.
185.

FED.
FED.
FED.

R. Civ. P. 34.
R. Civ. P. 33.
R. Civ. P. 36.

186. Adrospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2546. The second request for production of documents
sought reports and design specifications for the aircraft. The requests for admissions and interrogatories were limited in scope to certain claims made about the aircraft in advertisements
published in United States aviation magazines. Brief for Respondent at 2, supra note 176.
187. Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 13.
188. Arospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2546.
189. Id. The French blocking statute, French Penal Code Law No. 80-538, 1980 J.O. 1799,
1980 D.S.L. 285 (July 17, 1980) provides in part:
Article lA-Subject to treaties or international agreements and applicable laws
and regulations, it is prohibited for any party to request, seek or disclose, in writing,
orally or otherwise, economic, commercial, industrial, financial or technical documents or information leading to the constitution of evidence with a view to foreign
judicial or administrative proceedings or in connection therewith.
Id.
190. Adrospatiale, 107 S.Ct. at 2547. The magistrate stated that: "Etlo permit the Hague
Evidence Convention to override the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would frustrate the
courts' interests, which particularly arise in products liability cases, in protecting United States
citizens from harmful products and in compensating them for injuries arising from use of such
products." Id. The magistrate explored the history of the French blocking statute. Since it
had been instituted to impede enforcement of United States antitrust laws abroad, and had not
been strictly enforced in France, it was questionable whether the statute would apply to the
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Defendants petitioned the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
for a writ of mandamus. 9 ' Although immediate appellate review of an

interlocutory discovery order is not ordinarily available,192 the court of
appeals found the matter appropriate for review since the "novel and
important questions presented" were likely to recur. 19 3 The appellate
court denied the petition for mandamus.' 94 It held that when a district
court has jurisdiction over a foreign litigant, the Hague Evidence Convention does not apply to the production of evidence in that litigant's
possession, even though documents and information may be physically
located within a foreign signatory's territory. 195 The court found that

the district court magistrate had properly concluded that although the
French blocking statute might subject defendants to criminal sanctions if
they produced the requested information, the statute did not automatically bar a domestic court from compelling production. 96
On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision,
vacated the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case for

further proceedings.' 97 In the majority opinion, written by Justice Stevens,198 the Court disagreed in part with the position of the court of apdiscovery requests at issue. Id. Finally, the magistrate concluded that the United States' interests in protecting its citizens from harmful foreign products, and in compensating them for
injuries caused by such products, were paramount to France's interest in protecting its citizens
"from intrusive foreign discovery procedures." Id.
191. In re Soci6t6 Nationale Industrielle Arospatiale, 782 F.2d 120 (8th Cir. 1986).
192. Federal courts of appeals are empowered to review "all final decisions of district courts
of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1983 & Supp. 1986). Discovery orders are interlocutory and are therefore not ordinarily immediately appealable. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)
(1983 & Supp. 1986), if a district judge certifies in writing that an otherwise nonappealable
interlocutory order involves a "controlling question of law as to which there is substantial
ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal... may materially advance the
ultimate termination of the litigation," the court of appeals may, in its discretion, permit the
appeal to be taken. Id.
193. In re Soci&6 Nationale Industrielle Arospatiale, 782 F.2d at 123. The court
explained:
This is the first time this court has been called upon to consider the novel and important questions concerning the interplay between the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Hague Convention, and the French Blocking Statute. In addition, because
the Plaintiffs are in the initial stages of discovery, and because the nature of the
discovery requests at issue indicate that the answers generated from these requests
may necessitate further discovery, we believe the questions presented here may well
recur prior to any opportunity to review a final judgment.
Id.
194. Id. at 127.
195. Id. at 124.
196. Id. at 126.
197. Airospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2557.
198. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Powell and Scalia also joined the majority
opinion. Id. at 2545.
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peals and held that both the Hague Evidence Convention and the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure may be used to obtain discovery from a litigant
over whom the district court has jurisdiction. 199 The majority instructed
lower courts to scrutinize the particular facts of each case and use a caseby-case comity analysis to determine whether to proceed under the
Hague Evidence Convention or the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 2"
In a separate opinion, Justice Blackmun 2"' concurred with the majority
view that the Convention is not the exclusive means of obtaining discovery abroad.2 "2 He dissented, however, from the majority's unwillingness
to adopt a rule of first resort to the Convention.2 "3 He also dissented
from the majority's insistence on the use of a case-by-case comity analysis, and objected to the majority's failure to provide lower courts with
specific rules to guide those inquiries. 2"
V.

REASONING OF THE COURT

A.

The Majority

Justice Stevens presented the majority opinion in Socidtd Nationale
IndustrielleAdrospatialev. United States District Court.2 05 The Court defined the issue presented as to what extent a federal district court must
enforce use of the Hague Evidence Convention when litigants seek information and documents from a French adversary over whom the court
has personal jurisdiction.206 After reviewing the procedural history of
the case, 20 7 the Court analyzed the applicability of the Convention's procedures.20 8 It examined the Convention's history, purpose and text, and
then assessed whether the Convention should be applied uniformly to all
20 9
discovery requests directed to litigants of signatory nations.
1. The history, purpose and text of the treaty
The Court reviewed the history and the purpose of the ConvenThe Court acknowledged that the United States had proposed

tion. 2 10

199. Id. at 2554.
200. Id. at 2555-56.
201. Justices Brennan, Marshall and O'Connor joined in the separate opinion. Id. at 2557.
202. Id. at 2558 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
107 S. Ct. 2542 (1987).
Id. at 2545-46.
Id. at 2546-48; see also supra notes 175-204 and accompanying text.
Aerospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2548-50.

209. Id.
210. Id.
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adopting an evidence convention to improve procedures for obtaining evidence abroad.2 1 ' The Court emphasized that the Convention was created to provide a set of minimum acceptable standards for all contracting
states while preserving the "procedures of every country which... may
provide international cooperation.., on more liberal and less restrictive
bases .... 212
Observing that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Hague
Evidence Convention constitute two bodies of valid federal law, 2 13 the
Court proceeded to analyze the interaction between the two. 2 14 The
Court analogized the Convention to a contract between nations to which
211. Id. at 2548-49. The Court relied on the Secretary of State's Letter of Submittal to
President Nixon to uncover the goals of the Convention. Id. at 2549. The Letter of Submittal
described the international legal climate prior to the adoption of the Hague Evidence
Convention:
The willingness... to proceed promptly with work on the evidence convention is
perhaps attributable in large measure to the difficulties encountered by courts and
lawyers in obtaining evidence abroad from countries with markedly different legal
systems.... The substantial increase in litigation with foreign aspects arising, in part,
from the unparalleled expansion of international trade and travel in recent decades
ha[s] intensified the need for an effective international agreement to set up a model
system to bridge differences between the common law and civil law approaches to the
taking of evidence abroad.
Id. (quoting LETTER OF SUBMITTAL TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE
CONVENTION ON TAKING OF EVIDENCE ABROAD IN CIVIL OR COMMERCIAL MATrERS,
SEN. EXEC. Doc. A, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., VI (1972)).

The Court also noted that foreign litigants did not face the same obstacles in obtaining
evidence from litigants in the United States. The court stated:
In 1964 Rule 28(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1781
and 1782 were amended to offer to foreign countries and litigants, without a requirement of reciprocity, wide judicial assistance on a unilateral basis for... obtaining...
evidence in the United States.... They authorized the use in the federal courts of
evidence taken abroad in civil law countries, even if its form did not comply with the
conventional formalities of our normal rules of evidence. No country in the world
has a more open and enlightened policy.
Id. at 2548 n.13 (quoting Amram, The ProposedConvention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad,
55 A.B.A. J. 651, 651 (1969)).
212. Id. at 2549-50 (citation omitted).
213. Id.
214. Id. The Court explained that "at least four different interpretations of the relationship
between the federal discovery rules and the Hague Convention are possible." Id. Two interpretations are based on the premise that the express terms of the Convention describe its relationship to the federal discovery rules:
(1) The Hague Convention might be interpreted to require its exclusive use whenever
foreign evidence is sought for use in an American court.
(2) The Convention might be interpreted to requirefirst, but not exclusive, use of Convention procedures.
Id. (emphasis added). Two additional interpretations are based on the premise that principles
of international comity, rather than the express terms of the treaty, dictate how the treaty's
procedures should be employed:
(3) The Convention could be interpreted as establishing a supplemental, optional set of
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general rules of construction apply.2 15 The Court stated that it would
begin by examining the "text of the treaty and the context in which the
written words are used."2'16 The Court acknowledged that the treaty's
history, as well as the negotiations and the practical construction
adopted by the parties, would be relevant to its interpretation.2" 7
The Court observed a "conspicuous" absence of any language requiring mandatory use of Convention procedures.21 8 The Convention's
permissive language, coupled with its failure to expressly exclude all
other existing practices, led the Court to conclude that "[t]he text of the
Evidence Convention itself does not modify the law of any contracting
State, require any contracting State to use... Convention procedures,
.*. or compel any contracting State to change its own evidence gathering
procedures." 2'19 The Court therefore determined that the plain language
of the Convention refuted A6rospatiale's argument that the Convention
provides the exclusive and mandatory means of obtaining discovery
abroad.2 20
Of pivotal importance to the Court's conclusion was the position of
the Executive Branch and the Securities and Exchange Commission as
amici curiae that the Convention's procedures were not exclusive, 221 as
discovery procedures "to which concerns of comity nevertheless require first resort by American courts im all cases."
(4) The treaty could be viewed simply as an "undertaking among sovereigns to facilitate
discovery ..... " American courts could then resort to the Convention when they deem appropriate, after considering the interests of the parties and the interests of the foreign state.
Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 2550.
218. Id. at 2551. Particularly significant to the Court's analysis was a comparison between
the Preamble to the Hague Evidence Convention and the Preamble to the Hague Service Convention. The Court noted that the Hague Service Convention had been drafted prior to the
Hague Evidence Convention. The terms of the Hague Service Convention were mandatory
and required its use in all civil or commercial matters between the signatory nations. The
Court reasoned that since the drafters could have used the text of the Hague Service Convention as a "model exclusivity provision," the drafters' use of permissive language in the Hague
Evidence Convention was "strong evidence" of their intent. Id. at 2550-51 n.15.
219. Id. at 2550-51.
220. Id. at 2548. The Republic of France also took the position that the Convention is the
exclusive means of conducting discovery among its signatories in transnational litigation. Id.
n.l 1 (quoting Brief of Amicus Curiae the Republic of France in Support of Petitioners at 4,
Airospatiale (No. 85-1695)).
221. Id. at 2551 n.19. The United States interpreted the "language, history, and purposes"
of the Convention and concluded that "it was not intended to prescribe the exclusive means by
which American plaintiffs might obtain foreign evidence." Brief for the United States and the
Securities and Exchange Commission as Amici Curiae at 9, Adrospatiale (No. 85-1695). The
Court relied on the notion that "the meaning attributed to treaty provisions by the Government agencies charged with their negotiation and enforcement is entitled to great weight." Id.
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well as the inclusion of Articles 23222 and 27223 in the Convention.2 2 4
The Court reasoned that since a signatory nation could execute an Article 23 declaration, and thereby refuse to respond to requests for pre-trial
discovery of documents, it was implausible that the contracting parties
intended the Convention's procedures to be exclusive. 225 Absent explicit
textual support, the Court refused to accept the proposition that the
United States intended to relinquish its ability to use established federal
discovery procedures while permitting other signatory nations to avoid
production of evidence under Article 23.226 Further, the Court suggested that the existence of Article 27, which permits a contracting State
to use more liberal methods of providing evidence than those authorized
by the Convention,22 7 implied that the parties did not intend to rely on
Convention procedures exclusively.2 28 Without conducting a meaningful
examination of the negotiating history or practical expectations of the
(quoting Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 184-85 (1982)). See also
O'Connor v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 347, 351 (1986) (consistent application of Panama Canal
Treaty by Executive Branch is a factor entitled to great weight).
222. See supra text accompanying notes 117-21; see infra text accompanying notes 426-50.
223. See supra text accompanying notes 122-26; see infra text accompanying notes 451-63.
224. Ai4rospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2551-53.
225. Id. at 2551-52.
226. Id. "The utter absence in the Hague Convention of an exclusivity provision has an
obvious explanation: The contracting States did not agree that its procedures were to be exclusive." Id. at 2552 n.23.
The Court disagreed with Justice Blackmun's position that unless the signatory states had
expected the Convention to provide the customary method of conducting discovery, they
would have had no incentive to be bound by its terms. Id. The majority emphatically stated:
We find the treaty language that the parties have agreed upon and ratified a surer
indication of their intentions than the separate opinion's hypothesis about the expectations of the parties. Both comity and concern for the separation of powers counsel
the utmost restraint in attributing motives to sovereign States which have bargained
as equals.
Id.
227. See supra notes 122-26 and accompanying text.
228. Disagreement persists among courts on whether the provisions of Article 27 (which
ensures that more liberal procedures of internal law are preserved) apply to requesting states as
well as to executing states. See infra text accompanying notes 452-64 for a discussion of Article 27. See also Gebr. Eickhoff Maschinenfabrik und Eisengieberei GmbH v. Starcher, 328
S.E. 2d 492, 499-500 n.11 (W. Va. 1985) (rejecting argument that Article 27 permits more
liberal discovery procedures to be used by requesting as well as executing States). If Article 27
is interpreted to be inapplicable to a United States litigant as a requesting party, then the use of
more liberal federal discovery procedures would be effectively foreclosed. The Court decided
that the term "Contracting State" as used in Article 27 necessarily applied to all signatory
states, whether they were in the position of a requesting or executing state. 4drospatiale,107 S.
Ct. at 2552-53 n.24. The Court stated that even if Article 27 only applies to executing States,
the treaty's failure to expressly authorize executing states to use more liberal procedures for
obtaining evidence can not be construed as a "negative inference" which would curtail the
authority of a state to obtain evidence using internal laws of civil procedure. Id.
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contracting states, the Court concluded that the history and text of the
Convention "unambiguously supports the conclusion that it was intended to establish optional procedures [to] facilitate the taking of evidence abroad."' 2 9
2.

The application and use of the Convention
a. exclusive use

The Court determined that adopting a rule requiring exclusive use

of the Convention would adversely affect the jurisdiction of United States
courts and create three "unacceptable asymmetries.

2 30

First, in a law-

suit between a United States national and a foreign party, the foreign
party would be entitled to obtain discovery through the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, while the domestic party would be required to use the
procedures of the Hague Evidence Convention.2 3 ' Second, a rule of ex-

clusivity would give foreign companies an unfair competitive advantage
over their domestic counterparts.232 In the event both a foreign company
and a domestic company were defendants in the same action, the foreign
company would be subject to less extensive discovery procedures. Third,
since a limited number of nations are signatories to the Convention, a
rule of exclusivity would confer an unwarranted advantage on those domestic litigants who were not required to use Convention procedures in

actions involving nationals of non-Convention jurisdictions.233
To avoid these incongruous results,2 34 the Court decided that the
229. Id. at 2553.
230. Id. n.25.
231. Id.
232. Id. The Court admonished Arospatiale and in doing so, provided a warning for other
foreign companies that intend to sell products in the United States:
Petitioners made a voluntary decision to market their products in the United States.
They are entitled to compete on equal terms with other companies operating in this
market. But since the District Court unquestionably has personal jurisdiction over
petitioners, they are subject to the same legal constraints, including the burdens associated with American judicial procedures, as their American competitors. A general
rule according foreign nationals a preferred position in pre trial proceedings in our
courts would conflict with the principle of equal opportunity that governs the market
they elected to enter.
Id.
233. Id. The Court assumed that use of Convention procedures creates more burdens than
benefits for litigants. See infra notes 487-90 and accompanying text; see infra notes 540-65 and
accompanying text.
234. The Court adopted the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit in In re Anschuetz & Co.,
GmbH, 754 F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1985), vacated sub nom. Anschuetz & Co., GmbH v. Mississippi River Bridge Authority, 107 S. Ct. 3223 (1987). The court of appeals in Anschuetz
stated:
It seems patently obvious that if the Convention were interpreted as preempting
interrogatories and document requests... [it] would amount to a major regulation of
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Convention must be optional since a rule of exclusivity would effectively
subject every American court to the internal laws of foreign nations. 2"
The Court suggested that a rule of exclusivity would "subordinate the

court's supervision of even the most routine... pretrial proceedings to
' Since the
the actions.., or inactions of foreign judicial authorities."236
Convention contains no express or implied statements of preemptive in-

tent, the Court concluded that the Convention does not deprive district
courts of the power to compel production of evidence located abroad
from a foreign litigant under the Federal Rules.237
The majority rejected the position of the court of appeals 238 that the
Convention is entirely inapplicable to discovery sought from litigants
over whom the district court has personal jurisdiction. 239 The Court rea-

soned that the Convention draws no distinction between evidence obtained from third parties over whom the district court does not have
personal jurisdiction, and evidence obtained from litigants themselves. 4 '

Further, the Convention does not distinguish between evidence located
abroad and evidence within the control of a party subject to the requesting court's jurisdiction.2 4 1 Therefore, the majority concluded that the

Convention constitutes one method of seeking information abroad,
which may be used "whenever [it] will facilitate the gathering of
evidence."'2 42

b. first-use
The Court then considered whether to adopt a rule requiring American litigants to use Convention procedures initially before resorting to

domestic procedural alternatives.

3

Unable to find any textual support

the overall conduct of litigation between nationals of different signatory states, raising a significant possibility of very serious interference with the jurisdiction of United
States Courts.... While it is conceivable that-the United States could enter into a
treaty giving other signatories control over litigation instituted and pursued in American courts, a treaty intended to bring about such a curtailment of the rights given to
all litigants by the federal rules would surely state its intention clearly[,] and precisely
identify crucial terms.
Id at 612.
235. Arospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2553.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. 782 F.2d 120, 124 (8th Cir. 1986).
239. Adrospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2554.
240. Id.
241. I d; see supra text accompanying notes 134-35.
242. Adrospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2554.
243. Id. at 2554-56. A "first-use" rule would require an American litigant to attempt to
obtain discovery using the Hague Evidence Convention before resorting to the procedures of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The court of appeals had rejected a "first-use" require-

November 1988]

HAGUE EVIDENCE CONVENTION

in the Convention that would require adherence to a first-use rule,2" the
Court decided that a general rule of first resort would be inconsistent
with the overriding interest in just, speedy and inexpensive resolution of

litigation in United States courts.24 The Court declared that the Convention's procedures are unduly time consuming and expensive, and less
likely than the Federal Rules to produce evidence in many situtations. 24

The Court also rejected A6rospatiale's argument that principles of
international comity required the Court to apply a blanket first-use rule
out of respect for the sovereignty of foreign signatory nations.24 7 Rather,

the Court explained that the concept of international comity248 requires
lower courts to scrutinize the facts of each case, balance the sovereign
interests involved and assess the likelihood that use of the Convention
will be effective. 249 Consequently, the Court declined to adhere to a firstuse rule in all cases.25 °

ment because it was convinced that an American court's order, compelling discovery that a
foreign court had refused to provide, "would constitute 'the-greatest insult' to the sovereignty
of that tribunal." Id. at 2554. The Supreme Court majority declined to endorse a "first-use"
rule as well; however, it disagreed with the reasoning provided by the court of appeals:
It is well known that the scope of American discovery is often significantly broader
than is permitted in other jurisdictions, and we are satisfied that foreign tribunals will
recognize that the final decision on the evidence to be used in litigation conducted in
American courts must be made by those courts. We therefore do not believe that an
American court should refuse to make use of Convention procedures because of a
concern that it may ultimately find it necessary to order the production of evidence
that a foreign tribunal permitted a party to withhold.
Id. at 2554-55.
244. Id. at 2555.
245. Id.; see FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
246. Adrospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2555.
247. Id.
248. The court explained that the notion of comity refers to the spirit of cooperation required of domestic courts to resolve cases that affect the laws and interests of other sovereign
states:
"Comity," in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one
hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other. But it is the recognition
which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial
acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience,
and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are under the protection
of its laws.
Id. n.27 (quoting Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895)).
249. Id. at 2555-56. The Court suggested that the five factors contained in the RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (REVISED) § 437(l)(c) (Tent.

Draft No. 7, 1986) are relevant to any comity analysis and may be useful for trial court determinations. Adrospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2555 n.28; see infra notes 571-72 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the RESrATEMENT (REVISED) factors.
250. Adrospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2555-56. The existence of the French blocking statute did
not alter the Court's conclusion. Id. at 2556 n.29. See supra notes 53-67 and accompanying
text for an explanation of foreign blocking statutes. See infra notes 549-65 and accompanying

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

c.

[V/ol. 22:217

the comity analysis

The Court refused to articulate specific rules to guide case-by-case
comity determinations in lower courts, but briefly outlined a number of
general principles that should be considered."' 1 Since some discovery requests are more intrusive than others,25 2 the Court indicated that the
exact line between a reasonable and unreasonable discovery request
"must be drawn by the trial court, based on its knowledge of the case and
of the claims and interests of the parties and... governments whose...
policies they invoke.' '2 3 The Court cautioned lower courts to "exercise
special vigilance" to protect foreign parties from being placed in the unfavorable position of having to respond to unnecessary or unduly burdensome discovery requests.2 5 4 To prevent discovery abuses, the Court
instructed district courts to supervise pre-trial discovery proceedings
carefully when evidence is sought abroad, and to give serious consideration to claims advanced by foreign litigants concerning abusive discovery
requests. 255 Finally, the Court emphasized that trial courts must demonstrate respect for the special problems encountered by foreign litigants,
which result from nationality, location of operations and sovereign
interests.2 5 6
The Court therefore concluded that the Hague Evidence Convention provides domestic litigants with an optional method of obtaining
evidence from a foreign national. 2 7 The Court further concluded that
Convention procedures must be available to all litigants to ensure access
to favorable treaty procedures, and to guarantee foreign litigants a full
and fair opportunity to demonstrate that use of the Convention is more
appropriate for "some aspects of the discovery process.1 258
text for a discussion of the Court's analysis of the interaction between the French blocking
statute, the Federal Rules and the Hague Evidence Convention.
251. Adrospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2555-57.
252. The Court used the facts of the case to illustrate this point. It noted that an interrogatory that asked petitioners to "identify the pilots who flew flight tests in the Rallye before it
was certified for flight by the Federal Aviation Administration," as well as a request to admit
that "petitioners authorized certain advertising in a particular magazine," clearly are "less
instrusive than a request to produce all of the 'design specifications, line drawings and engineering plans and all engineering change orders, and plans and all drawings concerning the
leading edge slats for the Rallye type aircraft manufactured by the Defendants.' "Id. at 2556
(citation omitted).
253. Id.
254. Id. at 2557.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 2554.
258. Id. at 2557.
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B.

The Separate Opinion

Justice Blackmun, in a separate opinion, concurred with the majority's conclusions that the Hague Evidence Convention applies to evidence sought from both litigants and third parties, but does not provide
the exclusive means for obtaining discovery abroad. 59 He dissented,
however, from the majority's holding that courts must engage in a caseby-case comity analysis to determine whether Convention procedures
should be used. Justice Blackmun further criticized the majority's failure
to provide clearly articulated guidelines for courts to rely on when conducting those assessments." ° He emphasized that the majority's view of
the United States' international obligations is "particularly unfortunate
in a world in which regular commercial and legal channels loom ever
more crucial."2 6
Justice Blackmun criticized the majority for ignoring the significant
achievements that the Convention represents. 6 2 He stated that the Convention accomodates divergent interests and provides effective methods
for evidence gathering, which eliminate conflicts between domestic and
foreign laws.2 63 He expressed deep concern that the national and international interests of the United States may be jeopardized if lower courts
routinely assess complex domestic and foreign interests when engaging in
a comity analysis. 2 4 Since district courts are often unfamiliar with Convention procedures, he argued that lower courts might resort "to issuing
discovery orders under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in a raw
exercise of their jurisdictional power. ' To avoid this unacceptable result, he concluded that, in most cases, a general presumption should be
applied requiring litigants to resort to the Convention first.2 6 6
In his analysis, Justice Blackmun reviewed the history and text of
the Convention and took issue with the majority's interpretation of its
provisions.2 67 Next, he expressed his concern over the use of a case-by259. Soci6t6 Nationale Industrielle A6rospatiale v. United States District Court, 107 S. Ct.
2542, 2558 (1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justices Brennan,
Marshall and O'Connor also joined in the separate opinion. Id.
260. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
261. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
262. Id. at 2557-58 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
263. Id. at 2558 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
264. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
265. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
266. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The separate opinion
noted that many courts that have addressed this issue have adopted "a rule of first resort to the
Convention." Id. n.1. See supra notes 139-45 and accompanying text for a discussion of those
cases.
267. Adrospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2558-59 & n.2. See infra text accompanying notes 270-83.
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case comity analysis in the trial courts. 268 Finally, he explored the three

essential facets of a proper comity analysis, and concluded that all three
interests would be furthered if the litigants in Adrospatialewere required
to use the Hague Evidence Convention.2 69

1. The history and text of the Convention
Justice Blackmun reiterated that the United States requested and

enthusiastically participated in the drafting of the Hague Evidence Convention. 270 Although he believed that the express terms of the Conven-

tion do not clearly require its exclusive use, he nonetheless disagreed
with the majority's conclusion that the Convention is only an optional
supplement to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 27 1 He reasoned that

it would be incongruous to view the Convention as "merely advisory" in
light of the procedures and policies of the United States that existed
when the Convention was negotiated and drafted.27 2

At the time the Convention was drafted, federal legislation and federal discovery rules provided special assistance to foreign litigants to ob-

tain evidence in the United States.273

These policies were not

conditioned on reciprocity.27 4 Justice Blackmun argued that enactment

of the Convention did not have any effect on a foreign litigant's ability to
obtain evidence pursuant to federal statutes.275 Therefore, the only plausible benefit that foreign signatories derived from ratifying the treaty was
the expectation that the United States would respect their sovereignty by
routinely using the procedures of the Convention.27 6

Justice Blackmun contended that the provisions of Article 27 would
not change this result.2 77 Dismissing the majority's interpretation of Ar-

ticle 27 as implausible and inconsistent with the drafters' intent, 278 he
268. Adrospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2559-62. See infra text accompanying notes 284-98.
269. Adrospatiale, 107 S.Ct. at 2561-68. See infra text accompanying notes 299-341.
270. Afrospatiale, 107 S.Ct. at 2558. (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in

part).
271. Id. at 2557-59 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
272. Id. at 2559 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
273. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See supra note 211.
274. Afrospatiale, 107 S.Ct. at 2559 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
275. Id. (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
276. Id. (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
277. Id. n.2 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). See supra notes 12226 and accompanying text for the provisions of Article 27.
278. AMrospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2559 n.2 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in
part). The United States delegation's explanatory report on the Convention relates that Article 27 was "designed to preserve existing internal law and practice in a Contracting State
which provides broader, more generous and less restrictive rules of international cooperation
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stated that "[t]he only logical interpretation of this article is that a state

receiving a discovery request may permit [the use of] less restrictive [internal] procedures than those designated in the Convention." 27' 9 He ar-

gued that if a requesting state could unilaterally use its own domestic
procedures for gathering evidence, and thereby control the methods of

obtaining evidence in another state, there would, in effect, be no need for
the detailed procedures of the Convention. 280
Justice Blackmun noted that the type of discovery commonly conducted in the United States is completely incompatible with civil-law
principles, under which evidence gathering is a judicial function.28 ' In
view of the varied philosophical approaches to evidence gathering
abroad, he stressed that the Convention furthers important domestic in-

terests by furnishing channels for obtaining discovery abroad that would
be unavailable otherwise.28 2 In addition, the Convention serves the longterm interests of the United States by promoting a climate of cooperation
and goodwill, which is imperative for international legal and commercial
systems to function properly.28 3
2. The suitability of a case-by-case comity analysis
Justice Blackmun disagreed with the majority on the issue of

whether lower courts should rely on a case-by-case comity approach to
decide whether the Hague Evidence Convention or the Federal Rules
should be used. First, he argued that an individualized case approach
ignores important national and international policies which can only be
properly considered and implemented by the Executive and Legislative

branches of our government.284 Justice Blackmun stated that trial courts
in the taking of evidence for the benefit of foreign courts and litigants.... Article 27 authorizes
the use of alternative methods for gathering evidence 'if the internal law or practice of the State
of execution so permits.' "Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting P. A.MRAM, EXPLANATORY REPORT ON THE CONVENTION ON THE TAKING OF EVIDENCE ABROAD IN CIVIL OR COMMERCIAL MATTERS, S. EXEC. REP. A, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.,
39-40 (1972)).
279. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
280. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
281. Id. at 2558-59 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
282. Id. at 2559 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
283. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The French position on
the goal of the Hague Evidence Convention confirms that the Convention was intended to
establish "methods to reconcile the differing legal philosophies of the Civil Law, Common Law
and other systems with respect to the taking of evidence." Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (quoting Rapport de la Commission Sp6ciale, 4 Conf6rence de La
Haye de Droit International Priv& Actes et documents de la Onzi~me session 55 (1970) (Actes et documents)).
284. Id. at 2559-60 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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are well-equipped to accomodate domestic concerns, such as the interests
of the parties and of the judicial system in resolving conflicts based on
complete information. 28 5 He pointed out, however, that transnational
litigation also involves the interests of foreign legal systems and foreign

sovereign interests, which trial courts are not well-suited

to

accomodate.2 8 6
Justice Blackmun emphasized that reconciling our own interna-

tional interests with foreign interests normally falls within the sphere of
the Executive Branch.2 87 Only the Executive should decide when "a

course of action is important enough to risk affronting a foreign nation or
placing a strain on foreign commerce. '288 In Justice Blackmun's opinion, the ratification of the Hague Evidence Convention represented a
political determination by the Executive and Legislative branches that
the Convention properly balanced those competing interests. 28 9 There-

fore, consistent with the principle of separation of powers, it is not within
the province of the Judiciary to routinely engage in activities that result

in political decisions, which may affect national and international

interests.2 9 °
To justify his position, Justice Blackmun explained why courts are
generally incapable of balancing the interests of foreign nations with
those of our own. 291 Since foreign legal systems are often poorly understood, and few judges are experienced with transnational litigation,
courts are not competent to assess when foreign nations will be offended
285. Id. at 2559 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
286. Id. at 2560 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
The presence of these interests creates a tension between the broad discretion our
courts normally exercise in managing pre trial discovery and the discretion usually
allotted to the Executive in foreign matters.
... Unlike the courts, "diplomatic and executive channels are, by definition,
designed to exchange, negotiate, and reconcile the problems which accompany the
realization of national interests within the sphere of international association."
Id (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Laker Airways, Ltd. v.
Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 955 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
287. Id at 2560 (Blackmun, J.,concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Blackmun noted:
Our Government's interests themselves are far more complicated than can be
represented by the limited parties before a court. The United States is increasingly
concerned, for example, with protecting sensitive technology for both economic and
military reasons. It may not serve the country's long-term interest to establish precedents that could allow foreign courts to compel production of the records of American corporations.
Id. n.3 (Blackmun, J.,concurring in part and dissenting in part).
288. Id. at 2560 (Blackmun, J.,concurring in part and dissenting in part).
289. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
290. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
291. Id. at 2560-61 (Blackmun, J.,concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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by certain acts.292 He expressed concern that a pro-forum bias will
"creep into the supposedly neutral balancing process" and prompt courts
to rely on familiar local rules, since Convention procedures are often perceived as a threat to jurisdictional power.2 93 Further, a court's inability
to look to the federal government for guidance in each individual case, 9 4
along with limited appellate review of interlocutory discovery orders,2 9 5
precludes any effective correction of erroneous discovery orders.29 6
Finally, Justice Blackmun argued that, in most cases, using a caseby-case comity analysis is unnecessary and duplicative.29 7 The conflicts
that a trial court must attempt to resolve have already been evaluated
and eliminated through ratification of the agreements contained in the
Convention. 298 Therefore, he concluded that the majority unnecessarily
imposed an extra layer of comity analysis at the trial court level when the

Convention had already accomodated the competing interests relevant to
that analysis.2 99
292. Id. at 2560 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Container
Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 194 (1983)); see also, Wilkey, TransnationalAdjudication: A View from the Bench, 18 INT'L LAW. 541, 543 (1984); Ristau, Overview of International JudicialAssistance, 18 INT'L LAW. 525, 531 (1984).
293. Adrospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2560 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Justice Blackmun explained:
One of the ways that a pro-forum bias has manifested itself is in United States courts'
preoccupation with their own power to issue discovery orders....
There is also a tendency on the part of courts, perhaps unrecognized, to view a
dispute from a local perspective.... Thus courts inherently find it difficult neutrally
to balance competing foreign interests. When there is any doubt, national interests
will tend to be favored over foreign interests.
Id. n.4 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Laker Airways, Ltd.
v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 951 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
294. See infra text accompanying notes 597-601 for an explanation of the State Department's policy.
295. See supra note 192.
296. Adrospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2561 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). The Department of State maintains a policy that it does not participate in or take positions regarding litigation between private parties, unless required to do so by law. Id. n.5
(Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see Oxman, supra note 12, at 748
n.39.
297. Adrospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2562 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
298. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Blackmun observed that the factors contained in the RESTATEMENT (REVISED), supra note 1, are only
appropriately considered when no treaty exists between the parties. He also suggested that the
Restatement analysis may prove useful if the Convention falls to resolve a conflict in a particular case. Id. (BIackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
299. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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The components of a complete comity analysis

The separate opinion focused on the elements of a complete comity
analysis. Justice Blackmun argued that "[t]he principle of comity leads
to more definite rules than the ad hoc approach endorsed by the majority. '3°° He explained that comity is not a "vague political concern"
which requires international cooperation only when it is in our best interests.3 1 Rather, a comity analysis shares the same goals as a choice of
law analysis, which seeks to further "harmonious relations between
states and to facilitate commercial intercourse between them. ' 3 2 The
fundamental considerations in a choice of law analysis-foreign interests,
domestic interests, and the interest in a well-functioning international
legal order-are also essential to a comprehensive comity analysis. 3
Justice Blackmun explored each of these factors in detail and concluded
that all three interests would be furthered by use of the Convention in
Adrospatiale.
a

foreign interests

Justice Blackmun praised the majority's admonition to lower courts
to pay special attention to foreign interests. 3 4 Nevertheless, he asserted
that the majority's interpretation of the Convention was based on an incomplete analysis of foreign sovereign interests.30 5 After explaining the
differing legal philosophies of common-law 3 6 and civil-law 30 1 nations, he
argued that the majority failed to recognize the significance of civil-law
practices.30 8 Justice Blackmun reiterated that the act of gathering evi300. Id. at 2561 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). "The Court
frequently has relied upon a comity analysis when it has adopted general rules to cover recurring situations in areas such as choice of forum, maritime law, and sovereign immunity, and
the Court offers no reasons for abandoning that approach here." Id. (citations omitted).
301. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
302. Id at 2562 n.11 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting
RESrATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICr oF LAWS § 6, comment d (1971)).
303. Id at 2562 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
304. Id (Blackmun, J., concurring in part'and dissenting in part).
305. Id (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
306. See supra text accompanying notes 21-52.
307. Airospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2562 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
308. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Blackmun
noted:
The act of taking evidence in a common-law country from a willing witness,
without compulsion and without a breach of the peace, in aid of a foreign proceeding,
is a purely private matter, in which the host country has no interest and in which its
judicial authorities have normally no wish to participate. To the contrary, the same
act in a civil-law country may be a public matter, and may constitute the performance of a public judicial act by an unauthorized foreign person.
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dence in a civil-law country constitutes the performance of a public judicial act if performed by an unauthorized foreign person.3" 9 Unless

foreign authorities participate or give their consent, evidence gathering
abroad may violate the "judicial sovereignty" of that country. 10

By using the Convention's procedures, foreign sovereign interests
are protected since ratifying states have consented to their use.
Justice
Blackmun noted that contracting civil-law states agreed to procedures in

the Convention which conflicted with their own customary practices.312
He suggested that use of the Convention alleviates potential infringement

on foreign judicial sovereignty which would result if the same procedures
were used outside the bounds of the Convention.31 3
b. domestic interests
The first major domestic concern to be considered by the courts is
the necessity of "providing effective procedures to enable litigants to ob-

tain evidence abroad. ' 314 Justice Blackmun argued that Convention procedures are "a great boon" to litigants. 3 15 He stated that experience to
date proved that use of the Convention has been fruitful since contracting parties have honored their obligations. 6
Id at 2563 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Report of the
United States Delegation to the Eleventh Session of the Hague Conference on Private InternationalLaw, 8 LL.M. 785, 806 (1969)).
309. Id. at 2562 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
310. Id at 2563 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
311. Id (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
312. See infra text accompanying notes 491-501.
313. Adrospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2563 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Justice Blackmun underscored that some countries believe that protection of certain
substantive rights requires judicial control of evidence gathering. For example, in the Federal
Republic of Germany, an American discovery order may violate the German constitutional
principle of proportionality which ensures protection ofpersonal privacy, commercial property
and business secrets. It is up to the German judiciary to assess whether these constitutional
rights may be encroached upon in order to protect the rights of others in civil litigation. Id
(Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Meesen, The International
Law on Taking Evidence From, Not In, a Foreign State, App. to Brief for Anschuetz & Co.,
GmbH and Messerschmitt-Boelkow-Blohm GmbH as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners
at 27a-28a, Adrospatiale (No. 85-1695)). The government of the Federal Republic of Germany
filed a diplomatic protest emphasizing that American discovery orders violate rights protected
by their constitution. Id n.14 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing
App. to Brief for Federal Republic of Germany as Amicus Curiae at 20a, Adrospatiale (No. 851695)).
314. Id. at 2564 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
315. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
316. Id at 2564-65 & n.16 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). "According to the French government, the overwhelming majority of discovery requests by American litigants are 'satisfied willingly . . . before consular officials and, occasionally,
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Justice Blackmun disagreed with the majority's claim that using the
Convention's procedures might be "unduly time consuming and expen-

sive. "317 He argued that until the Convention is used extensively and
courts become familiar with its procedures, the majority's view was nothing more than speculation.31 8 Justice Blackmun pointed out that discovery conducted under the Federal Rules does not place a high premium on
either speed or cost-effectiveness.3 19 He concluded that unless costs are
prohibitive, some additional financial burden should be tolerated in the

interest of international goodwill.32°

In Justice Blackmun's opinion, the existence of Article 23 did not

alter his conclusion or present a significant enough obstacle to justify
disregarding Convention procedures. 32 1 He explained that Article 23

reservations only apply to letters of request for documents. 322 Therefore,
a reservation does not affect the most commonly used informal proce-

dures of taking evidence through a consul or commissioner, or requests
for depositions or interrogatories.32 3 Although Article 23 reservations
generally preclude pre-trial discovery of documents, France 324 and a
number of other nations, 32 5 have modified their declarations to exclude

only those requests that "lack sufficient specificity326or that have not been
reviewed for relevancy by the requesting court.

commissioners, and without the need for involvement by a French court or the use of its
coercive powers.'" Id. at 2564 n.16 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(citing Brief of Amicus Curiae the Republic of France in Support of Petitioners at 24, Adrospatiale (No. 85-1695)).
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
317. Id. at 2564-65 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
318. Id. at 2565 (Blackmun, J.,
319. Id. (Blackmun, J.,concurring in part and dissenting in part).
320. Id. (Blackmun, J.,concurring in part and dissenting in part).
321. Id. at 2565-66 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
322. Id. at 2565 (Blackmun, J.,
323. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
324. Justice Blackmun noted that France has recently modified its Article 23 declaration as
follows:
The declaration made by the Republic of France pursuant to Article 23 relating
to letters of request whose purpose is "pre-trial discovery of documents" does not
apply so long as the requested documents are limitatively enumerated in the letter of
request and have a direct and clear nexus with the subject matter of the litigation.
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Letter from
Id. at 2566 n.22 (Blackmun, J.,
J.B. Raimond, Minister of Foreign Affairs, France, to H. H. Broek, Minister of Foreign Affairs, The Netherlands (Dec. 24, 1986)).
325. Denmark has also modified its declaration and the Federal Republic of Germany has
drafted new regulations to permit "pretrial production of specified and relevant documents in
response to letters of request." Id. (Blackmun, J.,concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(quoting Brief for Anschuetz & Co., GmbH and Messerschmitt-Boelkow-Blohm GmbH as
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 21, Adrospatiale (No. 85-1695)).
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citation omitted).
326. Id. at 2566 (Blackmun, J.,
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The second major domestic interest to be considered by the trial
court is the goal of "fair and equal treatment of litigants., 327 Justice
Blackmun disagreed with the majority's suggestion that broad use of the
Convention would lead to "unacceptable asymmetries" to the detriment
of domestic litigants. 32 8 He explained that any possible unfairness that
might result from using the Convention could be neutralized by the trial
court's exercise of its power to supervise the proceedings, and to issue
"any order which justice requires" to limit the intrusiveness of discovery
requests from foreign parties.3 29
Justice Blackmun characterized as illusory the majority's concern
that parties who do not need to use the Convention will have an advantage over litigants who do.3 30 Since the purpose of the Convention is to
facilitate discovery, not hamper it, he reasoned that litigants who sue
nationals of non-contractingstates will be disadvantaged since they are
unable to take advantage of the Convention's procedures. 331 Nevertheless, Justice Blackmun acknowledged that inconsistencies are unavoidable when any treaty is less than universally ratified.3 32 However, he
concluded that in most cases, use of the Convention will advance domestic interests since it successfully facilitates the gathering of evidence
abroad and furthers our relationship with foreign states.33 3
c. development of an ordered internationalsystem
The final component of Justice Blackmun's comity analysis considered whether a course of action will further, rather than impede, the development of an ordered international system.3 34 Justice Blackmun
stressed that a smoothly functioning international legal regime furthers
basic interests that are common to all nations: predictability, fairness,
ease of commercial interactions and "stability through satisfaction of
mutual expectations. ' 335 He stated that the Convention reduces conflicts
between nations by facilitating communication through 'established diplomatic channels.33 6 In addition, use of the Convention eliminates "for327.
328.
329.
26(c)).
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
Ltd. v.
336.

Id. at 2567 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing FED. R. Civ. P.
Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added).
Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 2567-68 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Laker Airways,
Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 937 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
Id. at 2568 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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eign perceptions of unfairness" which arise when domestic courts are
insensitive to the interests protected by foreign legal regimes. 3 7
Finally, Justice Blackmun urged domestic courts to "avoid the paro'338
chial views that too often have characterized the decisions to date.
He warned that many countries may be reluctant to oppose American
discovery orders because of the strong economic, political and military
position of the United States.339 Justice Blackmun predicted that continued foreign acquiescence to orders that ignore the Convention will breed
accumulating resentment, at the long-term political cost of diminished
international cooperation.3 ° Justice Blackmun concluded that use of the
Convention is a "simple step to take" to avoid these undesirable consequences and to foster international cooperation.3 4 1

VII. ANALYSIS
In SocidtJ Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States District Court 342 the Supreme Court held that the Hague Evidence Convention functions as an optional supplement to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, and should be used when it will facilitate the gathering of
evidence abroad. 343 The decision reflects the Court's desire to send a
strong signal abroad that the United States will not tolerate foreign nationals' attempts to manipulate domestic judicial proceedings, or foreign
governments' attempts to shield their citizens from liability which may
arise from adverse disclosures during pre-trial discovery. The Court's
concern over reafirming the sovereignty of our judicial system clouded
the crucial issues in the case, and resulted in an inaccurate analysis of our
obligations under the Hague Evidence Convention. The Court confounded, rather than resolved, the problems that have arisen in response
to the extraterritorial application of our discovery procedures in private
civil litigation. Airospatiale creates new impediments for domestic litigants who are in need of predictable, uniform and effective procedures
for gathering evidence abroad in transnational diputes.
The Adrospatialedecision contains three fundamental problems that
require analysis. The first concerns the accuracy of the majority's interpretation of the text and history of the Hague Evidence Convention. The
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.

Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring
Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring
Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring
Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring
Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring
107 S. Ct. 2542 (1987).
Id at 2554.

in
in
in
in
in

part and
part and
part and
part and
part and

dissenting
dissenting
dissenting
dissenting
dissenting

in
in
in
in
in

part).
part).
part).
part).
part).
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Court's strict textual analysis of the Convention is flawed by its failure to
carefully explore the negotiating history of the Convention and its failure
to interpret the Convention in accordance with its clearly articulated
purpose. The second problem is whether the Court's rationale for rejecting a first-use rule is proper, in light of the operation of foreign blocking statutes and the practical realities of obtaining evidence under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Third, requiring lower courts to routinely perform case-by-case comity determinations will adversely affect
our judicial system and the foreign relations of the United States. This
analysis explores the problems likely to result from the case-by-case
approach.
A.

The Majority's Interpretationof the Convention

In Airospatiale,the majority claimed that the text of the Hague Evidence Convention, along with the history of its proposal and ratification,
"unambiguously" supported the conclusion that the Convention was intended to supplement, rather than supplant, the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. 3" Although the majority purported to consider the Convention's negotiating history as well as the practical construction adopted by
the parties, there is a conspicuous absence of any thoughtful examination
of either factor. The decision rests almost exclusively on a textual artalysis of critical provisions of the Convention. The Court did not meaningfully consider the practical and political expectations of the contracting
states, or the purpose of the Convention. Therefore, the majority
reached the implausible conclusion that the "text of the Evidence Convention itself does not modify the law of any contracting State, require
any contra6ting State to use the Convention procedures,... or compel
any contracting State to change its own evidence gathering
procedures."3 45
In analyzing the Convention, the Court made two determinations
regarding its applicability and operation. First, it decided that by its
terms, the Convention was not intended to provide the exclusive means
of conducting pre-trial discovery abroad.34 6 Second, the Court examined
whether the Convention was nonetheless intended to prescribe
mandatory procedures with which all contracting states were bound to
comply based on international comity.34 7 The Court concluded, based
344. Socit6 Nationale Industrielle Arospatiale v. United States District Court, 107 S. Ct.
2542, 2552-53.
345. Id at 2550-51.
346. Id. at 2552-53.
347. Id. at 2554-57.

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22:217

on the language and operation of the Convention, that the procedures
were intended to be strictly optional.3 48 The Court's conclusion that the
Convention creates no mandatory obligations for the United States was
premised on five factors: (1) the absence of mandatory language in the
treaty; (2) the inclusion of Article 23; (3) the text of Article 27; (4) a
number of hypothesized fairness concerns affecting the jurisdiction of
United States courts and equal treatment of litigants; and (5) the Court's
hypothesis regarding the expectations of the contracting parties.
1. The absence of mandatory language
It is generally accepted that a treaty is expected to reflect the intent
of the parties involved.34 9 The prinary goal of treaty interpretation is to
"undertake a disciplined, responsible effort to ascertain the genuine
shared expectations of the particular parties to an agreement." 3 5 In interpreting a treaty, it often becomes necessary to construe the literal
meaning of certain words in the context of the negotiating history in order to avoid conclusions which are obviously contrary to a treaty's purpose.35 ' In Choctaw Nation of Indians v. United States,35 2 the Court
emphasized that "treaties are construed more liberally than private
agreements, and to ascertain their meaning we may look beyond the written words to the history of the treaty, the negotiations, and the practical
construction adopted by the parties. 35 3 The Court has consistently relied on records of a treaty's drafting and negotiation to support subsequent interpretation.35 4 Moreover, the Court has often evaluated the
348. Id. at 2552-53.
349. G. VON GLAHN, supra note 13, at 503; see also J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS,
325 (1963). See generally M. McDouGAL, H. LASSWELL & J. MILLER, THE INTERPRETATION OF AGREEMENTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 1-118 (1967) [hereinafter M. McDouGAL & H. LASSWELL].
350. M. McDouGAL & H. LASSWELL, supra note 349, at 40.
351. Id at 41; Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corporation, 466 U.S. 243, 288
(1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
352. 318 U.S. 423 (1943).
353. Id. at 431-32; see also Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 294-95 (1933) (Court
relied on diplomatic history, negotiations and diplomatic correspondence to construe Article X
of Webster-Ashburton Extradition Treaty of 1842); Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 112
(1933) (Court relied on history, language and purpose of Treaty of May 22, 1924 between

United States and Great Britain to determine treaty's effect on federal statute); E. YAMBRUSIC,
TREATY INTERPRETATION:

THEORY AND REALITY 19-27 (1987) (discussing practice of

treaty interpretation by United States Supreme Court).
354. See, eg., O'Connor v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 347, 352 (1986) (reason for deletion of
phrase in Panama Canal Treaty clear from history of America's internal drafting of text); Air
France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 400-03 (1985) (detailed examination of negotating history, delegate objections and proposals, and preliminary draft revisions of articles in Warsaw Convention); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 259 & n.33 (1984)
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signatories' course of conduct after ratification to elicit a treaty's intent
and purpose,35 5 in addition to using subsequent interpretations by treaty
signatories to clarify ambiguous terms.3 5 6 Significantly, the Court has
endeavored to construe international agreements to give them the greatest effect, in order to preserve "every benefit negotiated for by the
parties.

' 35 7

In Adrospatiale, the Court decided that by its terms the Hague Evi-

dence Convention was not intended to provide the exclusive means of
gathering evidence abroad. 358 This textual argument has never been seri(examination of framers' intent from Warsaw Convention Conference Minutes); Id. at 265-70
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (detailed examination of deliberations of Swiss, French and British
delegates to determine intent of parties to Warsaw Convention); Maximov v. United States,
373 U.S. 49, 54-55 (1963) (Court looked to relevant materials instructive as to intent of the
parties to glean treaty's purpose).
355. See, e.g., O'Connor, 107 S. Ct. at 351 (course of conduct of parties to international
agreement, like course of conduct of parties to any contract, is evidence of its meaning); Air
France, 470 U.S. at 403 (reference to conduct of parties helps clarify meaning); Trans World
Airlines, 466 U.S. at 255, 259-60 (conduct of contracting parties in implementing treaty in first
50 years of operation cannot be ignored).
356. O'Connor, 107 S. Ct. at 351 (United States application of Panama Canal Treaty unchallenged by Panama); Air France,470 U.S. at 403-05 (subsequent interpretations by signatories help clarify meaning of term and opinions of sister signatories entitled to considerable
weight); Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 184 n.10 (1981) (position
of government of Japan entitled to great weight).
357. Maximov, 373 U.S. at 56. See also Air France,470 U.S. at 399 ("[I]t is our responsibility to give the specific words of the treaty a meaning consistent with the shared expectations of
the contracting parties."); Sumitomo, 457 U.S. at 185 ("Our role is limited to giving effect to
the intent of the Treaty parties."); Jordan v. Tashiro, 278 U.S. 123, 127 (1928) ("The principles which should control the diplomatic relations of nations, and the good faith of treaties as
well, require that their obligations should be liberally construed so as to effect the apparent
intention of the parties to secure equality and reciprocity between them.").
In Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243 (1984), Justice Stevens stated that international agreements, like other contracts, "are to be read in the light of
the conditions and circumstances existing at the time they were entered into, with a view to
effecting the objects and purposes of the States thereby contracting." Id. at 262 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). Justice Stevens also reaffirmed the relevance of Justice Story's directives on the
judiciary's role in enforcing treaties:
In the first place, this Court does not possess any treaty-making power. That
power belongs by the constitution to another department of the Government; and to
alter, amend, or add to any treaty, by inserting any clause, whether small or great,
important or trivial, would be on our part an usurpation of power, and not an exercise ofjudicial functions. It would be to make, and not to construe a treaty.... We
are to find out the intention of the parties by just rules of interpretation applied to the
subject matter; and having found that, our duty is to follow it as far as it goes, and to
stop where that stops-whatever may be the imperfections or difficulties which it
leaves behind.
Id. at 263-64 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting The Amiable Isabella, 6 Wheat. 1, 71-73, 5
L.Ed. 191 (1821)).
358. Adrospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2553.
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ously rebutted, either by the courts or by commentators. 359 The Preamble to the Convention contains no statement indicating that it is to be
used exclusively. 3" In contrast, the Hague Service Convention,3 61 on
which the Hague Evidence Convention is modeled, states that it is the
exclusive mechanism for serving documents abroad.36 2
The Court surmised that the drafters' election to omit preemptive
language from the text of the Convention was strong evidence of their
intent.36 3 Nevertheless, there is no indication from the negotiating his359. See Oxman, supra note 12, at 758; B. RISTAU, supra note 16, § 5-40, at 255; In re
Anschuetz & Co., GmbH, 754 F.2d 602, 608 (5th Cir., 1985), vacated sub nom. Anschuetz &
Co., GmbH v. Mississippi River Bridge Authority, 107 S. Ct. 3223 (1987); In re Messerschmitt
Bolkow Blohm GmbH, 757 F.2d 729, 731 (5th Cir. 1985), vacated sub nom. Messerschmitt
Bolkow Blohm GmbH v. Walker, 107 S. Ct. 3223 (1987); Laker Airways v. Pan Am. World
Airways, 103 F.R.D. 42, 48-50 (D.D.C. 1984); Compagnie Francaise D'Assurance Pour Le
Commerce Exterieur v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 105 F.R.D. 16, 27 (S.D. N.Y. 1984); Graco,
Inc. v. Kremlin, Inc., 101 F.R.D. 503, 519-24 (N.D. Ill. 1984); Philadelphia Gear Corp. v.
American Pfauter Corp., 100 F.R.D. 58, 61 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Schroeder v. Lufthansa German
Airlines, 18 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,222, 17,223-24 (N.D. IlM.1983); Lasky v. Continental Products
Corp., 569 F. Supp. 1227, 1228 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Pierburg GmbH & Co. KG v. Superior Court,
137 Cal. App. 3d 238, 244, 186 Cal. Rptr. 876, 880 (1982); Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellshaft
v. Superior Court, 123 Cal. App. 3d 840, 859, 176 Cal. Rptr. 874, 885-86 (1981); Vincent v.
Ateliers de la Motobecane, S.A., 193 N.J. Super. 716, 723, 475 A.2d 686, 690 (1984); Th.
Goldschmidt A.G. v. Smith, 676 S.W.2d 443, 445 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984); Gebr. Eickhoff Maschinenfabrik Und Eisengieberei GmbH v. Starcher, 328 S.E.2d 492, 497-501 (W. Va. 1985).
But see McLean, supra note 8, at 49; Comment, The Hague Evidence Convention on the Taking
ofEvidence Abroad in Civil or CommercialMatters: The Exclusive andMandatory Procedures
for Discovery Abroad, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1461, 1475-83 (1984).
360. The Preamble states that the parties desire "to facilitate the transmission and execution of Letters of Request... to further the accomodation of the different methods which they
use for this purpose[] ... [and] to improve mutual judicial co-operation in civil or commercial
matters[.]" Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 13, at Preamble.
361. See supra note 70.
362. Article 1 of the Hague Service Convention states that "[tihe present Convention shall
apply in all cases, in civil or commercial matters, where there is occasion to transmit a judicial
or extrajudicial document for service abroad." Hague Service Convention, supra note 70, at
art. 1.
363. Adrospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2550 n.15. It is questionable whether the omission of an
exclusivity provision was in fact evidence of the drafters' intent that the Convention was to be
non-exclusive. Mr. Bruno Ristau, Former Director of the Office of Foreign Litigation, U.S.
Department of Justice, and a participant in the negotiations and drafting of the Convention,
indicated that:
[based on his] personal notes on, and recollections of, departmental meetings
prior to and following the adoption of the Eviden~e Convention, the question of what
impact the Convention would have on outgoing requests from the United Statese.g., whether Rule 28(b), F. R. Civ. P., or other discovery Rules should be
amended-was never raised or discussed.
B. RISTAU, supra note 16, § 5-40, at 268.1 n.83 (emphasis in original). Similarly, in the 1985
Report of the Special Commission, supra note 119, at 1668, the Commission indicated that the
question of the exclusivity of the Convention "was a new issue" which had not arisen before.
Id. at 1678. This suggests that the drafters of the Convention did not intentionally omit
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tory that the issue of exclusivity was ever addressed, or that the drafters
intentionally omitted preemptive language, from the text of the Convention.3 What is clear from the negotiating history is that the drafters
intended to preserve the availability of existing domestic laws of each
state to enable a responding state to produce evidence more expeditiously
than through the Convention.36 5 Thus, although the literal text of the
Convention does not reflect that it was intended to be exclusive, the lack
of an exclusivity provision is not clearly attributable to the drafters'
thoughtful consideration of the issue, as suggested by the Court.
The majority also observed that both Chapters I and II of the Convention, which describe the methods of gathering evidence abroad, use
'3 66
the permissive term "may" rather than the mandatory term "shall.
Consequently, the Court reasoned that "[tihe absence of any command
that a contracting State must use Convention procedures when they are
not needed is conspicuous." 3 67 The Court's argument is based on a superficial reading of the Convention and is unpersuasive. Since the Convention provides three alternative methods that may be used to gather
evidence abroad,3 68 the use of the term "may" in each alternative provision seems entirely appropriate. 369 Had the drafters used the word
"shall" in Chapters I and II, a litigant would have been bound to use all
three alternatives each time evidence was sought. This absurd result
would have made compliance impossible. Comparison of the terminology contained in the Hague Service Convention supports this argument.
Only one uniform procedural mechanism for serving documents abroad
is available in the Hague Service Convention. Therefore, since all contracting states must use this procedure uniformly, the use of the term
"shall" throughout the Hague Service Convention was required.
mandatory language from the Preamble of the Hague Evidence Convention in order to make
use of the Convention optional.
364. See generally 1969 Report of the United States Delegation, supra note 74 and P.
AMRAM, EXPLANATORY REPORT, supra note 126.
365. See supra notes 80-100 and accompanying text.
366. Adrospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2551.
Thus, Article 1 provides that a judicial authority in one contracting State "may"
forward a letter of request to the competent authority in another contracting State
for the purpose of obtaining evidence. Similarly, Articles 15, 16, and 17 provide that
diplomatic officers, consular agents, and commissioners "may ... without compulsion," take evidence under certain conditions.
Id. & nn.17 & 18.
367. Id.
368. See supra text accompanying notes 101-14.
369. McLean, supra note 8, at 47-50.
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a. Philip Amram's statement
The Court failed to resolve a significant misunderstanding regarding
the Convention which arose from a statement made prior to its ratification. Philip Amram, Rapporteur to the 1968 Hague Conference, and a
member of the Special Commission which produced the initial draft of
the Convention, commented prior to ratification that the Convention
"makes no major changes in United States procedure and requires no
major changes in United States legislation or rules. ' '3 70 This statement
has been relied on repeatedly by United States courts to support the
proposition that adopting the Convention resulted in no changes in
37 1
United States law.
It has been argued, however, that in view of the compromises that
were made during the negotiation of the Convention, the reliance on Mr.
Amram's statement is misplaced.3 72 It is well-documented that the civillaw nations that participated in the drafting of the Convention agreed to
modify their internal evidence gathering practices to accomodate requests from the United States and other common-law nations. 373 This
was necessary due to the inherent differences between the common-law
and civil-law judicial systems. 374 The civil-law states agreed, for the purposes of satisfying requests under the Convention, to take evidence
370. Contained in STATEMENT OF CARL F. SALANS, supra note 72, at 5. Mr. Amram also
stated that "[o]n the other front, it will give United States courts and litigants abroad enormous aid by providing an international agreement for the taking of testimony, the absence of
which has created barriers to our courts and litigants." Id.
371. B. RISTAU, supra note 16, § 5-40, at 255; see, eg., In re Anschuetz, 754 F.2d at 610
n.19; Work v. Bier, 106 F.R.D. 45, 52 (D.D.C. 1985); Laker Airways, 103 F.R.D. at 49;
Compagnie Francaise, 105 F.R.D. at 28; Graco, 101 F.R.D. at 519-24; Wilson v. Lufthansa
German Airlines, 108 A.D.2d 393, 395, 489 N.Y.S.2d 575, 577 (1985); Starcher,328 S.E.2d at
498 (1985).
372. B. RISTAU, supra note 16, § 5-40, at 255-56; Petitioner's Reply Brief at 8,Adrospatiale
(No. 85-1695).
373. Philip Amram explained in United States Ratification of the Hague Evidence Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad, 67 AM. J. INT'L L. 104 (1973) that:
[t]he Convention effectively resolves the troublesome problem of assuring that
the evidence taken will be effectively useful in the tribunal where it is to be introduced. Each party to the Convention agrees in Article 9 that if the requesting authority asks that a special method or procedure be followed (which is different from
the domestic procedure of the requested authority), the requested authority shall
comply with that request unless it is ... impossible of performance. These exceptions should be inapplicable in the United States. Any "special method" which will
be requested by a civil law country will doubtless be the conventional letter of request, with which all common law courts are familiar. Letters of request are neither
incompatible with U.S. practice nor impossible of performance here. This article,
however, will impose obligations on civil law courts to take evidence "common-law
style," a method with which they are not familiar.
Id. at 106.
374. See supra notes 21-52 and accompanying text.
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"common-law style."37' 5 This compromise addressed the core issue that
initially inspired the need for the Convention.3 76 When the Convention
was drafted, the methods of evidence gathering used in the United States
were broad and encompassed all of the civil-law techniques. 7 7 Therefore, it was unnecessary for the United States to require judges and liti-

gants to alter their practices in order to satisfy requests under the
Convention.3 7 8 When the Convention was submitted to President Nixon,
he was advised that "[a] significant aspect of the ... Convention is...
that although it requires little change in the present procedures in the
United States[,] it promotes changes, in the direction of modem and efficient procedures, in the present practices of many other states."37 9
Further, since the Hague Evidence Convention is a self-executing

treaty,380 there was no need to enact legislation or rules to implement its
procedures when it was ratified. 3 1 Public Law 88-6193"2 and 28 U.S.C.
1782383 were in effect and empowered the federal courts to honor re-

quests that would be forthcoming from foreign nations. President Nixon
375. See supra note 373; P. AMRAM, EXPLANATORY REPORT, supra note 126, at 23.
376. See supra text accompanying notes 21-52 & 68-100. In the 1969 Report of the United
States Delegation,supranote 74, one of the primary purposes of the Convention was explained:
[It is clear that] no country could be expected to abandon its historic method of
taking evidence and its local practice and procedure. What should be asked was that
a country agree, in international litigation, to follow as closely as possible the practice and procedure of the requesting State, in order that the evidence might be taken
in a manner which most closely approached the technique of the forum where the
action was pending.
Id. at 806.
377. See supra text accomanying notes 21-52.
378. See supra note 373.
379. LETrER OF SUBMITTAL, supra note 26, at XI.
380. The constitutional requirements of many countries demand some further step beyond
ratification of a treaty in order to make the treaty binding on its citizens in the same way
domestic law is. G. VON GLAHN, supra note 13, at 500. In Switzerland, for example, a treaty
must be published in the official government journal before it acquires any domestic authority.
Id. Certain treaties require the passage of domestic legislation before they will have any effect
on the citizens of the contracting country. Id. However, no additional implementing legislation needs to be passed to make a self-executing treaty binding on domestic citizens. Id. Further, a state's failure to carry out implementary acts (proclamation, publication, legislation)
subsequent to ratification of a treaty does not eliminate the obligations incurred through ratification. Id. at 501. A government's obligations toward other parties to the agreement continue
in force despite the nonperformance of any domestic acts. Id.

381. LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL TO THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES FROM PRESIDENT NIXON, SEN. EXEC. A, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., III (1972) [hereinafter LETTER OF
TRANSMITTAL].
382. Act approved October 3, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-619, 78 Stat. 995. The Act amended 28
U.S.C. § 1781 and § 1782 to provide broad judicial assistance to foreign countries and
litigants.
383. 28 U.S.C. § 1782 (1983). Section 1782 provides "foreign countries and litigants, without a requirement of reciprocity, wide judicial assistance on a unilateral basis for... obtaining
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confirmed that the Convention was fully consistent with the exisiting policy of judicial assistance embodied in those laws so that ratification of the
Convention "require[d] no amendments to that legislation. On the other
hand, ... many other countries, particularly civil law countries, [will
'3 4
have to] make important changes in their judicial assistance practice.
It is clear that the negotiating teams devoted a substantial portion of
time to resolving the inherent differences in evidence-gathering methods
that existed among them. Furthermore, the drafters never discussed the
Convention's relationship to existing statutory procedural rules in the
United States.3" 5 By isolating the text of Mr. Amram's statement from
the circumstances that surrounded it, the majority developed a seemingly
plausible, but inaccurate interpretation of the statement. The Court's reliance on Mr. Amram's statement to support its view that the Convention was not intended to alter evidence-gathering procedures abroad is
misplaced.
b. the government'sposition
The Court also relied on the position of the Executive Branch and
the Securities and Exchange Commission to support its conclusion that
the Federal Rules were unaffected by ratification of the Hague Evidence
Convention: 38 6 "Our conclusion is confirmed by the position of the Executive Branch and the Securities and Exchange Commission, which interpret the 'language, history, and purposes' of the Hague Convention as
indicating 'that it was not intended to prescribe the exclusive means by
which American plaintiffs might obtain foreign evidence.' ",387 The
Court adhered to the principle set forth in Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc.
v. Avagliano,38 8 that "the meaning attributed to treaty provisions by the
Government agencies charged with their negotiation and enforcement is
'3 8 9
entitled to great weight.
In Sumitomo and other cases involving treaty disputes, the Court
has relied on foreign government interpretations of disputed provisions,
... evidence in the United States." Amram, The Proposed Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad, 55 A.B.A. J. 651, 651 (1969).
384. LETTER OF TRANSMITrAL, supranote 381. See also B. RiSTAU, supra note 16, § 5-40,
at 256; Petitioner's Reply Brief at 8, Adrospatiale (No. 85-1695).
385. See supra note 363.
386. Airospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2551 n.19.
387. Id. (quoting Brief for the United States and the Securities and Exchange Commission
as Amici Curiae at 9, Adrospatiale (No. 85-1695)).
388. 457 U.S. 176 (1982).
389. Id. at 184-85.
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as well as the position of the United States government.390 In those

cases, however, the interpretations provided by foreign governments
were in full agreement with the United States' position.3 9 ' In contrast,
the amicus briefs ified in Adrospatiale on behalf of the governments of
France, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany indicated that the current United States interpretation of the Convention was
inconsistent with the intent and expectations of other signatory nations.39 2 The Court, however, did not acknowledge this crucial
disagreement.3 93

The Court did not discuss the fact that the United States government radically changed its interpretation of the Convention in 1984.394

Although the government has never offered an explanation for the
change, this did not affect the weight that the Court accorded to the

Solicitor General's current position. In view of the statement by the
Court in Sumitomo that ex post facto government interpretations are
"not conclusive, ' 395 it seems reasonable to expect that the Court would
have scrutinized the government's position in more detail.
In December 1983, the Solicitor General unequivocally stated that
the United States viewed the Hague Evidence Convention as the exclusive mechanism for conducting discovery abroad. 39 6 Nine months later,
the government departed from its earlier position and informed the
Court that the Convention was intended to be an optional supplement to
390. See cases cited supra note 356.
391. O'Connor, 107 S.Ct. at 351 (U.S. application of Panama Canal Treaty unchallenged
by Panama); Air France, 470 U.S. at 404-05 (subsequent interpretations of term "accident" in
Warsaw Convention by sister signatories in accordance with American view and entitled to
considerable weight); Sumitomo, 457 U.S. at 184 n.10 (Japan's interpretation of Friendship,
Commerce and Navigation Treaty identical to United States' interpretation and entitled to,
great weight).
392. See Brief of Amicus Curiae the Republic of France in Support of Petitioners at 8-9,
Adrospatiale (No. 85-1695) (the Convention sets forth mandatory procedures unless the foreign
sovereign permits otherwise); Brief for the Federal Republic of Germany as Amicus Curiae at
13-17, Airospatiale(No. 85-1695); Brief for the Government of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 8, Adrospatiale
(No. 85-1695); Brief of Government of Switzerland as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners
at 11-12, Airospatiale(No. 85-1695).
The government of Switzerland also filed an amicus brief. Switzerland filed its brief in
anticipation of becoming a signatory to the Convention in the future. Brief of Government of
Switzerland as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 2, Adrospatiale (No. 85-1695).
393. See supra note 392.
394. See supra text accompanying notes 146-74.
395. Sumitomo, 457 U.S. at 184.
396. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 5-6, Volkswagenwerk A.G. v. Falzon,
464 U.S. 811 (1983), appeal dismissed, 465 U.S. 1014 (1984) (No. 82-1888).
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domestic rules of civil procedure. a97 The policy changes in the State Department and the Securities and Exchange Commission that influenced

the Solicitor General to reinterpret the Convention in 1984 have never
been disclosed. The State Department's current position on the Conven-

tion appears to have evolved in accordance with the Reagan Administration's approach to international adjudication and its wavering observance
of United States' treaty obligations. The recent international enforcement efforts of the Securities and Exchange Commission appear to have
provided further impetus for the United States to retreat from its obligations under the Hague Evidence Convention.
i.

the State Department

The Solicitor General's office modified its position concerning the
exclusivity of the Hague Evidence Convention in 1984.398 At that time,

the United States' committment to international adjudication underwent
a substantial change. In April, 1984, the Republic of Nicaragua fied a

complaint in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) alleging that the
United States was involved in military and paramilitary actions against
Nicaragua in violation of international law.3 99 Three days before the

complaint was filed, the United States attempted to eliminate the jurisdiction of the ICJ by withdrawing from the jurisdiction of the ICJ with

regard to any disputes with Central America.'

Despite the fact that the

United States' filing was untimely, the ICJ held that it did have jurisdiction over the dispute." 1 After the jurisdictional decision, and in anticipation'of an adverse judgment against it, the United States boycotted
further proceedings in the case.' 2 Following its walkout, the United

States withdrew altogether from the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ
effective April 7, 1986.4

3

397. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 8-9, Club M6diterranie S.A. v. Dorin,
465 U.S. 1019, appealdismissed and cert denied, 469 U.S. 913 (1984) (No. 83-461).
398. See supra text accompanying notes 396-97.
399. Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984
I.C.J. 392 (Jurisdiction of the Court and Admissibility of the Application).
400. Id. at 415-21, paras. 52-65 (Nov. 26). The withdrawal was unsuccessful because the
United States Declaration required a six month notice period before termination of the ICJ's
jurisdiction would be effective. 39 I.C.J. Y.B. 99, 100 (1985).
401. Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984
I.C.J. 392 (Jurisdiction of the Court and Admissibility of the Application).
402. Department of State, United States: Statement on the U.S. Withdrawalfrom the Proceedings Initiatedby Nicaraguain the InternationalCourt of Justice,Jan. 18, 1985, reprintedin
24 I.L.M. 246 (1985).
403. Department of State Letter and Statement Concerning Termination of Acceptance of
IC.J. Compulsory Jurisdiction,Oct. 7, 1985, reprintedin 24 I.L.M. 1742 (1985).
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The State Department indicated in a press release that the United
States was not withdrawing completely from the ICJ, and that it was
willing to participate in the adjudication of treaties in cases which might
be referred to the ICJ by both parties.' The United States thus established that it was only willing to diminish its national sovereignty, by
submitting to international adjudication, when it appears to be in its own
best interests.
Strict adherence to treaty obligations has not been a hallmark of the
Reagan Administration either. For example, the Administration has attempted to broaden the interpretation of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile
Treaty (ABM Treaty) between the United States and the Soviet Union in
order to permit research into space-based national defense systems. °5 In
this regard, Dante B. Fascell (D.-Fla.), Chairman on Foreign Affairs,
U.S. House of Representatives, has observed:
The Reagan Administration has proposed to... articulat[e] a
new interpretation of the ABM treaty which opens the door to
testing in outer space, and thus to SDI. Congress has neither
abandoned the treaty obligations of the United States nor
thrown overboard the doctrine of mutual deterrence. Congress
has a duty to insist that the case for a major shift in strategic
nuclear strategy be convincingly made by the Administration
and that it obtain bipartisan support (neither of which has
occurred).
That support will not be forthcoming if the Administration continues to insist on its reinterpretation of the ABM
treaty as a vehicle by which to dismantle the doctrine of mutual
deterrence. The Administration's tactics in this respect encroach on the Senate's constitutional responsibility to approve
only one text of a treaty as the law of the land. The executive
branch has no constitutional power to unilaterally reinterpret
treaties. 4 6
The Administration appears to have taken a similar approach in attempting to uiilaterally reinterpret the Hague Evidence Convention. The
Supreme Court's decision in Adrospatiale,that the United States can rely
on the Hague Evidence Convention only when it will facilitate evidence
gathering abroad, parallels the United States' stance on international adjudication, and appears to reflect an evolving policy within the Executive
404. Id. at 1743-45.
405. See generally Klema, Strategic Defense Initiative and the New Interpretation of the
ABM Treaty, 10 ASILS INT'L L. J. 149 (1986).
406. Fascell, Congress and Arms Control, 65 FOREIGN AiF. 730, 736 (1987).
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Branch that adherence to international obligations is unnecessary when it
may be adverse to United States' interests.
ii.

the Securities and Exchange Commission

Although State Department policy was important to the Solicitor
General's formulation of our obligations under the Convention, it appears that the Securities and Exchange Commission provided the strongest impetus for the United States to retreat from our obligations under
the Convention. For the first time in the ongoing dispute over the Hague
Evidence Convention, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
joined in the amicus brief of the United States.' 7 The Solicitor General
stated that the SEC had used the Convention's procedures in the past to
obtain evidence abroad and "thus has [had] actual experience with the
practical operation of its transnational discovery methods."'"' 8
The increased internationalization of securities markets over the
past few years has created serious challenges for SEC enforcement efforts
abroad.4 9 Michael D. Mann of the SEC's Office of International Legal
Assistance noted in 1985 that "[s]ecrecy and blocking laws can inhibit
disclosure of critical evidence to the SEC in its investigation overseas.
The documents sought by the SEC under U.S. rules may be outside of
the allowable scope of discovery in a foreign nation .... [N]o method
currently exists for resolving the conflicts in international laws ....,41o
In 1986, SEC Commissioner Charles C. Cox presented a paper to the
International Association of Securities Commissions in which he observed that the SEC's investigative power is greatly limited with regard
to international offerings. 4 ' Cox further noted that foreign law often
does not permit investigative or pre-trial discovery and that the Commission has no jurisdiction to compel production of evidence in foreign
countries.4 1 Cox stated that multinational transactions can be "advantageous to securities law violators desiring to conceal evidence of their
activities from enforcement authorities. ' 41 3 In Cox's opinion, the procedures for gathering evidence abroad which existed in 1986 were inade407. Brief for the United States and the Securities and Exchange Commission as Amici
Curiae, Adrospatiale (No. 85-1695).
408. Id at 1-2.
409. SEC Official Discusses InternationalLaw Enforcement, [Vol. 85-224] The SEC Today
(Wash. Serv. Bur.) at 1 (Nov. 20, 1985).
410. Id.
411. Cox Discusses InternationalTradingBefore the Int'l Ass'n. of Securities Commissions,
[Vol. 86-160] The SEC Today (Wash. Serv. Bur.) at 1 (Aug. 19, 1986).
412. Id.
413. Id.
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quate for the SEC to gather evidence abroad prior to litigation.4 14
The SEC's dissatisfaction with the procedures of the Hague Evidence Convention were reviewed by the Solicitor General in the United
States' brief.4 15 The Solicitor General observed that the SEC's "limited
experience" with the Convention had been unsatisfactory.41 6 The Solicitor General explained that the SEC had only used the Convention four
times to obtain documents and testimony from third party witnesses "for
use in enforcement actions involving insider trading in violation of the
federal securities laws. 41 7 In each instance, the requests either failed to
produce the information needed, or were successful but were extremely
time consuming and expensive.4" 8
The Solicitor General admitted, however, that the SEC experience
with the Convention was "atypical" since the Commission is a government enforcement agency and the Convention was designed to be used in
private civil and commercial litigation.41 9 In fact, the Solicitor General
was informed by the State Department that "private plaintiffs [in typical
negligence or contract actions] have found resort to the Convention more
successful."'42 Nevertheless, the Solicitor General indicated that the
SEC's experience supported the belief that adopting a "blanket presumption mandating 'first-use' of the Convention in all cases would be
unwise." 42 1
The SEC has been involved in the past few years in negotiating bilateral agreements with foreign countries to assist the Commission in its
international enforcement efforts.4 22 Since the SEC has not used the
Hague Evidence Convention extensively, it is possible that the mere
414. Id. See Mann & Sullivan, CurrentIssues in InternationalSecuritiesLaw Enforcement,
in SECURITIES ENFORCEMENT INSTITUTE 1987, PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE CORPORATE
LAW & PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK 769, 789-843 (1987) for a discussion of the obstacles

encountered by the SEC in its international enforcement efforts. The authors also discuss the
limited utility of the Hague Evidence Convention and the SEC's need to enter into bilateral
agreements to provide a reliable mechanism for obtaining evidence abroad. Id. at 829-41.
415. Brief for the United States and the Securities and Exchange Commission at 15-18,
Adrospatiale (No. 85-1695).
416. Id. at 15.
417. Id. at 15-16.
418. Id. at 16-18.
419. Id. at 18; see also Adrospatiale, 107 S.Ct. at 2565 n.20 (Blackmun, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
420. Brief for the United States and the Securities and Exchange Commission at 18, Adrospatiale (No. 85-1695).
421. Id.
422. U.S. and UK Reach Agreement to Cooperatein Securities-RelatedInvestigations,[Vol.
86-185] The SEC Today (Wash. Serv. Bur.) at 1 (Sept. 24, 1986); PetersDebates Regulation of
InternationalSecurities Markets, [Vol. 86-227] The SEC Today (Wash. Serv. Bur.) at 1 (Nov.
25, 1986).
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existence of the Convention was hampering SEC efforts to negotiate additional bilateral agreements to gain access to information abroad.
Although the SEC has been successful in reaching accords with Japan,
the United Kingdom, Switzerland and the Cayman Islands to enable the
United States to gather information abroad,4 23 it seems likely that the
existence of a valid United States treaty on the subject of the taking of
evidence abroad may have been asserted by other foreign nations to avoid
entering into any additional agreements. By taking the position that the
Hague Evidence Convention is merely optional, the United States gains
the bargaining power to encourage other nations to enter into additional
bilateral agreements concerning securities enforcement to alleviate the
friction created by SEC attempts to apply United States law extraterritorially during its investigations. If this is in fact the case, it is not surprising that SEC Commissioner Joseph A. Grundfest observed that in view
of the "unusually heavy docket of securities laws cases" facing the
Supreme Court in 1987, including Adrospatiale, 1987 was predicted to be
"the most important year for the SEC since it was established in
1934. " 424
Despite the fact that the SEC faces problems in international securities enforcement, it must be reiterated that the object of the Hague Evidence Convention was to provide procedures for private litigants to
obtain evidence abroad in civil or commercial disputes.425 The government has effectively interjected private litigants into a problem with
which they have little concern. If, based on the experience of private
litigants, the Convention had proved ineffective because foreign governments were uncooperative, the United States might have been justified in
retreating from our obligations under the Convention. It is disconcerting
that the Solicitor General purported to justify a reinterpretation of the
Convention based on the terms and operation of the Convention itself,
when it appears that the current United States position on the Convention was really inspired by diplomatic problems and the hidden agenda of
the Securities and Exchange Commission.
The Supreme Court's disposition in Arospatiale might have been an
attempt to accomodate both private and governmental interests. Government agencies can use the optional character of the Convention to
their advantage in future negotiations whereas private litigants can take
423. US. and U.K. Reach Agreement to Cooperatein Securities-RelatedInvestigations, [Vol.
86-185] The SEC Today (Wash. Serv. Bur.) at 1 (Sept. 24, 1986).
424. Grundfest Predicts: 1987 SEC's Most Important Year, [Vol. 87-8] The SEC Today
(Wash. Serv. Bur.) at 1 (Jan. 13, 1987).
425. See supra notes 68-100 and accompanying text.
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advantage of the Convention when it will facilitate transnational discovery. However, the Court's failure to acknowledge that the Convention
can alleviate many difficulties associated with transnational discovery
disputes when it is used in the context for which it was designed-private
civil and commercial litigation-might well discourage trial courts from
ordering discovery to proceed under the Convention.
2.

Article 23

Article 23 of the Convention permits a contracting state to declare
that it will not comply with pre-trial requests for documents "as known
in Common Law countries."4 26 The Court relied erroneously on the
presence of Article 23427 to support its conclusion that the Convention
was intended as a permissive supplement to the Federal Rules.42 First,
the majority inaccurately stated that Article 23 enables a contracting
state to declare that it will not "execute any letter of request in aid of
pretrial discovery in a common law country."4 29 The Court reasoned
that it would have been anomalous for the United States to have agreed
to Article 23 had it expected the Convention to be mandatory.430 The
Court rejected the possibility that the United States intended to relinquish all recourse to the procedures available under the Federal Rules
while permitting civil-law states to "unilaterally abrogate" the Convention's procedures by filing an Article 23 declaration.4 3 1
Although the impact of Article 23 has been vigorously debated by
courts and commentators alike,4 32 the Adrospatiale Court allocated only
a portion of one brief paragraph to the provision.4 3 3 The Court not only
misstated the terms of Article 23, it developed its own interpretation of
the provision which supported a permissive application of the Convention. Contrary to the Court's description, however, Article 23 provides
that a state may refuse to execute letters of request for the purpose of
426. Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 13, at art. 23.
427. See supra text accompanying notes 115-21 for an explanation of the conflict over Article 23.
428. Adrospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2551-52.
429. Id. (emphasis added).
430. Id. at 2552.
431. Id.
432. Many courts have held that the terms of Article 23 indicate that the Convention was
not designed to be mandatory. See cases cited supra note 120. Many commentators have
concluded that Article 23 should not be interpreted so as to defeat the binding obligations of
the Convention. See B. RiSTAU, supra note 16, § 5-40, at 253-256.4; Oxman, supra note 12, at
771-79; McLean, supra note 8, at 32-35; Radvan, supra note 119, at 1042-46.
433. Airospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2551-53.
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obtaining pre-trial discovery of documents. 434 Article 23 applies only to
the production of documents, and does not affect responses to interroga-

tories or oral testimony.
On its face, Article 23 permits a contracting state to refuse to comply with pre-trial document requests. The Court therefore reasoned that

the Convention is ineffective for producing needed discovery, thus leading to the conclusion that the Convention was not intended to be the sole
method for obtaining evidence abroad.43 5 The course of conduct between

the parties to the Convention since 1972 shows that, contrary to the
Court's conclusion, Article 23 in practice has not been shown to be a
barrier to effective use of the Convention. 3 6
There is almost no negotiating history regarding Article 23. 43 1 It
was adopted at the request of the United Kingdom delegation shortly

before the final text of the Convention was approved; therefore, the drafting group did not discuss the clause.4 38 The United Kingdom proposed

the provision out of its distrust of American pre-trial discovery procedures, which in their view had often led to "fishing expeditions" for evidence to support anticipated lawsuits.43 9
After the Convention was implemented, the United Kingdom ex-

plained that Article 23 was intended to control document requests that
do not indicate precisely which documents need to be produced for examination.' 0 In fact, the United Kingdom's declaration restricts only
those requests that make identification of the documents to be produced
impossible."

This restriction conforms with Article 3, which states that

434. Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 13, at art. 23 (emphasis added).
435. Adrospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2552; Brief for the United States and the Securities and
Exchange Commission at 15, Adrospatiale (No. 85-1695); see supra note 120.
436. See infra notes 44647.
437. B. RisTAu, supra, note 16, § 5-35, at 228.
438. Id. In fact, the only reference to Article 23 by the drafters in their report on the
negotiation and drafting of the Convention states that "Article 23 permits a State to refuse to
execute a letter, issued to obtain pre-trial discovery of documents." 1969 Report of the United
States Delegation, supra note 74, at 808-09.
439. Report on the Work of the Special Commission on the Operationof the Convention of 18
March 1970 on the Takingof Evidence Abroad in Civil or CommercialMatters, 17 I.L.M. 1425,
1428 [hereinafter 1978 Reportof the Special Commission]; B. RSTAu, supra note 16, § 5-35, at
229; 1978 Report of the United State Delegation,supra note 119, at 1421.
440. 1978 Report of the Special Commission, supra note 439, at 1428,
441. Id. The United Kingdom's declaration states:
In accordance with Article 23 Her Majesty's Government declare that the United
Kingdom will not execute Letters of Request issued for the purpose of obtaining pretrial discovery of documents. Her Majesty's Government further declare that Her
Majesty's Government understand "Letters of Request issued for the purpose of obtaining pre-trial discovery of documents" for the purposes of the foregoing Declaration as including any Letter of Request which requires a person:-
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a letter of request must specify the evidence to be obtained or the docu-

ments to be examined.

42

After ratification, it became evident that Arti-

cle 23 had been poorly drafted due to a gross misunderstanding of the
term "pre-trial discovery" by the civil-law contracting states. 4 3 Mr.
Bruno Ristau, who participated in the drafting of the Convention, and
served as United States delegate to the Special Commission that reviewed
its operation in 1978, explained that during the 1978 review:

[i]t became apparent... that there was not only considerable
apprehension about the sweeping pre-trial discovery practice

permitted under United States law, but that the delegates from
a number of civil law countries displayed an appalling misun-

derstanding of the institution of "pre-trial discovery[.]" [T]o
them, the term "pre-trial" was synonomous with "prior to the

institution of a suit." Almost all civil law delegates were conversant with the English expression "fishing expedition." It

therefore followed that their States had to decline lending judicial aid to such searches for potential evidence by prospective
plaintiffs. 4 4
After the United States delegate explained the function of American prea. to state what documents relevant to the proceedings to which the Letter of Request relates are, or have been, in his possession, custody, or power; or
b. to produce any documents other than particular documents specified in the Letter of Request as being documents appearing to the requested court to be, or to
be likely to be, in his possession, custody or powers.
8 MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY, Selected International Conventions, Part VII,
19 (1987).
442. Article 3 provides that a Letter of Request shall specify:
(a) the authority requesting its execution and the authority requested to execute it, if
known to the requesting authority;
(b) the names and addresses of the parties to the proceedings and their representatives, if
any;
(c) the nature of the proceedings for which the evidence is required, giving all necessary
information in regard thereto;
(d) the evidence to be obtained or other judicial act to be performed.
In appropriate cases, the Letter of Request must also specify:
(e) the names and addresses of the persons to be examined;
(f) the questions to be put to the persons to be examined or a statement of the subjectmatter about which they are to be examined;
(g) the documents or other property, real or personal, to be inspected;
Ch) any requirement that the evidence is to be given on oath or affirmation, and any
special form to be used;
(i) any special method or procedure to be followed under Article 9.
Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 13, at art. 3.
443. B. RisTAU, supra note 16, § 5-35, at 229; see also 1978 Report of the United States
Delegation, supra note 119, at 1421.
444. B. RISTAU, supra note 16, § 5-35, at 229; see also 1978 Report of the United States
Delegation, supra note 119, at 1421.
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trial discovery and made it clear that discovery is conducted only after a
lawsuit is instituted, the "delegates from the civil law jurisdictions agreed
to urge their governments to reconsider their declarations under Article
23 of the Convention."" 5
Since 1980, all but three signatory states have modified, or are in the
process of modifying, their Article 23 declarations to restrict compliance
only with those letters of request that do not specifically enumerate
which documents are needed." 6 Moreover, there is no evidence that in
practice Article 23 has created a roadblock for litigants, since refusals to
execute have been very infrequent.' 7 The Republic of France advised
445. B. RSTAU, supra note 16, § 5-35, at 232; see also 1978 Report of the United States
Delegation, supra note 119, at 1424.
446. Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, Singapore, and Sweden have
modified their declarations to conform to that of the United Kingdom. See supra note 441 for
the text of the United Kingdom's declaration. See also 8 MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY, Selected International Conventions, Part VII, 15-19 (1987).
In 1986, the French Ministry of Justice revised its position on Article 23. The French
declaration now states:
The declaration made by the Republic of France pursuant to Article 23 relating
to letters of request whose purpose is "pre-trial discovery of documents" does not
apply so long as the requested documents are limitatively enumerated in the letter of
request and have a direct and clear nexus with the subject matter of the litigation.
Airospatiale, 107 S.Ct. at 2566 n.22 (Blackmun, J.,concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(quoting Letter from J. B. Raimond, Minister of Foreign Affairs, France, to H. H. Broek,
Minister of Foreign Affairs, The Netherlands (Dec. 24, 1986)).
The Federal Republic of Germany has also taken steps to qualify its Article 23
declaration:
The Federal Republic of Germany has recently accelerated the procedure for the
issuance of regulations which will permit the pre-trial production of documents when
they are clearly identified, relevant and do not unnecessarily divulge business secrets.
The government of the Federal Republic of Germany is endeavoring to issue the
regulations before the end of 1986, after the necessary consent of the Bundesrat (Upper House of Parliament) has been obtained. This corresponds with suggestions
made by the Government of the United States on a diplomatic level.
Brief for the Federal Republic of Germany as Amicus Curiae at 9-10, Adrospatiale (No. 851695). Once France and Germany officially modify their declarations, only three countries,
Italy, Luxemburg and Monaco, will have unqualified Article 23 declarations still in effect. See
also B. RISTAU, supra note 16, § 5-35, at 232.
447. 1978 Report of the Special Commission, supra note 439, at 1431. Petitioner A6rospatiale noted that it knew of "no case in which a French court has refused to execute a letter of
request." Brief for Petitioners at 10 n.26, Adrospatiale (No. 85-1695). Further, the Federal
Republic of Germany stated that:
181 formal letters of request from U.S. courts were received by German Central
Authorities from 1980 through 1985. 154 of the letters of request were accepted and
executed. The remaining 27 were rejected because the evidence to be taken was not
sufficiently identified or the request was for the production of documents for pre-trial
discovery. These figures disprove the argument that application of the Convention is
futile.
Brief for the Federal Republic of Germany as Amicus Curiae at 8-9, Adrospatiale (No. 851695) (footnote omitted).
In addition, the Goverment of Switzerland indicated that even though it was not yet a
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the Court in Airospatiale, that its existing Article 23 declaration "was
not intended to preclude American litigants from obtaining necessary evidence."" 8 The majority inAirospatialeneeded to examine Article 23 in
more detail, to consider how it has act'ually been interpreted and narrowly implemented by the Convention's signatories. Had this been done,

the majority could not have reasonably concluded that any contracting
state expected Article 23 to create a genuine impediment to the production of relevant evidence, and thus undermine proper operation of the

Convention.
The United States received what it bargained for in the Convention
in terms of document production: the assured assistance of foreign judicial authorities, by compulsion if necessary, 449 to obtain documentary ev-

idence that has a direct, clear nexus with the subject matter of
commenced litigation. The Court was unwilling to acknowledge this.
The provisions of Article 23 were fully disclosed to President Nixon and
to the Senate prior to ratification. 4 0 Had the State Department or the

Senate been concerned with the operation of Article 23, ratification could
have been postponed and negotiations could have been resumed. It
would have been most anomolous for the civil-law contracting nations to
enter into the treaty only to remain subject to the status quo situation
that existed prior to its implementation: unrestricted extraterritorial ap-

plication of United States discovery procedures in violation of foreign
judicial sovereignty.45 1
signatory to the Convention, it had been "extremely liberal in granting assistance" in gathering
evidence in response to American letters rogatory. It noted that "about twenty requests per
year have been received from the United States, and all have been executed. The Goverment
of Switzerland expects to continue this liberal policy after Switzerland joins the Convention."
Brief of Government of Switzerland as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 6-7 n.4,
Adrospatiale (No. 85-1695).
448. Brief of Amicus Cojriae the Republic of France in Support of Petitioners at 23, Adrospatiale (No. 85-1695).
449. Article 10 of the Coavention requires a state to "apply appropriate measures of compulsion ...to the same extent as are provided by its internal law" to aid in executing Letters of
Request. Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 13, at art. 10. The Republic of France advised the Court in Adrospatialethat "[i]n the isolated instances where the party... declines to
cooperate voluntarily, French courts possess evidence-gathering powers that can be used effectively in aid of the American request. The Republic of France will continue to make use of
those powers whenever so required under the Convention." Brief of Amicus Curiae the Republic of France in Support of Petitioners at 3, Airospatiale (No. 85-1695).
450. MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TRANSMITTING THE CONVENTION ON THE TAKING OF EVIDENCE ABROAD IN CIVIL OR COMMERCIAL MATTERS,
SEN. EXEC. DOC. A, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., VI (1972); P. AMRAM, EXPLANATORY REPORT,

supra note 126, at 15.
451. Justice Blackmun, in his dissent, made a similar argument regarding Article 27. Airo-
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Article 27

To further support its conclusion that the Convention was not intended to modify the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court declared that the language of Article 27452 "plainly states that the
Convention does not prevent a contracting State from using more liberal
methods of rendering evidence than those authorized by the Convention."4'5 3 The majority found that Article 27 indicates "on its face" that
both a requesting state and a state of execution may rely on more liberal
existing policies to request and produce evidence. 4 4 The Court reasoned
that even if Article 27 is held applicable only to states of execution, "the
treaty's internal failure to authorize more liberal procedures for obtaining evidence would carry no pre-emptive meaning.1 45 5 The documented negotiating history of the Convention clearly contradicts the
majority's interpretation of Article 27. Moreover, the majority's analysis
of Article 27 is internally inconsistent with other portions of its opinion.
As Justice Blackmun observed, the Explanatory Report on the Convention,4 56 which was submitted to the Senate prior to ratification, indicates that Article 27 was designed to permit states of execution to
continue using less restrictive internal methods of gathering evidence
other than those in the Convention in order to respond to letters of request.4 57 In fact, each reference to Article 27 in the Explanatory Report
plainly indicates that the provision was designed to preserve the existing
internal practices of states of execution only.458 Furthermore, nothing
spatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2559 n.2. (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See
infra text accompanying notes 504-07.
452. See supra text accompanying note 122 for the text of Article 27.
453. Airospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2552.
454. Id. n.24.

455. Id. at 2553 n.24. The Court further stated: "We are unpersuaded that Article 27
supports a 'negative inference' that would curtail the pre-existing authority of a State to obtain
evidence in accord with its normal procedures." Id.
456. P. AMRAM, EXPLANATORY REPORT, supra note 126.
457. Adrospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2559 n.2 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Justice Blackmun pointed out the incongruity of the majority's reading of Article 27:
The only logical interpretation of this article is that a state receiving a discovery
request may permit less restrictive procedures than those designated in the Convention. The majority finds plausible a reading that authorizes both a requesting and a
receiving state to use methods outside the Convention ....
If this were the case,
Article 27(c), which allows a state to permit methods of taking evidence that are not
provided in the Convention, would make the rest of the Convention wholly superfluous. If a requesting state could dictate the methods for taking evidence in another
state, there would be no need for the detailed procedures provided by the
Convention.
Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
458. The Explanatory Report states:
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contained in the Convention's documented history suggests that Article
27 was indicative of whether the treaty was mandatory or exclusive.45 9
Most perplexing, however, is the internal inconsistency of the
Court's logic in its textual analysis of the Convention. Initially, the
Court reasoned that the text of Article 23 and Chapter I affirmatively
demonstratedthe drafters' intent not to affect the Federal Rules based on
Article 27 has been discussed in connection with almost every one of articles 1
to 22.
This is a most important article, designed to preserve existing internal law and
practice in a Contracting State which provides broader, more generous and less restrictive rules of international cooperation in the taking of evidence for the benefit of
foreign courts and litigants.
It provides, in sub-division (h) that any act provided for in the Convention may
be performed upon less restrictive conditions than the Convention provides, if the
internallaw or practice of the State of execution so permits....
It provides, in sub-division (c), for methods of taking evidence other than those
provided in the Convention, to the extent that internal law and practice will permit.
This means taking evidence without either a Letter of Request or the use of a consul
or commissioner.
For example, counsel for the parties may travel to the home of a willing witness,
call in a local official to administer an oath, and then question the witness, making a
record by stenographer or tape-recorder. Or to save travel expense, competent local
counsel in the State of execution could be briefed to examine the witness. The only
conditionsare that the State of execution willpermit this, and that the resulting record
will be admissible at the trial of the action....
Another example would be for the parties or counsel, with an engineer, to inspect, examine, photograph, measure or test certain machinery in a factory, or the
inside of a mine, with the consent of the owner, to obtain evidence for use at the trial
of the action. Again, if the State of execution will permit ths the result may be satisfactory.
A final example is the illustration given in the Report to the draft Convention,
where the courts in New York and Chicago appointed foreign German and Italian
judges as "commissioners" and granted [them] compulsion against the witnesses, so
that they might examine the witnesses in New York and Chicago in their own langnage, and under their own procedure, without interference or participation by the
local courts. If the internallaw and practice of a particularState offers these broad
privileges to foreign courts and litigants, which go beyond anythingprovidedfor in the
Convention, that State may safely sign and ratify the Convention without thereby affecting its right to continue to offer these extra benefits to foreign courts and litigants.
P. AMRAM, EXPLANATORY REPORT, supra note 126, at 39-40 (emphasis added). See also id.
at 17-18 (state of execution may permit executed letter of request to be returned by route other
than provided for in Convention); id. at 19-20 (state of execution may accept letters of request
in languages other than provided for in Convention if internal law permits); id. at 22 (state of
execution may permit letters to be executed within its territory by methods other than provided in Convention); id. at 31 (state of execution may grant power to foreign consuls to
perform some other judicial act by internal law or practice under Article 27(b)); id. at 32
(Article 27(b) permits any state to permit a consul to take evidence on less restrictive conditions than provided in Article 15); id. at 33 (state of execution may waive permission clauses of
Article 16(1) by the internal law or practice of the State of execution under Article 27(b)); id.
at 34 (consul or commissioner may apply for permission to apply compulsion if the internal
law or practice of the state of execution permits under Article 27(b)).
459. See supra note 457.
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the inclusion of terms in those provisions." In fact, the Court stressed
that absent "explicit textual support" it would be unable to accept an

interpretation of Article 23 that was not evident from the face of the
treaty. 46 1 Similarly, the Court relied on the omission of an exclusivity
provision in the Preamble as strong evidence that the drafters intended to
omit the provision from the treaty in order to make it optional.4 62 The

Court later contradicts its own reasoning by stating that the absence of
language in Article 27 did not preclude it from drawing an inference,
based on the omission, that the parties intended to preserve the availability of procedures under the Federal Rules.46

The Court's result-oriented analysis reflects the parochialism that
has also been evident in the lower court interpretations of the Convention. Rather than examining the d6cumented history of the Convention,

and the intent and purposes of the contracting states, the Court relied on
a superficial reading of the text, and looked at crucial provisions in isolation from the overall purpose of the treaty. The Court's unwillingness to
place the text in the contextual framework in which it was created hindered the Court in properly scrutinizing the Convention, clarifying its
terms and effectuating its goals. 64
4. Fairness concerns
The Court underscored the importance of relying on explicit textual
support to interpret the Convention 46 rather than on the "hypothesis
460. Adrospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2551-52.
461. Id. at 2552.
462. Id at 2550 & n.15.
463. Id. at 2553 n.24.
464. It has been recognized that:
[I]n the process of determining the genuine shared expectations of parties to an
agreement, a simple reading of the final text, while clearly indispensable, may often
be of only limited assistance. Other indices of expectation, including the general
features of the world social and power processes, the particular circumstances attending negotiation, the events occurring during negotiation, and the subsequent actions
of the parties under the agreement, may be of much greater assistance in any given
situation. The point to be stressed is that prior to a comprehensive contextual examination [of an international agreement] no determination of the hierarchicalimportance or relevance of any feature of the context may be usefully made, and any
attempt to do so must ultimately frustrate the ascertainment of genuine shared
expectations.
M. McDOUGAL & H. LASSWELL, supra note 349, at 96-97 (emphasis in original).
465. Adrospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2552 n.23. "The Preamble does not speak in mandatory
terms ..... "Id. at 2550. "The absence of any command... is conspicuous." Id. at 2551. "In
the absence of explicit textual support, we are unable to accept the hypothesis ...." Id. at
2552. "[IThe text... unambiguously supports the conclusion . . . ." Id. at 2552-53. "The...
Convention... contains no such plain statement of a pre-emptive intent." Id. at 2553.
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about the expectations of the parties.14 66 It was willing, nonetheless, to
examine its own hypothetical fairness considerations to determine
whether the Convention was intended to be exclusive or optional.4 67 The
Court expressed its concern that if the Convention were deemed exclusive, it would "effectively subject every American court hearing a case
involving a national of a contracting State to the internal laws of that
State. ' 468 It further asserted that "a rule of exclusivity would
subordinate the court's supervision of even the most routine ... pretrial
proceedings to the actions or, equally, to the inactions of foreign judicial
authorities. ' 469 The Court relied on the reasoning expressed by the Fifth
Circuit in In Re Anschuetz & Co., GmbH:'10
It seems patently obvious that if the Convention were interpreted as preempting interrogatories and document requests,
the Convention would really be much more than an agreement
on taking evidence abroad. Instead, the Convention would
amount to a major regulation of the overall conduct of litigation between nationals of different signatory states, raising a
significant possibility of very serious interference with the jurisdiction of United States courts.
While it is conceivable that the United States could
enter into a treaty giving other signatories control over litigation instituted and pursued in American courts, a treaty intended to bring about such a curtailment of the rights given to
all litigants by the federal rules would surely state its intention
clearly and precisely identify crucial terms.4 71
The majority does not explain why it considers the Convention's
procedures to be conceptually different from the letter rogatory procedure authorized under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 28(b).47 2 In
either case, a United States court retains jurisdiction and control over the
parties to the suit.47 3 A court is not subject to the internal laws of a
...

466. Id. at 2552 n.23. The majority stressed that "both comity and concern for the separation of powers counsel the utmost restraint in attributing motives to sovereign States which
have bargained as equals." Id.
467. Id. at 2553 n.25.
468. Id. at 2553.
469. Id.
470. 754 F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1985), vacated sub nor. Anschuetz & Co., GmbH v. Mississippi River Bridge Authority, 107 S. Ct. 3223 (1987).
471. Id. at 612.
472. FED. R. Civ. P. 28(b).
473. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26; see also supra note 329 and accompanying text.
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foreign nation; rather, the foreign authority serves as a procedural conduit through which a litigant may obtain evidence abroad without violating the sovereignty of the foreign state.4 7 In fact, a letter rogatory issued

pursuant to Federal Rule 28(b) contemplates that "courts of other countries may be expected to follow their customary procedure for taking tes-

timony."'

Furthermore, since "[s]ome foreign countries are hostile to

allowing a deposition to be taken in their country, or to lending assistance in the taking of a deposition.., compliance with the terms of [Fed.

R. Civ. P. 28(b)] may not in all cases ensure completion of a deposition
abroad."47 6

It follows then that the assumptions made by the Fifth Circuit are
unfounded. A United States court can actually obtain greater assistance

and protect itself against being subject to the customs and laws of a foreign state by using the Convention. A foreign authority is bound to comply with the Convention in good faith, and if asked, to use a special

method of gathering evidence to comply with the request of another contracting state.4 77 Also, the Convention is designed to facilitate, rather

than preempt, the transmission of interrogatories and document requests.
Document requests and interrogatories served pursuant to the Federal

Rules are likely to be thwarted by the existence of foreign blocking
laws.47 8
The Court also speculated that "three unacceptable asymmetries"
would be created if the Convention were deemed to be exclusive.47 9
474. Although the Hague Evidence Convention prescribes procedural mechanisms with
which contracting states must comply, a request made pursuant to the Convention is subject,
to an extent, to the substantive legal constraints of the state of execution. Article 9 of the
Convention grants the responding party the right to withhold a response insofar as a privilege
or duty to refuse to give evidence exists. Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 13, at art.
11. However, the right of a foreign national to claim a privilege also exists when discovery is
conducted under the Federal Rules. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
Article 12 of the Convention also expressly states that a contracting state may not refuse
to execute a request solely on the ground that "under its internal law the State of execution
claims exclusive jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the action or that its internal law would
not admit a right of action on it." Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 13, at art. 12. A
state may only refuse execution when the act requested does not fall within the function of its
judiciary or if the state considers that its sovereignty or security would be prejudiced thereby.
Id. The existence of foreign blocking laws demonstrates that states exert the same prerogatives
with respect to discovery conducted under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See supra
notes 53-66 and accompanying text.
475. FED. R. CIv. P. 28(b) advisory committee's note [on 1963 amendments], reprintedin 6
Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) xli-xlii.
476. Id.
477. Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 13, at art. 9.
478. See supra text accompanying notes 53-66.
479. Airospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2553 n.25.
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First, in a lawsuit between a United States national and a foreign national, the foreign party would be entitled to obtain discovery pursuant
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure while the domestic party would
be required to use the procedures of the Hague Evidence Convention. 8 0
The Court implied that a foreign party would have broader access to
relevant information since it would not be constrained by the limitations
of the Convention.4 8 ' Second, the Court asserted that if two companies,
one domestic and one foreign, were both sued in a United States court,
the companies would in effect be competing on unequal terms since the
foreign company would be subject to less extensive discovery procedures
under the Hague Evidence Convention.4" 2 Third, the Court claimed that
a rule of exclusivity would confer an unwarranted advantage on domestic
litigants who are involved in litigation with nationals of states who are
not parties to the Convention.4" 3
The majority's theories are unpersuasive. The Court did not provide even one example to support its contention that use of the Hague
Evidence Convention has actually hampered domestic litigants from obtaining evidence abroad. Similarly, the Court did not show that the strategic position of any domestic litigant in relation to a foreign adversary
has ever been seriously prejudiced by reliance on the Convention. According to Justice Blackmun, a court can alleviate any potential disparity
that might occur by exercising its discretionary power to control discovery to ensure fairness to all parties.4 84 He noted that under the provisions of Federal Rule 26(c), a court can "make any order which justice
requires" to limit discovery, including an order permitting discovery only
on specified terms and conditions, or with limitation in scope to certain
matters.48 5 Therefore, if resorting to the Convention disadvantages a domestic litigant, a court can prevent potential unfairness by similarly restricting the foreign party's access to information.48 6
The hypothetical fairness concerns raised by the Court are based on
the assumption that the Convention hampers, rather than assists, litigants in obtaining evidence abroad. 487 This unfounded belief has served
480. Id.
481. Id.
482. Id.
483. Id. at 2554 n.25.
484. Id. at 2567 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
485. Id. (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c)) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
486. Justice Blackmun suggested that a court could postpone the domestic party's obligation to respond until completion of the foreign discovery. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
487. See id. at 2567 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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as a basis for many lower court opinions as well.4 88 Justice Blackmun

aptly pointed out that dissimilar treatment of litigants occurs in the opposite manner posited by the majority: litigants who need evidence from
nationals of noncontracting states are disadvantaged by the unavailability of Convention procedures.48 9 Justice Blackmun also argued that this
potential disparity in treatment is not manifestly unfair, since there is "an
unavoidable inequality inherent in the benefits conferred by any treaty
that is less than universally ratified. '490 Without any factual justification, the majority mischaracterized the Convention's utility to domestic
litigants. By doing so, the Court developed an interpretation of the Convention that completely contravenes the treaty's clearly articulated purpose-to facilitate evidence gathering abroad.
5. The expectations of the contracting states
The majority did not analyze how the expectations of the signatory
states affected the final agreements embodied in the Convention. The
Court nevertheless made some unfounded general assumptions about the
operation and effect of the Convention to support the conclusion that the
Convention was not intended to be mandatory or exclusive. First, the
Court reasoned that the parties did not expect the treaty to be mandatory
'491
since the text "does not modify the law of any contracting State.
While the text of the Convention itself does not prescribe how the Convention was to affect the existing laws of each contracting state, ratification of the Convention did modify the law of the United States-it
created a new body of federal law which, under the United States Constitution, became the supreme law of the land. 492 According to basic principles of treaty law and customary international law, the Convention
created binding obligations on the United States to adhere to its promises
in good faith.49 As discussed above,494 there was no need to pass implementing legislation in the United States, and the internal evidence gathering procedures of our judicial system did not have to be modified to
satisfy our obligations under the Convention.495 Title 28 United States
488. See cases cited supra note 120.
489. Airospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2567 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
490. Id.
491. Id. at 2550-51.
492. Id. at 2550; U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2.
493. See J. BRIERLY, supra note 349, at 331; G. VON GLAHN, supra note 13, at 170; E.
YAMBRUSIC, supra note 353, at 27.
494. See supra text accompanying notes 380-84.
495. See supra notes 382-83.
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Code section 1782496 was in effect prior to ratification of the Convention,
and it provided broad judicial assistance, without the requirement of reciprocity, to foreign nationals gathering evidence in the United States.4 97
Therefore, it seems plausible that, at least with respect to the United
States, there was no need to modify any domestic law in order to comply
in good faith with the terms of the Convention.
This was not true, however, for the civil-law nations that adopted
the Convention. For example, the Federal Republic of Germany had to
pass legislation in order to make the Convention binding on its citizens.4 98 Further, the Republic of France advised the Court that: "[t]he
French Code of Civil Procedure was extensively amended in order to
make the Convention procedures an integral part of domestic French
law."4' 99 Following ratification of the Convention, the French government revised the French code of civil procedure to incorporate a special
set of provisions on international letters of request. 5" "Articles 733
through 748 of the Nouveau Code de Proc6dure Civile create an exception to French procedural rules in the case of foreign litigants using
Hague Convention procedures, and radically depart from traditional
French rules by opening the Republic of France's borders to United
States-style discovery."5 0 1 The Court's conclusion that the parties did
not expect the Convention to be mandatory because it did not modify the
laws of any contracting state is incorrect.
Second, the Court implied that since the Convention's text does not
require any contracting state to use the Convention exclusively, either to
request evidence or to respond to foreign requests, the parties did not
expect Convention procedures to be compulsory. 02 In his dissent, Justice Blackmun refuted the majority's reasoning.10 3 He asserted that if the
parties had contemplated that contracting states could unilaterally abrogate the requirements of the Convention, and rely on domestic procedures instead, the entire Convention would be, in effect, "wholly
496. 28 U.S.C. § 1782 (1983).

497. Adrospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2548 n.13 (citing Amram, The ProposedConvention on the
Taking of Evidence Abroad, 55 A.B.A. J.651, 651 (1969)).
498. Brief for the Federal Republic of Germany as Amicus Curiae at 9 & n.24, Adrospatiale
(No. 85-1695) (citing Act to implement the Hague Evidence Convention, Bundesgesetzblatt
December 22, 1977 I 3106).
499. Brief of Amicus Curiaethe Republic of France in Support of Petitioners at 2, Adrospatiale (No. 85-1695).
500. Id. at 19.
501. Id. (footnote omitted); see id. at 19-21 for a detailed explanation of the provisions of
France's code of civil procedure.
502. Adrospatiale, 107 S.Ct. at 2550 n.15.
503. Id. at 2559 (Blackmun, L,concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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superfluous." 5" He emphasized that although the text of the Convention on its face does not affirmatively require contracting states to use its
procedures, if the parties had not "expected the Convention to provide
the normal channels for discovery,... [they] would have had no incentive to agree to its terms."' 50 5
The majority suggested that the parties did not expect the Convention to be exclusive because the text of the Convention does not compel
any contracting state to "change its own evidence gathering procedures." 5 6 As discussed above,50 7 it is clear from the negotiating history
and subsequent implementation of the Convention that the civil-law
countries understood that ratification of the Convention would require
them to modify their evidence gathering procedures, despite the fact that
the text of the Convention itself did not so state. 0 After all, the Convention was conceived to improve and liberalize existing procedures for
gathering evidence abroad. 9 Had the Convention not been ratified by
th6 United States, foreign litigants would still have broad access to information located here, whereas domestic litigants would continue to be
stymied in their attempts to obtain utilizable evidence abroad. Therefore, it is only reasonable to assume that the civil-law states expected
good faith reliance on the agreed Convention procedures in return for
their wide-ranging compromises.
Under the majority's interpretation of the Convention, the binding
and operative effects of the Hague Evidence Convention are virtually
eradicated. The Court reached questionable conclusions about the Convention because it superficially examined the text, and isolated the language from the overall purpose and context of the treaty. Further, the
majority did not acknowledge that international agreements impose inherent obligations on all contracting parties based on principles of treaty
law and customary international law." 0 Justice Stevens, in his dissenting
504. Id. n.2 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
505. Id. at 2559 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See infra note
552.
506. Adrospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2551.
507. See supra notes 498-501 and accompanying text.
508. See, eg., Brief ofAmicus Curiae the Republic of France in Support of Petitioners at 2,
5, 11, Adrospatiale (No. 85-1695); Brief for the Federal Republic of Germany as Amicus Curiae at 6, Airospatiale (No. 85-1695); Brief of Amicus Curiae the Italy-America Chamber of
Commerce, Inc. in Support of Petitioners 8-10, Arospatiale (No. 85-1695); see supra notes
498-501 and accompanying text.
509. See supra notes 80-95 and accompanying text.
510. See supra text accompanying notes 349-57; see infra text accompanying notes 521-27;
G. VON GLAHN, supra note 13, at 16.
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opinion in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. FranklinMint Corp.,"'1 observed
that:
The frame of reference in interpreting treaties is naturally international, and not domestic. Accordingly, the language of the
law of nations is always to be consulted in the interpretation of
treaties.... Constructions of treaties yielding parochial variations in their implementation are anathema to the raison d'&re
of treaties, and hence to the rules of construction applicable to
5 12
them.
In Adrospatiale, however, the majority overlooked crucial international
considerations, and resolved the ambiguities of the Convention in a manner reminiscent of a domestic contract dispute rather than an international treaty dispute.
The majority ignored the fact that all contracting states, and particularly the United States, negotiated and ratified the Convention for the
purpose of facilitatingevidence gathering abroad, in order to modify existing practices that had proven unworkable. 13 Moreover, the states
that participated in the negotiation and drafting of the Convention believed that they were reasonably relying on the good faith performance of
the obligations that arise from international law. 14 The Court's analysis
suggests that before the United States can adhere to international treaty
obligations, it must be manifestly clear from the text of the treaty that the
United States intended to be bound by the international contractual obligation. Signature and ratification are not enough. This approach, in
terms of the Hague Evidence Convention, not only frustrates the goals of
the signatories to the Convention, but also sends a dangerous message to
our foreign trading partners that the United States will only adhere to
valid international obligations when it is expedient to do so.
B.

Rejection of a First-Use Rule

After the Court determined that the Hague Evidence Convention by
its terms is not the exclusive method of gathering evidence abroad, the
Court then considered whether to adopt a rule requiring litigants to use
Convention procedures first, before resorting to the Federal Rules of
511. 466 U.S. 243 (1984).
512. Id. at 262-63 (citations omitted) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
513. See supra notes 498-501 and accompanying text.
514. See, eg., Brief of Amicus Curiae the Republic of France in Support of Petitioners at
11-12, Adrospatiale (No. 85-1695); Brief for the Federal Republic of Germany as Amicus Curiae at 16-17, Adrospatiale (No. 85-1695); Brief of Amnicus Curiaethe Italy-America Chamber
of Commerce, Inc. in Support of Petitioners 8, 10, 17, Airospatiale(No. 85-1695).
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Civil Procedure. 5 ' The court of appeals had rejected this proposal based
on the belief that "the greatest insult to a civil law country's sovereignty
would be for American courts to invoke the foreign country's aid merely
as a first resort, subject to the eventual override of their rulings under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." ' 6 The Fifth Circuit had argued that
17
this action would defeat, rather than promote, international comity.'
According to the majority in Airospatiale, the court of appeals' concern
was unfounded since foreign courts recognize that American courts must
make the final decision on what evidence is needed in domestic tribunals."' 8 The Court then declared that adopting a first-use rule for the
Convention would be unwise. 19 The Court relied on three arguments to
justify its position: (1) the text of the Convention imposes no duty to
employ a first-use rule; (2) a first-use rule would adversely affect the jurisdiction of our courts; and (3) Convention520procedures are more burdensome to litigants than the Federal Rules.
1. Absence of an affirmative duty in the text of the Convention
The Court stated that no duty to employ a first-use rule could be
inferred from the text of the Convention. 521 The majority asserted that
the United States has no absolute duty to "accord respect to the sovereignty of states in which evidence is located" by relying on Convention
procedures.5 22 This position, however, fails to acknowledge two vital
concepts that influenced the agreements embodied in the Convention:
the civil-law nations' belief that accepted principles of international law
would be observed, and the significance of the concept of "judicial
sovereignty."
A basic condition to the existence of an international legal order is
the duty of every state to conduct its relations with other countries in
515. Soci&6t Nationale Industrielle Arospatiale v. United States District Court, 107 S. Ct.
2542, 2554-56.
516. In re Socilt6 Nationale Industrielle Arospatiale, 782 F.2d 120, 125-26 (8th Cir. 1986)
(citing In re Anschuetz & Co., GnbH, 754 F.2d 602, 613 (5th Cir. 1985), vacated sub nom.
Anschuetz & Co., GmbH v. Mississippi River Bridge Authority, 107 S.Ct. 3223 (1987)).
517. Id. at 126.
518. Airospatiale,107 S.Ct. at 2554-55. "[A]n American court should [not] refuse to make
use of Convention procedures because of a concern that it may ultimately find it necessary to
order the production of evidence that a foreign tribunal permitted a party to withhold." Id. at
2555.
519. Id.
520. Id.at 2554-56.
521. Id. at 2555.
522. Id.
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accordance with international law.52 3 Although it is accepted that exigent circumstances may make compliance impossible in certain instances, it is undeniable that this fundamental tenet of international law
creates binding obligations among states.5 " Further, it is recognized
that all states have a duty to exercise good faith in complying with obligations that arise from treaties and other sources of international law. 2 5
A state may not invoke a provision in its constitution or laws as an exin
cuse for failing to carry out this duty;5 26 the duty to honor obligations
5 27
order.
legal
a
for
condition
basic
and
essential
an
is
faith
good
The Court's view that the Hague Evidence Convention applies to
United States litigants, but no concurrent obligation to.use the Convention exists, is inherently contradictory, and does not reflect a good faith
attempt to adhere to valid treaty obligations. Rather, the majority appeared to rely on this non sequitur to soften the practical effect of its
decision on foreign nations. If there is no duty to employ a first-use rule,
the possibility exists that very few litigants will be compelled to use Convention procedures. 28 Sporadic reliance on the Convention cannot reasonably be considered to be good faith observance of our commitment to
assist in improving international judicial cooperation. 29
The majority's examination of the foreign concept of "judicial sovereignty" was also incomplete. Justice Blackmun explained that "[u]nder
the classic view of territorial sovereignty, each state has a monopoly on
the exercise of governmental power within its borders and no state may
' 5 30
perform an act in the territory of a foreign state without consent."
The Swiss government elaborated on this concept in defining the foundations of "judicial sovereignty":
Under this fundamental principle of the civil law, which
derives from the doctrine of territorial jurisdiction in interna523. G. VON GLAHN, supra note 13, at 171.
524. Id.
525. Id. at 170.
526. Id.
527. Id. at 171. It is accepted that the fundamental international legal principle of pacta
sunt servanda (treaties must be observed) can only be vitiated under limited circumstances.
See id. at 506-11.
528. See infra notes 592-601 and accompanying text.
529. The text of the Convention explicitly states that each signatory is agreeing through
ratification to "improve mutual judicial co-operation in civil or commercial matters." Hague
Evidence Convention, supra note 13, at Preamble. "The States signatory to the present Convention... [d]esiring to improve mutual judicial co-operation in civil or commercial matters
...[h]ave resolved to conclude a Convention to this effect... ." Id. at Preamble.
concurring in part and dissenting in
530. Adrospatiale, 107 S.Ct. at 2562 (Blackmun, J.,
part).
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tional law, only the state in which the requested evidence is
located has the authority to enforce and execute the gathering
of that evidence. If a U.S. court orders a party to produce evidence from Switzerland, and backs that ordei with its coercive
powers, the U.S. court, in effect, substitutes its own authority
for that of the competent Swiss court, and therefore violates
5 31
Swiss sovereignty and international law.
Therefore, the unauthorized taking of evidence in a civil-law country is
analogous to a foreign national entering the territory of the United States
and attempting to perform a judicial function such as rendering a legal
judgment against a United States citizen. It usurps the judicial sovereignty of the host nation. Furthermore, infringing on a civil-law nation's
judicial sovereignty may adversely affect the constitutional rights of for5 32
eign nationals.
By rejecting a first-use rule, the Court sanctioned the return of the
very situation which prompted the United States to adopt the Convention: the inability to obtain evidence abroad without violating foreign
jidicial sovereignty. The majority's failure to clearly articulate its concern for the sovereignty of other contracting states is an offense to the
nations that attempted to accomodate American interests by entering
into the Convention.533 More than any other factor, the Court's failure
to precisely distinguish between whether the Convention is "exclusive"
and whether it nonetheless creates "mandatory" obligations on the
prudent decision regarding
United States precluded it from reaching a 34
rule.
first-use
a
employing
of
the suitability
531. Brief of Government of Switzerland as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 8,
Adrospatiale (No. 85-1695).
532. Adrospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2563 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
533. The Court did reject two aspects of the court of appeals' decision that it considered
erroneous. First, the Court decided that the Convention draws no distinction between evidence sought from third-party witnesses and evidence sought from the litigants themselves.
Id. at 2554. Second, the Court rejected the locus of evidence argument which has led many
courts to conclude that the Convention is inapplicable in situations where evidence is physically located "abroad," but is nonetheless within the control of a party subject to the court's
jurisdiction. Id. The Court stated that, regardless of whether evidence ultimately will be produced in the United States, the Convention does not distinguish between evidence that is physically located abroad and evidence that is within the control of a party subject to the
jurisdiction of the court. Id.
534. The Court relied on its assessment that the Convention is not "exclusive" to support
its conclusion that the Convention is not "mandatory." Id. at 2554-56. This reasoning is faulty
since the two concepts are unrelated. A determination that the Convention is not exclusive by
its terms does not preclude a finding that international law and principles of international
comity mandate use of the Convention in the first instance. The Court did not have to con-
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Adverse effects on the jurisdiction of our courts

The majority asserted that employing a first-use rule would undermine the power and jurisdiction of United States courts.53 5 Justice
Blackmun disputed this argument in his dissent:
One of the ways that a pro-forum bias has manifested itself
is in United States courts' preoccupation with their own power
to issue discovery orders. All too often courts have regarded
the Convention as some kind of threat to their jurisdiction and
have rejected use of the treaty procedures .... It is well established that a court has the power to impose discovery under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when it has personal jurisdiction over the foreign party.... But once it is determined that
the Convention does not provide the exclusive means for foreign discovery, jurisdictional power is not the issue. The relevant question, instead, becomes whether a court should forgo
5 36
exercise of the full extent of its power to order discovery.
Thus, the majority confounded the notion of jurisdictional power with
the propriety of exercising that power. The Court's rationale for rejecting a first-use rule was tied to its own objective of alerting foreign
states that they too must respect the sovereignty of United States courts
when actions are commenced in our territory. Arrospatiale never argued
that the United States courts should relinquish their jurisdictional power
in order to accomodate foreign interests. The fundamental international
principle that each nation is sovereign over its own territory was not at
issue. Rather, the issue concerned how the United States should interact
with other nations when it does need to exercise its jurisdiction over foreign nationals.5 3 7
Contrary to the Court's position, a first-use rule would not give foreign judicial authorities substantial control over proceedings in United
States courts. First-use of the Convention would not affect a court's ability under Federal Rule 26(c) to "make any order which justice requires"
sider whether the Convention was exclusive to determine whether the Convention nonetheless
should be mandatory, and subject to a first-use presumption.
535. Id. at 2553; see also supra text accompanying notes 468-70.
536. Adrospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2560 n.4 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).
537. It has been noted that "[allthough the government clearly has the power to violate
international law, the courts have nevertheless sometimes imposed limitations on the extraterritorial application of United States law." Trimble, A Revisionist View of Customary InternationalLaw, 33 UCLA L. REV. 665, 675 (1986) (footnotes omitted); see infra note 548.
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to control the proceedings or the parties.53 8 Moreover, use of the Convention would eliminate the adverse effects of foreign blocking legisla-

tion, which gives rise to the most common situation in which discovery
orders are needed under the Federal Rules.5 39

3. Convention procedures more burdensome
a. alternativesunder the Federal Rules
The majority's final justification for rejecting a first-use rule was its
unsupported opinion that in many situations, use of Convention procedures would be "unduly time consuming and expensive, as well as less
certain to produce needed evidence than direct use of the Federal

Rules. ' ' 5 ' Based on its earlier analysis of the operation of the Convention, the Court reasoned that a first-use rule would be inconsistent with
"the overriding interest in the 'just, speedy, and inexpensive determina-

tion' of litigation in our courts. 5 41 Justice Blackmun responded that
until the Convention is used extensively, and courts become familiar with
538. Adrospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2567 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
539. See infra text accompanying notes 549-65.
540. Adrospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2555. The United States took the position in Adrospatiale
that an individualized comity analysis is the only available method for resolving conflicts between domestic and foreign interests implicated in transnational discovery disputes. Brief for
the United States and the Securities and Exchange Commission as Amici Curiae at 11-13,
Adrospatiale (No. 85-1695). The Solicitor General cited a number of reasons for rejecting a
first-use presumption, including the belief that Convention procedures are often less effective
and more costly than the Federal Rules. Id. at 15, 18. The government also relied on the
Securities and Exchange Commission's "limited experience" with the Convention to support
its position. Id. at 15. The government provided a detailed description of four occasions in
which the Securities and Exchange Commission has been unsuccessful in obtaining foreign
evidence through the Convention in its attempts to punish insider trading violations. Id. at 1518. It then concluded:
The Commission's experience with the Hague Convention procedures, which
has not been entirely positive, may well be atypical. The Commission is a government enforcement agency, whereas requests for discovery under the Convention are
more commonly made by private parties. The Commission has resorted to the Convention only four times, each request being directed to a non-party rather than to a
party before the court, and each request being made in the context of a fraud suit
rather than the more typical negligence or contract action. The State Department
informs us that private plaintiffs in the latter sorts of litigation have found resort to
the Convention more successful. The Commission's experience, however, does buttress our belief that adoption of any blanket presumption mandating "first use" of the
Convention in all cases would be unwise.
Id. at 18. The United States did not consider, however, that the competing national interests
that affect the determination of whether to resort to the Convention in private civil and commercial litigation are substantially similar in most cases. Conversely, the competing national
interests that are implicated when the United States is seeking information abroad to aid in
government enforcement proceedings may differ substantially from case to case.
541. Adrospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2555 (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 1).
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its procedures, the majority's assertion was nothing more than speculation. 42 He emphasized that discovery under the Federal Rules is "not
known for placing a high premium on either speed or cost' 543
effectiveness.
The inefficacy of relying on the Federal Rules in international litigation was, in essence, what motivated the United States to adopt the

Convention:
Indeed, in the absence of a specific judicial assistance treaty...

letters rogatory, transmitted at a leisurely pace through diplomatic channels and executed in accordance with the rules [of a
foreign tribunal], have generally provided American litigants
with evidence of little or no practical value before courts in the
United States. 54
Furthermore, it is well-known that conducting discovery abroad under
the Federal Rules often requires significant financial expenditures to obtain evidence, to bring motions for orders compelling discovery and to
enforce noncompliance with those discovery orders. The Convention
broke a major roadblock for domestic litigants by eliminating the necessity of routing requests through diplomatic channels. 4 5
The majority's opinion suggests that absent the Hague Evidence
Convention, American litigants would be assured of access to more effective evidence-gathering procedures under the Federal Rules. This notion
is based on questionable assumptions regarding the utility of the Convention, and overlooks the fundamental principles of international law
which often affect a litigant's ability to secure evidence abroad under domestic rules of civil procedure. The United States has recognized that,
apart from the Hague Evidence Convention, established principles of international law preclude American courts from ordering anyone to par542. Id. at 2565 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Blackmun pointed out that the Convention's voluntary discovery procedures which permit evidence
to be taken by a diplomatic or consular official, or by commissioners, "are a great boon to
United States litigants and are used far more frequently in practice than is compulsory discovery pursuant to letters of request." Id. at 2564 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
543. aId
at 2565 (Blackmun, J.,concurring in part and dissenting in part). In fact, the
RESTATEMENT (REvISED), supra note 1, observes that orders for production of documents or
other information located abroad nearly always give rise to objections that must be heard by
the courts, so the requirement of increased court supervision contemplated by the Hague Evidence Convention is not likely to increase the burden on the courts or delay proceedings. Id.
at § 437, reporters' note 2.
544. Borel & Boyd, supra note 5, at 37. See also supra text accompanying notes 474-78 for
a discussion of the disadvantages of using the letter rogatory procedure under Federal Rule
28(b).
545. Oxman, supra note 12, at 734 n.3.
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ticipate in discovery proceedings in the territory of a foreign state absent
that state's consent.

46

Furthermore, the United States has encouraged

courts "to refrain, if possible, from ordering a person to perform an act
that would violate the laws or clearly articulated policies of a foreign

government."547 Therefore, it is clear that the Federal Rules themselves
present obstacles to domestic litigants since extraterritorial application of
United States discovery orders must be tempered by a consideration of
foreign interests.5 4
b. foreign blocking laws
Probably the most significant obstacle to frequent use of the Federal
Rules in international litigation is the existence of foreign blocking statutes.5 49 Foreign blocking laws may completely thwart a litigant's ability
to obtain needed evidence.1 50 The Court dealt briefly with this issue in a
footnote.5 5 ' However, careful analysis of the operation of and underlying
motivation behind foreign blocking statutes should have been crucial to
the Court's determination of whether litigants should be required to use
552
the Convention on a first-use basis.
546. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 9 n.10, Club M6diterran6e S.A. v.
Dorin, 465 U.S. 1019, appealdismissedand cert denied, 469 U.S. 913 (1984) (No. 83-461); see
also Oxman, supra note 12, at 751-52. In fact, the Advisory Committee's Notes to the 1963
Amendments to Fed. R. Civ. P. 28(b), reprinted in 6 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) xli-xlii,
acknowledged that due to differences in customary procedure, completion of a deposition pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 28(b) is not ensured in all cases. See supra notes 474-78 and accompanying text.
547. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 10, Club Mdditerranie(No. 83-461);
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 11, Anschuetz and Messerschmitt, supra note
168 ("Courts should refrain, when feasible, from ordering a party to perform acts that would
violate the laws or clearly articulated policies of a foreign government.").
548. In Trimble, supra note 537, Professor Trimble points out that "[a]lthough the government clearly has the power to violate international law, the courts have nevertheless sometimes
imposed limitations on the extraterritorial application of United States law." Id. at 675 (footnotes omitted). For an excellent discussion of cases in which courts have both limited or
refused to limit the extraterritorial application of United States law, see id. at 699-701 &
nn.125-37.
549. See supra notes 53-67 and accompanying text.
550. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
551. Airospatiale, 107 S.Ct. at 2556 n.29.
552. It is not surprising that foreign sovereigns have resorted to the use of blocking legislation to promote compliance with the Hague Evidence Convention. The United States initiated
the formulation and drafting of the Convention in response to the difficulties encountered by
domestic litigants in securing evidence abroad. See supra text accompanying notes 68-95. At
the time the Convention was adopted, foreign litigants had very little difficulty in obtaining
evidence in the United States for use in foreign tribunals. See supra text accompanying notes
494-97. In addition, many foreign signatories had to revise existing laws and practices in order
to comply with the obligations imposed by the Convention. See supra text accompanying
notes 373-79. Since its adoption, the Convention has been used infrequently by domestic liti-
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The Court emphasized that foreign blocking statutes "do not deprive an American court of the power to order a party subject to its
jurisdiction to produce evidence even though the act of production may
violate that statute. 5 s 53 In Socidtd InternationalePourParticipationsIndustrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v. Rogers,554 the Court held that the
existence of a foreign blocking law does not automatically divest a court
gants and the United States courts have in many cases discouraged use of its procedures. See
supra text accompanying notes 130-38.
In many cases involving the Convention, diplomatic notes and protests have been unavailing in exacting United States compliance with its obligations under the Convention. See supra
text accompanying notes 598-600. Therefore, it is not unreasonable that foreign governments
have sought to compel the United States to rely on the Convention so as not to render useless
the civil-law states' concessions made at the request of the United States. See supra text accompanying notes 491-95. See also D. RoSENTHAL & W. KNIGrON, supra note 3, in which
the authors state that "it was inevitable that broad American laws compelling the furnishing of
foreign information should induce the adoption of foreign regulations compelling non-compliance. In the absence of internationally accepted standards, an eye for an eye provides rough
justice." Id at 75.
The United States Solicitor General has tried to justify the United States' current interpretation of the Convention by asserting that even if the United States does not participate in the
Convention on a regular basis, other signatories nevertheless "receive[] additional tangible
benefits from the Convention despite its nonexclusive operation." Brief for the United States
as Amicus Curiae at 10 n.11, Anschuetz and Messerschmitt, supra note 168. The Solicitor
General believes that other signatories "enjoy[] the benefits of participation in a multilateral
convention that presumably enhances its evidence gathering opportunities in countries other
than the United States." Id. In light of the fact that the civil-law signatories had no problems
obtaining evidence from the United States prior to ratification of the Convention and that the
European signatories arguably had no problems obtaining evidence among themselves prior to
the ratification of the Convention, the Solicitor General's position is unreasonable and thoroughly unpersuasive.
In Adrospatiale, the Supreme Court has perpetuated a cycle of retaliation rather than
confronting the core of the problem: the United States' refusal to comply with its international
commitments. The majority argued that with respect to the French blocking statute:
[Tihe enactment of such a statute by a foreign nation [cannot] require American
courts to engraft a rule of first resort onto the Hague Convention, or otherwise to
provide the nationals of such a country with a preferred status in our courts. It is
clear that American courts are not required to adhere blindly to the directives of
such a statute. Indeed, the language of the statute, if taken literally, would appear to
represent an extraordinary exercise of legislative jurisdiction.., over a United States
District Judge, forbidding him or her from ordering any discovery from a party of
French nationality, even simple requests for admissions or interrogatories that the
party could respond to on the basis of personal knowledge.... The lesson of comity
is that neither the discovery order nor the blocking statute can have the same omnipresent effect that it would have in a world of only one sovereign.
Adrospatiale, 107 S.Ct. at 2556 n.29. Although the Court recognized the retaliatory pattern
that has emerged in the area of international discovery, it was unwilling to accept the challenge
to take some constructive action to end the cycle, and thereby promote international
cooperation.
553. Id.
554. 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
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of its power to enforce a domestic discovery order.55 5 The Rogers Court

also held that the question of whether a foreign litigant should be sanctioned for noncompliance, due to the existence of a foreign blocking law,
depends on a court's analysis of the facts and interests implicated in each
case. 5 6 Since Rogers, however, the courts have developed different ap-

proaches for assessing whether sanctions are appropriate in the international context." 7 Frequently, once a foreign litigant demonstrates that it
has attempted to comply with a discovery order in good faith, the courts
deem sanctions to be unjustified."5 ' Therefore, the assertion that a court
555. Id. at 204. See supra note 64.
556. Id. at 208. In Rogers, Interhandel, a Swiss holding company, brought suit under the
Trading with the Enemy Act to recover assets which had been seized during World War II by
the Alien Property Custodian. The assets, valued at more than $100,000,000 in cash and
stock, "were found by the Alien Property Custodian to be 'owned or held for the benefit of'
I.G. Farben, a German firm and an enemy national." Id. at 199. Interhandel claimed it
owned the stock and was therefore entitled to recover the seized assets as the national of a
neutral power. The government challenged Interhandel's claim and asserted that Interhandel
had conspired with I.G. Farben and others to "conceal, camouflage and cloak the ownership,
control and domination by I.G. Farben ... in order to avoid seizure and confiscation in the
event of war ..
" Id.
The court ordered Interhandel to produce certain records of its Swiss bank. The records
were not produced, on the grounds that their production would violate Swiss penal laws resulting in the imposition of criminal sanctions, including fines and imprisonment. Id. at 200. The
district court found that there was no proof of collusion between the claimant and the Swiss
government and that Interhandel had shown good faith in its efforts to comply with the production order. Id. at 201. Nevertheless, the district court dismissed Interhandel's complaint
with prejudice on the ground that Swiss law did not furnish an adequate excuse for failure to
comply with the production order. Id. The court of appeals affirmed. Id. at 202. The
Supreme Court unanimously reversed the order of dismissal. The Court stated:
The findings below, and what has been shown as to petitioner's extensive efforts
at compliance, compel the conclusion on this record that petitioner's failure to satisfy
fully the requirements of this production order was due to inability fostered neither
by its own conduct nor by circumstances within its control. It is hardly debatable
that fear of criminal prosecution constitutes a weighty excuse for nonproduction, and
this excuse is not weakened because the laws preventing compliance are those of a
foreign sovereign.
Id. at 211. The Court noted further:
In view of the findings in this case... we think that Rule 37 should not be construed
to authorize dismissal of this complaint because of petitioner's noncompliance with a
pretrial production order when it has been established that failure to comply has
been due to inability, and not to willfulness, bad-faith, or any fault of petitioner.
Id. at 212.
557. Rosdeitcher, supra note 59, at 1066-73. See also RESTATEMENT (REVISED), supra
note 1, § 437, reporters' notes 6-9.
558. Rosdeitcher, supra note 59, at 1071-72. In Rogers, the Court stated that a foreign
party's good faith in attempting to comply with a discovery order is relevant to the nature of
what sanctions, if any, should be imposed. Rogers, 357 U.S. at 212. However, one commentator has observed:
Inasmuch as "good faith," as interpreted by the courts, takes account of a party's or
witness' efforts to obtain a waiver of the blocking statute, a foreign government's
refusal to waive, notwithstanding diligent efforts by the party to which discovery is
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can issue a discovery order to neutralize the effects of a foreign blocking
statute is a good theoretical argument but one of little practical signifi-

cance. A court may issue an order compelling discovery, but the chances
of a litigant actually enforcing the order are slim.
A general assumption also exists that foreign governments can grant

waivers of prosecution for potential violations of blocking laws to enable
foreign litigants to produce information without penalty;55 9 however, this

option is not always available. In Airospatiale, the court of appeals asserted that A6rospatiale could obtain a waiver from the French goverment to prevent prosecution under the French blocking law. 6 The
French government advised the Court that, contrary to the assumption
of the court of appeals, the 1980 blocking law does not empower the
French government to grant waivers from the law's prohibitions against
furnishing information outside the Hague Evidence Convention. 561 The

French government emphasized that "no mechanism for obtaining such
'5 62
waivers exists."

Furthermore, in France, as well as in other civil-law countries, treaties are supreme over domestic legislation.163 The French blocking law is
expressly subject to existing treaties. 5 6 Therefore, any conflicts created
by the existence of blocking legislation are eliminated when litigants use
the Hague Evidence Convention. 65 As a practical matter, first-use of the

Convention eliminates those obstacles that can hamper litigants from securing evidence in a proper form for use in a domestic tribunal.
directed, ordinarily will mean that the foreign government's interest is vindicated,
because no sanctions will apply.
Rosdeitcher, supra note 59, at 1072.
559. See RESTATEMENT (REVISED), supra note 1, § 437, reporters' note 5; Rosdeitcher,
supra note 59, at 1072.
560. See In re Soci6t6 Nationale Industrielle Arospatiale, 782 F.2d 120, 127 (8th Cir.
1986).
561. Brief ofAmicus Curiae the Republic of France in Support of Petitioners at 17, Adrospatiale, 107 S.Ct. 2542 (1987) (No. 85-1695). The French government also stated:
The requirement that some American courts have sought to impose, under threat of
sanctions, that a French witness seek a waiver of the 1980 Law is regarded by the
Republic of France as a significant infringement or attempted infringement of its
sovereignty and a material interference with its national interests.
Id. n.24.
562. Id. at 17.
563. G. VON GLAHN, supra note 13, at 47-51.
564. See Brief of Amicus Curiae the Republic of France in Support of Petitioners at 12-13,
Adrospatiale (No. 85-1695) (quoting Article 1-bis of French law 80-538, 1980 J.O. 1799, 1980
D.S.L. 285).
565. See supra notes 53-67 and accompanying text; see also Brief of Amicus Curiae the
Republic of France in Support of Petitioners at 5, Airospatiale (No. 85-1695) ("[A]bsent the
Convention, application of the rules usually employed in French domestic litigation would
frequently stymie American discovery.").
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The Court's position that the Convention is more burdensome to
domestic litigants than the Federal Rules is not based on a thoughtful
consideration of all the factors which affect transnational discovery procedures. In fact, by rejecting a first-use rule, the majority actually creates
more burdens for litigants who need to obtain evidence in hand for use in
domestic proceedings. First-use satisfies our obligations under international law and our obligation to comply in good faith with a valid United
States treaty. 'The Convention vitiates the effect of foreign blocking statutes, which may preclude a litigant from actually obtaining crucial evidence. Above all, first-use promotes positive perceptions about the
United States. Using the Convention demonstrates that the United
States is taking a cooperative attitude, rather than engaging in unilateral
and aggressive actions when discovery abroad is necessary. 6
C. The Proprietyof Employing a Case-By-Case Comity Analysis
The majority did not accept the proposition that the concept of international comity requires a general rule of first resort to the Convention when discovery is sought abroad.167 Instead, the majority adopted
the position of the Solicitor General and decided that the concept of international comity requires trial courts to perform a case-by-case analysis
to assess whether use of the Convention would be effective. 5 6 The ma566. See Adrospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2567-68 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Blackmun took the position that "unless the costs become prohibitive,
saving time and money is not such a high priority in discovery that some additional burden
cannot be tolerated in the interest of international goodwill." Id. at 2565 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
567. Soci&6 Nationale Industrielle A6rospatiale v. United States District Court, 107 S. Ct.
2542, 2555 (1987).
568. Id. at 2555-56. The Solicitor General stated:
Absent direct guidance from Congress, an individualized comity analysis provides
the best-indeed, the only-available method for resolving conflicts between domestic and foreign interests. Properly conducted, a comity analysis gives the district
court the necessary flexibility to consider the multiple and various factors that may
be relevant in any particular case ...
The American concept of international comity favors an individualized,
case-by-case weighing of domestic and foreign interests, not per se rules of the sort
petitioners urge....
The American concept of international comity, from its earliest origins, has eschewed inflexible rules.... This Court has often stated that comity requires the
exercise ofjudgment rather than adherence to mechanical formulae.
Brief for the United States and the Securities and Exchange Commission as Amici Curiae at
11-13, Adrospatiale (No. 85-1695). The Solicitor General also relied on Socit6 Internationale
Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958), to
support the application of a case-by-case approach. The Solicitor General noted that Rogers
"specifically recognizes that transnational discovery disputes cannot be resolved through per se
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jority suggested that trial courts consider the factors set forth in section
437 of the Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United
5 70
States (Revised)56 9 to guide their analysis.
Section 437(l)(c) of the Restatement provides that the following factors are relevant to a determination of whether to issue an order directing
production of information located abroad:
(1) the importance to the investigation or litigation of the
documents or other information requested;
(2) the degree of specificity of the request;
(3) whether the information originated in the United States;
(4) the availability of alternative means of securing the information; and
(5) the extent to which non-compliance with the request
would undermine important interests of the United States,
or compliance with the request would undermine important interests of the state where the information is
71
located.1
The Court acknowledged that the factors contained in the Restatement
do not represent a consensus of international views on the scope of a
district court's power to order foreign discovery in response to objections
5 72
by foreign states.
The Court favored a case-by-case approach because "[s]ome discovery procedures are much more 'intrusive' than others. ' 573 It contemplated that use of the Convention may not be required when only
responses to simple interrogatories or request for admissions are required. 4 Lower courts are responsible for scrutinizing the facts of each
case, the sovereign interests involved and the likelihood that use of Convention procedures will prove effective in order to decide whether to
compel use of the Convention. 7 5 The Court briefly outlined a few genrules. A unanimous Court there... [noted] that a general rule excusing disclosure would
undermine substantive United States interests and encourage evasion of domestic law." Brief
for the United States and the Securities and Exchange Commission as Amici Curiae at 13,
Airospatiale(No. 85-1695). The Solicitor General failed to acknowledge, however, that Rogers
was decided long before the Hague Evidence Convention was conceived and ratified.
569. See supra note 1.
570. Adrospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2555 n.28.
571. RESTATEMENT (REvisED), supra note 1, § 437 (1)(c).
572. Adrospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2555 n.28.
573. Id. at 2556.
574. Id. "The exact line between reasonableness and unreasonableness in each case must be
drawn by the trial court, based on its knowledge of the case and of the claims and interests of
the parties and the governments whose statutes and policies they invoke." Id.
575. Id. at 2555-56. The Court did not specify whether foreign litigants must conclusively
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eral concerns that courts should consider in a comity analysis, but refused to set forth any clearly defined rules to guide lower courts in
making those determinations.5 76 Although the Court attempted to devise a scheme whereby foreign interests receive adequate consideration

and protection at the trial court level, relying on a case-by-case comity
analysis to assess the utility of the Convention in private civil and com-

mercial litigation is questionable.
In his lengthy separate opinion, Justice Blackmun assailed the majority for rejecting a first-use presumption in favor of case-by-case comity
determinations. 77 He stated that there is nothing inherent in the comity
principle that requires a case-by-case analysis:

Comity is not just a vague political concern favoring international cooperation when it is in our interest to do so. Rather
it is a principle under which judicial decisions reflect the sys-

tematic value of reciprocal tolerance and goodwill....
...The Court frequently has relied upon a comity analysis

when it has adopted general rules to cover recurring situations
in areas such as choice of forum, maritime law, and sovereign
immunity, and the Court offers no reasons for abandoning that
approach here. 78
demonstrate to the trial court that the Convention will be successful before the court may
order its use. However, the Solicitor General suggested that such a showing should not be
necessary:
[A foreign litigant] need not demonstrate that the Convention will function as effectively or as efficiently as the Federal Rules. But he must satisfy the court that, under
the circumstances, resort to the Convention is consistent with the "just, speedy, and
inexpensive" determination of the suit (Fed. R. Civ. P. 1). The district court should
not require resort to the Convention unless it has reasonable prospects of producing
effective and efficient discovery under the facts and circumstances of the particular
case.
Brief for the United States and the Securities and Exchange Commission as Amici Curiae at
28, Adrospatiale (No. 85-1695).
576. The Court stated that trial courts should pay special attention to the following concerns:
a. Protecting foreign litigants from the danger that unnecessary or unduly burdensome
discovery may place them in a disadvantageous position. Adrospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2557;
b. Minimizing costs and inconvenience. Id.;
c. Preventing discovery abuses. "Objections to 'abusive' discovery that foreign litigants
advance should therefore receive the most careful consideration." Id.;
d. Accomodating foreign interests. "American courts should... take care to demonstrate due respect for any special problem confronted by the foreign litigant on account of its
nationality or the location of its operations, and for any sovereign interest expressed by a
foreign state." Id.
577. Id. at 2558 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
578. Id. at 2561 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (footnotes omitted). In The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972), the Court held that forum
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Justice Blackmun argued that the Convention was designed to accomodate all three categories of interests that are relevant to a comity analysis-foreign interests, domestic interests and the interest in a smoothly
functioning legal order.579 In most cases, there is no need to resort to
comity principles since the conflicts they are designed to resolve have
been eliminated by the agreements expressed in the treaty.5 80 Justice
Blackmun asserted that the majority added a duplicative, additional
"layer of so-called comity analysis by holding that the courts should deselection clauses in private contracts in admiralty are presumed to be enforceable absent a
strong showing that enforcement is unreasonble under the circumstances. The Court stated:
We cannot have trade and commerce in world markets and international waters exclusively on our terms, governed by our laws, and resolved in our courts.
The argument that such clauses are improper because they tend to "oust" a
court ofjurisdiction is hardly more than a vestigial legal fiction. It appears to rest at
core on [sic] historical judicial resistance to any attempt to reduce the power and
business of a particular court and has little place in an era when all courts are overloaded and when businesses once essentially local now operate in world markets. It
reflects something of a provincial attitude regarding the fairness of other tribunals.
Id. at 9-12.
579. Airospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2562 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
580. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Blackmun acknowledged that it may be appropriate for courts to rely on the approach outlined in the
RESTATEMENT (REVISED), supra note 1, in situations where no treaty has been negotiated to
accommodate the different legal systems involved or if the Convention failed to resolve a conflict in a particular case. Adrospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2562 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). In Trimble, supra note 537, the author also questions the legitimacy of
applying the balancing approach embodied in the RESTATEMENT (REVISED) rather than valid
treaty law. "Customary international law is not an appropriate doctrinal vehicle for general
restraint of considered political branch action. It lacks the ideological legitimacy and the
widespread scrutiny that constitutional-type norms should have." Id. at 704. Professor Trimble goes on to explain the weakness of routinely relying on the Restatement's interest-balancing approach:
The Draft Restatement asserts that a new rule of customary international law has
emerged limiting the scope of national law by reference to a standard of reasonableness.... This standard is applied by balancing a number of factors to determine
whether the United States interest is sufficiently high as compared with foreign interest, to justify application of United States law....
Although the courts have sometimes engaged in this kind of interest analysis
and "balancing," they generally have not characterized their activity as an application of international law. Instead they have referred to "comity," to presumed congressional intent, or simply to judicial precedent and the Restatement. Nevertheless,
let us assume that in these cases the courts implicitly were applying international
law ....
...[T]here is no historical basis for the proposition that courts in fact restrain
the government through the application of customary international law. To the extent that changes in judicial attitudes may be observed, the trend is toward expanding
United States regulatory authority, not constraining it.
Id. at 696-701 (footnotes omitted).
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termine on a case-by-case basis whether resort to the Convention is desirable."5'8 1 Furthermore, routine reliance on an interest balancing
approach raises both practical and constitutional difficulties for trial
5 82

courts.

1. The judiciary's inability to assess relevant interests properly
The objections leveled against the case-by-case comity approach are
twofold. First, it is argued that the judiciary is unable to competently
perform such determinations. Second, no procedural mechanism exists
whereby erroneous lower court decisions can be corrected to avoid offending an interested foreign sovereign."53 It has been asserted that
American courts are institutionally unequipped to properly engage in an
interest balancing approach to decide whether to apply United States law
extraterritorially. 5 84 Rather, the application of treaty law is "more comfortably within the traditional confines of judicial competence."5 85 Justice Blackmun noted that relatively few judges are experienced in the
area of international law or familiar with the procedures of foreign legal
systems.5 86 This lack of expertise precludes most judges from accurately
assessing the relevant interests incident to the application of the Hague
Evidence Convention. One commentator has elaborated on this notion
by drawing an analogy between the analysis required of judges under the
Restatement balancing approach and the routine application of custom587
ary international law:
A common law judge may look to legislative developments, judicial precedents in related fields, and other sources of
public policy. He or she may also draw on intuitions in order
to ascertain the right direction for legal development. In the
case of customary international law, however, the judge does
not have the same opportunity or ability. Foreign developments are more difficult to learn about and understand than
changes in the domestic legal landscape. The academic train581. Adrospatiale, 107 S.Ct. at 2562 (Blackmun, J.,concurring in part and dissenting in

part).
582. Id. at 2559-61 (Blackmun, J.,concurring in part and dissenting in part).
583. See infra text accompanying notes 599-617.
584. Trimble, supra note 537, at 672.
585. Id.
586. Adrospatiale, 107 S.Ct. at 2560 (Blackmun, J.,concurring in part and dissenting in
part). "[Clourts are generally ill equipped to assume the role of balancing the interests of
foreign nations with that of our own." Id. (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
587. Trimble, supra note 537, at 698.
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ing and professional experience of a person who becomes a federal judge is not likely to include widespread exposure to
foreign cultures. Moreover, the regular sources of information
available to professional people in the United States are not
likely to cover foreign developments in significant depth. Even
if counsel could remedy those deficiencies, the training, background, and ordinary experience of a judge do not provide a
good basis for forming intuitions about desirable new directions
for the law. 88
In Adrospatiale, even the Supreme Court was unable to overcome the
inherent disability of the Judiciary to properly implement the international policies of the Executive branch.
The majority did not demonstrate an understanding of the full import of the concept of "judicial sovereignty," nor did it acknowledge the
sovereignty of foreign substantive and constitutional laws. For example,
the majority stated that lower courts can require foreign parties to bear
the burden of providing detailed descriptions of documents that may be
needed by domestic litigants to ensure that a document request will not
be rejected for lack of specificity under Article 3.589 Such a requirement,
however, arguably violates the judicial sovereignty of a foreign state to
the same extent as any other non-Convention request. The taking of
such information as potential evidence is exclusively within the sphere of
the foreign judiciary.5 9 0 Furthermore, the broad requests contemplated
by the Court may likely be viewed as "fishing expeditions," and thus
contravene foreign laws that protect foreign citizens against unnecessary
disclosures of business information. 59 ' One cannot reasonably expect
that the insensitivity to foreign interests exhibited by the majority in Adrospatiale will be eradicated or improved at the lower court level.
Another deficiency in the case-by-case approach is the tendency for
the interest balancing to be tipped in favor of United States' interests.
Justice Blackmun noted that it is easy for a "pro-forum bias... to creep
into the supposedly neutral balancing process" and lead courts to rely on
more familiar procedures established by local rules.5 92 This has proven
588. Id. at 713-14.
589. Adrospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2557 n.30.
590. See supra notes 45-50 and accompanying text.
591. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
592. Adrospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2560 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Justice Blackmun explained that "[t]here is also a tendency on the part of courts, perhaps unrecognized, to view a dispute from a local perspective." Id. n.4 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). This occurs because:
domestic courts do not sit as internationally constituted tribunals.... The courts of
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true with respect to decisions involving the extraterritorial application of
United States law relating to antitrust, securities, intellectual property
and commodity trading regulations. 93 There is little support for the
proposition that courts in fact restrain assertions abroad of United States

law.5 94 In fact, the trend is toward expanding regulatory authority
rather than constraining it.5 95 One commentator has remarked:
"America has always had an active isolationist tendency, and even when
it became actively involved on a regular basis with other countries after
the Second World War, it did so with a parochialism that continues to

reflect its suspicion of 'foreign ways.' "596
The unavailability of any review mechanism to correct erroneous
discovery orders also detracts from the utility of the interest balancing
approach. The Department of State and foreign governments are unable,
or unwilling, to intervene in every case "in order to articulate the broader
international and foreign interests that are relevant to the decision
whether to use the Convention."59' 7 Generally, the Department of State
does not transmit diplomatic notes from foreign governments to state or
federal trial courts.5 9 The Department also adheres to a policy whereby
it does not take positions regarding, or participate in, litigation between
most developed countries follow international law only to the extent it is not overridden by national law. Thus courts inherently find it difficult neutrally to balance competing foreign interests. When there is any doubt, national interests will tend to be
favored over foreign interests.
Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Laker Airways, Ltd. v.
Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 951 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (footnotes omitted).
593. Trimble, supra note 537, at 702. Professor Trimble provides a detailed review of cases
in the past decade involving extraterritorial application of United States law in these areas. Id.
at 701-04. He notes that in only two out of nineteen cases involving extraterritorial application
of United States law in these areas were United States' interests found insufficient. Id. at 702.
In eleven of the cases, a balancing approach was rejected. Id. at 703. In three more cases, a
balancing approach was used but United States' interests prevailed. Id.
594. See, e.g., Trimble, supra note 537, at 696-701.
595. Id. at 701. "Even judges of international courts are not viewed as truly independent of
their national perspectives, and their opinions are not likely to be perceived as 'objective' determinations of international law." Id. at 727 (footnotes omitted).
596. Trimble, supra note 537, at 721-22; see also infra notes 618-19.
597. Adrospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2561 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in

part).
598. Id. n.5 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Bernard Oxman has
observed that:
[B]ecause courts may not perform the negotiating and political functions necessary to
resolve a conflict with a foreign state if one arises, and because the federal government may be unable or reluctant to intervene in private litigation on behalf of a
foreign state, the courts must be particularly careful to avoid creating international
conflict in the first place.
Oxman, supra note 12, at 748 (footnote omitted).
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private parties, unless required to do so by applicable law.5 99 Even when
foreign governments do intervene through the filing of amicus briefs or
diplomatic notes, it is questionable whether the actions have any substantial effect on the deliberations of the courts."
The limited appellate review of interlocutory discovery orders intensifies the shortcomings of the comity approach since any effective caseby-case correction of erroneous decisions is foreclosed. °1 On a practical
level, the case-by-case approach does not afford litigants a consistent or

predictable method to assess how discovery will proceed in a particular
lawsuit. The success of the approach is inextricably tied to the degree of
international expertise of each individual judge.
2.

Separation of powers

On a constitutional level, the role of the courts in matters affecting
foreign affairs traditionally has been strictly limited." 2 Courts generally
defer to the other branches of government to avoid complicating foreign
affairs in ways they cannot control through subsequent dispositions, and
to reiterate the need for the nation to "speak with one voice. 60 3 Routine
reliance on case-by-case comity determinations creates fertile ground for
the Judiciary to infringe upon the powers of the Executive.' Although
the courts may be well-equipped to accomodate the interests of litigants
and the judicial system, the Executive normally decides when to risk following a course of action that might affront a foreign nation or place a
strain on foreign commerce. 6 One commentator has observed that

"[t]he international argument over extraterritorial application of United
599. Adrospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2561 n.5 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); see also Oxman, supra note 12, at 748 n.39.
600. See, e.g., Petitioners' Brief in Response to the Solicitor General's Brief for the United
States at 3-4, In re Anschuetz & Co., GmbH, 754 F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1985), vacated sub nom.
Anschuetz & Co., GmbH v. Mississippi River Bridge Authority, 107 S. Ct. 3223 (1987) (No.
85-98) and In re Messerschmitt Bolkow Blohm GmbH, 757 F.2d 729 (5th Cir. 1985), vacated
sub nom. Messerschmitt Bolkow Blohm GmbH v. Walker, 107 S. Ct. 3223 (1987) (No. 85-99);
Brief for Anschuetz & Co., GmbH and Messerschmitt-Boelkow-Blohm GmbH as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Adrospatiale (No. 85-1695).
601. Adrospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2561 & n.6 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part); see 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1983 & Supp. 1986).
602. Trimble, supra note 537, at 715.
603. Id.
604. Aerospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2560 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
605. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Blackmun noted
that the government's interests are often far more complicated than the limited issues
presented to the courts. Id. n.3 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). "It
is the Executive... that is best equipped to determine how to accomodate foreign interests
along with our own." Id. at 2560 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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States law reflects basic national differences over economic, social, and
political philosophy. The choice that must be made is a political
choice.""6 6
Justice Blackmun believed that by ratifying the Hague Evidence
Convention, the Executive and Legislative branches made a political
choice that regular use of the Convention was in the best interests of the
United States. 60 7 The decision to adopt the Convention was itself the
product of a comity analysis by the Executive and Legislative branches,
carried out to further United States' interests with a minimum of interna-

tional friction.6 "8 In fact, the Solicitor General has reiterated often that
the United States has a strong interest in avoiding conflicts with foreign

nations that arise from transnational discovery disputes and, further, that
use of the Convention alleviates potential international friction.

°9

The majority's endorsement of a case-by-case comity approach,
along with its failure to emphasize the United States' clearly articulated
policy of avoiding international friction in all possible instances, may
lead to repeated interference by the Judiciary in the Executive sphere.
Regardless of whether the outcome of those assessments are adverse to

foreign interests, the Judiciary will, in effect, be responsible for making
policy decisions that affect the international relations of the United
States. Justice Blackmun expressed concern that such interference may
result in a long-term political cost for the United States in that foreign
cooperation in other matters may be withheld.6 1

Conversely, those

606. Trimble, supra note 537, at 706. He notes further that "[g]eneral restraint of national
jurisdiction undoubtedly would facilitate international trade, investment, and corporate activity." Id.
607. Airospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2560 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). "The Convention embodies the result of the best efforts of the Executive Branch, in
negotiating the treaty, and the Legislative Branch, in ratifying it, to balance competing national interests." Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
608. Justice Blackmun stated that "there is no need to resort to comity principles; the conflicts they are designed to resolve have been eliminated by the agreements expressed in the
treaty." Id. at 2562 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
609. Brief for the United States and the Securities and Exchange Commission as Amici
Curiae at 7, Adrospatiale (No. 85-1695). The Solicitor General has emphasized that "American courts should utilize the procedures established by the Hague Evidence Convention in
appropriate cases to avoid unnecessary international friction resulting from American procedures for pretrial discovery." Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 9, Anschuetz and
Messerschmitt, supra note 168. The Solicitor General has implied that "appropriate cases"
include those in which foreign governments express objections to American discovery procedures, id. at 11, and when a conflict exists between the Federal Rules and a foreign blocking
statute. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 13, Club Mditerran6e S.A. v. Dorin,
465 U.S. 1019, appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 469 U.S. 913 (1984) (No. 83- 461).
610. Adrospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2567-68 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). M. McDougal and H. Lasswell have observed:
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comity determinations that result in judicial restraint and acquiescence
to foreign laws may also undercut the Executive's ability to negotiate
future agreements by making it more difficult to gain concessions and
cooperation from foreign governments in other areas. 6 11 Further, the
possibility exists that repeated unwillingness by the Judiciary to use the
Convention will be relied upon by foreign signatories to invoke the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus and terminate the Hague Evidence Convention
altogether.6 12 These constitutional and political difficulties would be alleviated, and the foreign relations of the United States substantially furthered, if trial courts were not required to engage in routine
determinations regarding the applicability of the Hague Evidence
Convention. 13
3. Inconsistent application of the convention
The most serious practical problem posed by the case-by-case comity approach is the possibility that the Convention will be applied inconsistently in state and federal trial courts. In Adrospatiale, the majority
sought to alleviate the existing discord at the lower court level regarding
use of the Convention; however, it is likely that the Court's decision will
have the opposite effect. Inevitably, reliance on the Convention will differ among districts and states, depending on the degree of judicial sensitivity to foreign interests. Further, the majority failed to recognize that
If Governments cannot have confidence that the instruments by which they bind
themselves will not be made to serve unintended purposes, if respect is not paid to
terms and tenor of the obligations imposed by such instruments, the result may be a
reluctance to assume further commitments and the progressive development of international law may be seriously retarded.
M. McDOUGAL & H. LASSWELL, supra note 349, at 84.
611. Trimble, supra note 537, at 706-07.
612. The doctrine of rebus sic stantibus, or changed circumstances, is "a tacit condition,
said to attach to all treaties, that they shall cease to be obligatory so soon as the state of facts
and conditions upon which they were founded has substantially changed." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1139 (5th ed. 1979).
[I]n order to apply the rule of rebussic stantibus, it is not necessary that the performance should be rendered impossible or that a breach of the treaty should be committed by the other party. The doctrine applies if the change of circumstances is of such
a character as to destroy the objects and purposes of the treaty while literal performance could still be possible, although it would have no meaning or raison d'etre in the
sense of the treaty.
A. VAMVOUKOS, TERMINATION OF TREATIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, 204 (1985). See also
J. BRIERLY, supra note 349, at 335-40; see generally S. ROSENNE, BREACH OF TREATY (1985).
613. Professor Trimble suggests that the limits of the government's extraterritorial application of law should be determined in the political process rather than in the courts. He believes
treaties are the appropriate vehicle for limiting or expanding extraterritorial application of law,
not customary international law as embodied in the reasonableness inquiry in the RESTATEMENT (REVISED), supra note I. Trimble, note 537, at 707.
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its decision creates an anomaly for the federal and state court systems.
Even though the Court held that the Convention, although valid, is not
supreme over the Federal Rules, it did not address whether the Convention remains supreme over state rules of procedure. Thus, the possibility
exists that a valid United States treaty is supreme over state law but not
over federal law. The Court's failure to resolve this question may lead to
conflicting applications of the Convention among different state courts,
thereby depriving state court litigants of predictable, fair and uniform
treatment.
Although a case-by-case approach appears to give trial courts the
ability to tailor use of the Convention to the type of discovery sought and
the nature of the foreign interests involved, routine reliance on an individualized approach presents a multitude of problems for courts and litigants. Whether the Convention will be used appropriately depends on
the ability of an individual judge to harmonize a complex set of foreign
and domestic interests. Adrospatiale grants wide discretion to trial courts
to guide one facet of our political relationship with foreign nations. The
Hague Evidence Convention was designed specifically to improve transnational discovery procedures in private civil and commercial litigation. 6 14 The case-by-case approach defeats this purpose because it
deprives private litigants of access to a predictable and uniform method
of gathering evidence abroad.

VIII.

RECOMMENDATIONS

With respect to transnational discovery disputes, the interests of foreign sovereigns and that of the United States judicial system are not necessarily inconsistent. Foreign sovereigns are concerned with enforcing

constitutional protections and substantive laws for the benefit of their
citizens. 615 Similarly, the United States' primary interest is in providing
redress for its citizens, and ensuring that adjudication is based on the
greatest amount of available information.616 It is not unreasonable, however, that foreign governments refuse to accede to American discovery

requests which require their tribunals to refrain from vigorously enforcing their own laws and upholding their own judicial systems.61 7 Never614. Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 13, at Preamble.
615. See supra text accompanying notes 21-52.
616. See supra text accompanying notes 21-52; Soci6t6 Nationale Industrielle Arospatiale
v. United States District Court, 107 S. Ct. 2542, 2564-67 (1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
617. The broad scope of United States legal powers that law enforcement agencies, private
litigants, and judges employ to control the conduct of foreign persons abroad:
[is] perceived by other developed nations as a threat to their sovereignty-to their
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theless, domestic courts often perceive that objections to broad discovery
requests by foreign governments arise from their desire to collude with
foreign nationals to prevent the disclosure of relevant evidence. 618 Do-

mestic tribunals equate nondisclosure with bad faith. 19
The majority opinion in Adrospatiale reflects this concern:

Petitioners made a voluntary decision to market their products

,>

in the United States. They are entitled to compete on equal
terms with other companies operating in this market. But since
the District Court unquestionably has personal jurisdiction
over petitioners, they are subject to the same legal constraints,
including the burdens associated with American judicial procedures, as their American competitors. A general rule according
foreign nationals a preferred position in pretrial proceedings in
our courts would conflict with the principle of equal opportu-

ability to regulate, effectively, economic activity within their own territory. They are
also perceived as disruptive to the traditional process of dispute resolution by diplomacy. Diplomacy, it is felt, is usually facilitated by confidentiality and clear lines of
responsibility. The dispersal of power which results from the American systems of
checks and balances, and from mistrust of the low visibility of executive branch discretion, is seen as weakening the reliability of the U.S. government as a political
partner.
D. ROSENTHAL & W. KNIGHTON, supra note 3, at 7-8. See also id. at 86.
618. D. Rosenthal and W. Knighton observe:
Americans want those who manufacture defective products, which are sold in U.S.
markets and cause injury, to compensate the victims. If an import causes injury, and
the defect may be structural, why shouldn't the product's blueprints and test results,
wherever located, be subject to reasonable inspection by experts retained by the
plaintiff? Arguably, making such documents available, if and when demanded in an
American litigation, is one of the costs of access to the largest and most lucrative
integrated market-place in the world. When foreign parties, backed up by foreign
authorities, resist the production of such documents, it leads to the understandable
suspicion that there is something to hide. The American perception that some businessmen are using foreign corporations in foreign jurisdictions as flags of convenience
to evade American economic and compensatory regulation, often with the tacit acquiescence of foreign authorities who care more about export earnings than export
ethics, heightens this suspicion.
D. ROSENTHAL & W. KNIGHTON, supra note 3, at 71.
619. This belief arises from a distinctly American perspective on government and
lawmaking:
It is a keystone of the American ideology that the United States has a "government of laws not of men." While an Englishman, Sir William Jones, observed, "My
opinion is, that power should always be distrusted, in whatever hands it is placed," it
is Americans more than Europeans who have embraced the thought. Suspicion of
those with political authority, and suspicion of those with economic power, both
pervasive in America, encourage legal rather than administrative regulation, [and]
encourage the feeling that the good faith and proper exercise of discretionary power
by bureaucrats and businessmen cannot be assumed.... Issues which diplomats in
other nations have the authority to address can, in the United States, be finally resolved only by judges in the federal court system. The American system of checks
and balances is of fundamental importance.
Id. at 7.
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nity that governs the market they elected to enter. 620
There is no question that foreign parties should be held to answer for
injuries caused by defective products and other civil and commercial
wrongs. The persisting question is, what is the most effective way to
accomplish this goal with the least amount of international friction?
Dismantling the Hague Evidence Convention is not the answer.
Undermining the United States' foreign relations with its trading partners does not have to be a prerequisite to exacting responsibility and
compliance from foreign litigants. As the Supreme Court itself has suggested, compelling foreign compliance with United States law should focus on the litigants themselves, not on foreign sovereigns. 62 1 Foreign
states cannot be expected to bear the burden of diminishing their sovereignty each time a foreign national is brought before a United States
court. Rather, it is foreign litigants themselves who should bear the burden of relinquishing legal protections abroad, when necessary, to attempt
in good faith to comply with American legal requirements. As the Court
in Adrospatiale made clear, foreign litigants cannot expect to receive the
advantages of foreign laws when marketing products and engaging in
commercial activities in the United States. But once again, it is foreign
litigants, and not foreign sovereigns, who should be required to make
these concessions.
All of the foregoing concerns can be reconciled by relying on the
Hague Evidence Convention to collect evidence abroad. Using the Convention demonstrates respect for the sovereignty of foreign nations, and
permits discovery to proceed in a manner which has been consented to
by all parties.62 2 Use of the Convention reflects a tolerance and understanding of the responsibility of foreign governments to protect their citizens' substantive rights.623 Similarly, by relying on the Convention, the
620. Airospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2553 n.25.

621. Socit6 Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 201 (1958). In Rogers, the Court stated:
The Report of the Master bears importantly on our disposition in this case. It
concluded that the Swiss Government had acted in accordance with its own established doctrines in exercising preventive police power by constructive seizure of the
Sturzenegger records, and found there was "... . no proof, or any evidence at all of

collusion between plaintiff and the Swiss Government in the seizure of the papers
herein."... [The burden was on petitioner to show good faith in its efforts to comply with the production order,... the test of good faith [being] whether petitioner
had attempted all which a reasonable man would have undertaken in the circumstances to comply with the order ....
Id.
622. Adrospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2563 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
623. See id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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United States furthers its interests in avoiding international friction62 4
and provides domestic litigants with reliable methods by which evidence
can actually be obtained abroad.62 5
Nevertheless, the United States cannot permit the Hague Evidence
Convention to be used as a shield by foreign nationals to avoid production of potentially damaging evidence. By implicitly discouraging use of
Convention procedures, the Court has, in effect, resolved this concern at
the expense of long-term international cooperation.6 26 As an expression
of good faith, it is not unreasonable to expect a foreign litigant to relinquish those protections of foreign laws that interfere with the obligation
to comply with transnational discovery requests. 2 7 A presumption that
foreign litigants should relinquish such protections would obviate the
need for foreign judicial authorities to obstruct production of information to protect the substantive rights of their citizens. Foreign tribunals
would only need to order non-disclosure when legitimate government interests were implicated.62 8
In order for trial courts to accurately assess whether to rely on the
Convention, the suggestions outlined below should be incorporated into
the case-by-case analysis required by the Court in Adrospatiale. Trial
courts should frame their determinations to resemble the two-part approach used by the Court in Socidtj InternationalePour Participations
62 9
Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v. Rogers.
A.

Some Basic Assumptions

In order to avoid the parochialism and result-oriented decisions
which have become common in lower court assessments of whether to
employ the Hague Evidence Convention, trial courts must be willing to
acknowledge two basic assumptions regarding the Convention. First, until actual experience proves otherwise, courts must begin with the premise that the Convention, in practice, will accomplish what it was intended
to do: facilitate production of tangible evidence more successfully than
the Federal Rules. Second, our courts should take the position that by
624. See id. at 2568 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
625. See id. at 2564-67 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see supra
text accompanying notes 540-66.
626. See Airospatiale,107 S. Ct. at 2568 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
627. See infra note 644.
628. Resort to the Federal Rules is no more calculated to produce requested information
when legitimate government interests are implicated than resort to the Hague Evidence
Convention.
629. 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
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utilizing the Convention, they are complying with United States obligations under international law, and furthering United States interests in
avoiding international conflict. Absent reliance on these assumptions,
the burden on a foreign party of showing that the Convention would be
useful may be insurmountable.
B.

Should the Convention or the Federal Rules be Used?

The first step for the trial court must be to determine whether pretrial discovery should proceed under the Convention or the Federal
Rules. The trial court should initially consider the factors outlined in
section 437 of the Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States (Revised)6 30 to gauge whether resorting to the Convention
will further the interests of the parties and the governments involved.
Next, the trial court should make the following specific inquiries to accurately assess whether use of the Convention procedures will be effective:
(1) Do the discovery requests seek information that is protected by
foreign substantive laws (such as the German doctrine of proportionality,63 1 or similar laws protecting disclosure of business secrets and confidential communications 632 ), thereby requiring the supervision of foreign
6 33
judicial authorities?
(2) Do the discovery requests seek disclosure of information that
may implicate government secrecy laws, thereby requiring the interven634
tion of foreign judicial and government authorities?
(3) Does a foreign blocking statute exist that precludes compliance
with discovery under the Federal Rules? 635 It is recognized that the
existence of foreign blocking laws cannot, in itself, compel resort to the
630. See supra note 1.
631. See Soci6t6 Nationale Industrielle A6rospatiale v. United States District Court, 107 S.
Ct. 2542, 2563 (1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The German
constitutional doctrine of proportionality is roughly equivalent to the due process clause of the

14th Amendment to the United States Constitution. It requires that "[interference] with private rights... be strictly limited to situations in which interference is both unavoidable and
justifiable in view of reaching certain legitimate objectives." Meessen, The Anschtitz and MesserschmittOpinions: The InternationalLaw on TakingEvidence From, Not In, A Foreign State,
App. to Brief for Anschuetz & Co., GmbH and Messerschmitt-Boelkow-Blohm GmbH as

Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 27a, Adrospatiale (No. 85-1695). "Under the principle of proportionality, therefore, the rights of personal privacy, commercial property, and busi-

ness secrets may not be interfered with unless such interference is necessary to protect other
persons' rights in the course of civil litigation." Id.
632. See supra note 7.
633. See supra text accompanying notes 21-52.
634. See supra notes 61 & 64.

635. See supra text accompanying notes 53-66.
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Convention.63 6 However, the Restatement (Revised) 637 and the Solicitor
General 63 8 suggest that the existence of foreign blocking legislation
should be given serious consideration to prevent undue international conflict when possible.
An affirmative response to any one of these three inquiries indicates
that the Convention would be useful to circumvent foreign procedural
obstacles and to alleviate undue international conflict. The trial court
should then consider:
(4) Is the foreign party a national of a contracting state that presthus creating an
ently has an unqualifiedArticle 23 declaration in effect,
6 39
absolute bar to production of requested documents?
If so, the Convention will not be effective for obtaining responses to
requests for production of documents and may indicate that the Federal
Rules should be used. Of course, the Federal Rules may be just as ineffective if a foreign blocking statute is involved.' If the interested con64 1
tracting state merely has a qualified Article 23 declaration in effect,

the Convention should be used since effective results are assured if document requests are specifically enumerated.' 2
C. Noncompliance with Requests Under the Convention or the Federal
Rules
If use of the Convention or the Federal Rules results in nondisclosure, the trial court must make a second determination of whether sanctions should be imposed on the foreign party. The trial court should
engage in the analysis outlined by the Court in Socidtd Internationale
64
Pour ParticipationsIndustrielles et Commerciales, SA. v. Rogers. 3 If
discovery has proceeded under the Federal Rules, then a court can rely
on Rogers to guide its analysis. If discovery has proceeded under the
Convention, a court should also consider the following factors in assessing whether a foreign litigant has acted in good faith in attempting to
comply with discovery requests:
(1) Could the foreign party have waived substantive protections
conferred by foreign law to enable a foreign tribunal to permit disclosure
636. Adrospatiale, 107 S.Ct. at 2556 n.29; see supra text accompanying notes 549-66.
637. Supra note 1, § 437.
638. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 15, Anschuetz and Messerschmitt,
supra note 168.
639. See supra text accompanying notes 446-48.
640. See supra text accompanying notes 446-47.
641. See supra text accompanying notes 554-56.
642. See supra text accompanying notes 434-35.
643. 357 U.S. 197 (1958). See supra note 64.
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As discussed above,64 5 foreign litigants should

not be entitled to escape the burdens associated with American litigation
by invoking the protections of foreign laws. It is not unreasonable to
expect a foreign national to demonstrate a good faith attempt to comply
with discovery requests by declining to exercise a privilege recognized

under foreign law which may hamper full disclosure of information in
the United Statesf 46
(2) Was disclosure precluded by foreign government intervention
based on the existence of valid government interests? 7
(3) If Article 23 was invoked to prevent compliance with document requests, was this reasonable? Did the document requests satisfy

the specificity requirements of Article 3 of the Convention and any applicable Article 23 declaration? The trial court should consider whether
requested documents were specifically enumerated and whether they had

a clear nexus with the subject matter of the litigation.
As in Rogers, a court must be satisfied that a foreign party is not

attempting to prevent disclosure of pertinent evidence by relying on privileges of its foreign citizenship:
Petitioner has sought no privileges because of its foreign citizenship which are not accorded domestic litigants in United
States courts.... It does not claim that Swiss laws protecting
banking records should here be enforced. It explicitly recog-

nizes that it is subject to procedural rules of United States
courts in this litigation and has made full efforts to follow these

rules. It asserts no immunity from them. It asserts only its
644. A distinction should be drawn between the right to claim a privilege under foreign law,
which a foreign litigant arguably would be able to waive in good faith in a domestic proceeding, and the duty that arises under the foreign government compulsion doctrine, which cannot
be waived under any circumstances. See RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
OF THE UNrED STATES (REVISED), § 436 comments a, c (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1985). According to the Restatement, in order for the foreign government compulsion defense to be effective,
the other state's requirements must be embodied in binding laws or regulations, violation of
which would subject the litigant to penal or other severe sanctions. Id. § 436 comment c.
645. See supra text accompanying notes 615-28.
646. Under Article 11 of the Convention, a responding party is entitled to claim any privilege which exists under the law of the state of execution. Hague Evidence Convention, supra
note 13, at art. 11. Under the express terms of the Convention, a witness is unconditionally
entitled to take advantage of this provision. Nevertheless, the drafters of the Convention recognized that no compromise could be fashioned to fully protect a foreign party and avoid
frustrating the execution of letters of request at the same time. See P. AMRAM, EXPLANATORY REPORT, supra note 126, at 25-27; see also Oxman, supra note 12, at 767-69.
647. See RESTATEMENT (REVISED), supra note 1, § 437 reporters' note 6; see supra note
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inability to comply because of foreign law."'
If the trial court is satisfied that a foreign party is acting in bad faith by
attempting to conceal relevant and essential evidence, then the trial court
is justified in imposing sanctions, including sanctions of contempt, dismissal, default or findings of fact adverse to the foreign party."49 Once a
court complies with United States' obligations under the Convention, it
should not hesitate to impose sanctions on those foreign nationals who
rely on the Convention in bad faith to avoid liability in United States
courts.
IX.

CONCLUSION

In Sociitd Nationale Industrielle Airospatiale v. United States District Court,65 0 the Supreme Court missed the first opportunity since
1958651 to address the complex problems that have plagued domestic and
foreign litigants in transnational discovery disputes. After engaging in a
cursory investigation into the history and operation of the Hague Evidence Convention, the Court concluded that the Convention serves as an
optional supplement to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to be used
when it will facilitate evidence gathering abroad.65 2 The Court's position
on the Hague Evidence Convention may produce short-term benefits for
domestic litigants, who may now believe that proceeding under the Federal Rules will provide them with broader and more powerful procedures. Nevertheless, evidence gathering abroad under the Federal Rules
will continue to be thwarted by the existence of foreign blocking statutes,
so that in many cases, discovery attempts will not be fruitful. Many litigants who proceed under the Federal Rules will end up with nothing
more than an unenforceable discovery order in view of the widespread
reluctance of the courts to assess sanctions subsequent to SocidtdInternationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v.
653
Rogers.
The Court, swayed by its overriding concern with halting foreign
manipulation of domestic judicial proceedings, failed to carefully consider the long-term implications of undermining the utility of the Convention. International judicial cooperation is likely to be adversely
648. Rogers, 357 U.S. at 211-12 (emphasis in original).
649. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
650. 107 S.Ct. 2542 (1987).
651. See Soci& Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v.
Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
652. Adrospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2555-56.
653. 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
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affected by the Court's decision.6" 4 Repeated failure to take advantage of
the Convention will inevitably affect its continued viability. Domestic

litigants may soon find themselves subject to reciprocal foreign orders,
which might detrimentally affect domestic commercial interests. 6 5"
By diminishing the importance of the Convention in international

litigation, the Court has effectively forced domestic litigants to rely on
the complex, obstacle-laden procedures that existed prior to its ratifica-

tion. Furthermore, reliance on a case-by-case comity approach in the
trial courts can only undermine predictability and uniformity for domestic litigants. The Court's unwillingness to provide concrete guidelines for
the lower courts will encourage parochialism and result-oriented deci-

sions. The unanswered questions regarding the Convention's supremacy
over state rules of civil procedure, coupled with varying standards of ju-

dicial sensitivity to foreign interests, will once again produce conflicting

lines of decisions in both the state and federal court systems.6 56
The Supreme Court's isolationist position might be more acceptable
654. As Justice Blackmun pointed out, the international interests implicated in transnational discovery disputes must be viewed in a broader context than just the immediate interests
of the parties to each case. Adrospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2567 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
655. Id. at 2560 n.3 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In fact, the
Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the United States, Inc. and the Product Liability
Advisory Council, Inc. urged that maintaining the status of the Hague Evidence Convention
was imperative:
Since many MVMA and PLAC member companies are potential defendants
abroad, the spectre of a world-wide "tit for tat" approach to increased "longarm"
jurisdiction followed by unbridled discovery orders calling for production overseas of
tons of documents, innumerable persons for deposition under foreign procedures and
thousands of burdensome interrogatory answers is certainly not welcome. Yet, that
threat is the potential end result when foreign sovereigns repeatedly see that American treaty commitments are easily bypassed via assertions of raw jurisdictional
power. For obvious reasons, Amici's American companies have a vital stake in seeing to it that the integrity of international treaties is upheld.
Brief for the Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the United States, Inc., Product
Liability Advisory Council, Inc., and Volkswagenwerk AG as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioners at 4, Adrospatiale (No. 85-1695).
656. In fact, the decisions that have emerged from the lower courts subsequent to Adrospatiale demonstate that the trial courts are emphasizing different aspects of the Supreme Court's
analysis, thus leading to different applications of the Convention. See Hudson v. Hermann
Pfauter GmbH & Co., 117 F.R.D. 33 (N.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding that under "tripartite analysis" outlined by Justice Blackmun, Hague Evidence Convention should be used first in present
case because it furthers national and international interests and will be as effective as Federal
Rules); Benton Graphics v. Uddeholm Corp., 118 F.R.D. 386 (D.N.J. 1987) (holding that
Convention procedures ineffective unless foreign party can demonstrate existence of specific
sovereign interests of Sweden which indicate Convention should be used); Sandsend Financial
Consultants, Ltd. v. Wood, 743 S.W.2d 364 (Tex. App. 1988) (holding that trial court determination that discovery should proceed under Texas state rules of civil procedure rather than
Hague Evidence Convention is proper).
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if the United States was still in a strong eonomic position relative to its
trading partners; however, the United States economy is rapidly changing. 5 7 In view of our increased dependence on foreign trade and investment, the Court's insular views are no longer tenable. The Hague
Evidence Convention is more important now than ever before.

The United States must acknowledge that participating in the international marketplace subjects domestic consumers to both the benefits

and burdens associated with those transactions. There are inherent obstacles associated with litigating transnational disputes that cannot be al-

leviated in all instances. The influx of foreign investment and goods is
now essential to the prosperity of the United States economy. Therefore,
our courts must begin to promote international legal cooperation by ex-

ercising restraint in the extraterritorial assertion of jurisdiction in transnational discovery disputes.
Lori A. Fields*

657. See Kissinger, PreparingNew US. Position to Meet the Next World Order,L.A. Times,
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